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Abstract
This thesis studies the value of corporate control and its effect on COr}lOrat.e decision
making. In particular the first chapter assunles that control is valualJle and analyzes
the decisIon of a firm to go public fronl a corporate control perspect.ive. A large,
possibly Inajority, shareholder increases the cOInpany's ability to extract Ilrivat.e lJell-
efits in an armslength transaction with a potential buyer. A dispersed ownershiI)
increases the ability to free ride on any verifiable ilnprovelnent. inlplelllent.e(l by t.he
buyer. The optimal combination between these two elelnents deterillines whet.her a.
c<Jrnpany should be private or public, as well as the insiders' ownershill in public
companies. The model provides a useful fraIllework to int.erl>ret a variet.y of different.
empirical facts .. It explains the equity carve-out pllenolllenon, it slleds SOllle new light.
on IPO underpricing, and it gives an alternative interpretation of the "going privat.e"
transactions.
The second chapter estinlates the value of control in Italy, l)y using f,lle prices of
differential voting shares quoted on the Milan Stock Exchange. The price difference
between voting and nonvoting shares is utilized to measure the value of vot.ing right.s
and to test a relationship betw~en the Inarket price of voting right.s all<1 the structure
of ownership. A theoretical model, based upon Shapley and Milnor's (1961) theory
of oceanic games, is compared with other measures of ownershilJ concentration. 1.'he
results suggest the existence of a positive relationship between ownership concentra-
tion and value of votes. The high level of voting prelniuln in Italy is at least. partially
explained by the magnitude of p.rivate benefits of control, estilllated to be about 30%
of the value of the underlying assets. The predictions of the lllodel are also corrol)o-
rated by a case study of an actual control contest involving a COlllpany with Illult.iple
classes of common stock.
The third chapter studies the value of voting rights in t.he J9808 in t.lle U.8. lly
using a new dataset of public companies that have two classes of COIlllllon st.ock
traded with differelltial voting rights, but sitnilar or identical dividen(I rigllts. Vot.ing
rights have generally a positive value and this value can l)e attributed to the expect.ed
differential payment in case of a control contest. An analysis of (Iual class COlllllany
acquisitions confirms this view. The relation between nlarket price of votillg right.s
and structure of ownership is egtablished empirically by using both sonle case studies
and a panel data analysis. A Ineasure of the distribution of ownershiJ> and a proxy
for the probability of a change in cont.rol ca.n expla.in 13% of t.he vB.riabilit.y in t.he
voting preluiuln. This regression provides also an estilllat.e of t.lle value of cont.rol:
about 2% of the value of a company. Controlling for the COlllpany size, t.he voting
prenlium is positively correlated to a nleasure of privat.e lJenefit.s of cont.rol, like t.he
top executive salary. On the contrary, the voting prellliull1 is llegatively correlat.ed
v/ith the fraction of superior voting sltares held by instit.ut.ional invest.ors.
The fourth chapter uses Italian data to test the tlleory of sllareholder response
to dual class exchange offers proposed by Ruback (1988). (~ontra.ry to Rouback's
conjecture, outside shareholders are not trapped in a coercive equililJriulll in which
they are induced to a suboptilIlal choice of inferior vot.ing shares by a coordination
failure. T~.e evidence st\ggests that the nlost likel)- equilibriuIll is tIle alternat.ive one
in which only a fraction of outside shareholders clloose tIle inferior vot,ing share and
the prices of the tVlO classes of stock after the exchange offer are eqllal.
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Introduction
In recent years a growing consensus among econonlists indicates that it is itllpossible
to understand the financial structure of a corporation without foc.using on t.he value
of control. Informational asymmetries alld incentive problems are certaiIlly present in
financial markets. However, if these ,vere the only problems, standard contrac.t.s could
easily take care of them, making irrelevant the capital structure and the ownership
structure of a corporation. By starting from these observations C4roflslIlan alld Ilart
(1986 and 1988), Hart and Moore (1990a, 1990b, 1991), Hart. (1991), Aghion all (1
Bolton (1992), and Harris alld Raviv (1988a, 1988b, 1989) focus the theoret.ical debat.e
in corporate finance on the importance of corporate control.
It is in ~his stream of literature that this thesis wants to bring its cont.ril}llt.ion,
both tlleoretical and empirical. TILe theoretical part is dedicated to explain one of
the most important and least studied questions in corporate finance: the choice of
whether to remain a private or to become a publicly traded COlllpany. ConsisteIltly
with the stated approach the driving force of the mod~l is the existence of a control
value, distinct from the value of the future dividend strealn. Tile value ('If cont.rol is
just assumed as parameter of the model. By contrast, the inlportant contribution of
the empirical part of this dissertation is to provide some actual estilnat.es of t.he value
of corporate control.
We observe public and private firms at almost all points in the size distribution
of firms. Although most private firms are small, we also see large privately-lleld
companies like Mars candy company and Bechtel. This fact alone 'woul<l be enougll
to reject the traditional wisdom that considers a firtn's decision to go ptlblic. as a
simple stage in the growth process of a corporation. However, additional evidence
against this naif view comes from the major wave of th.e leverage buyouts (LBO) and
reversed LBOs experienced by the U.8. economy in the 19808. The first chapter of
this dissertation presents a new theory of the going public decision based on the value
of corporate control.
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The idea. is that when an entrepreneur considers the possibility of goillg pulllie, he
knows that in the future a potential buyer will appear. The entrepreneur's wealt.h is
determined b)T the amount of surplus he can extract froln the buyer if the sale takes
place. The entrepreneur can change his amount of SllrpltlS by changing the prO!lOr-
tion of profit and control he retains. In particular, he can st.rat.egically exploit. t.he
small shareholders' ability to free ride on any ilnprovement of tlte COlnpany profit.a.lJil-
ity. Selling a minority stake in the COlllpany, let's say 20%, to outside sh"reholders,
before facirlg a negotiation with a potential buyer, t.he ent.repreneur 8ucceeds in ex-
tracting part of the buyer surplus through the sinall sllareholders. In addition, he
becolnes less willing to sell to the buyer at a later date, IJecause now lle lIas full cOllt.rol
of the company but he has a clailn on only 80% of tIle c.olllpany profits. By doing
so, the entrepreneur increases his share of surplus. The intuit.ion is fairly straigllt-
forward. Selling shares but retaining control makes the incunlbent lllore powerful in
any subsequent bargaining with potential buyers. As a result a two-stage sale of a
company, where the first sale is to outside shareholders (i.e. going public) 111ay be
more profitable th.an a direct sale.
In initial public offerings of small entrepreneurial firnls I expect tllat. also risk
aversion and the limited entrepreneurial wealth, explicitly left out of IllY II10(lel, Illay
play an important role. For this reason when I look at tIle eillpirical evi<lence I
restrict my attention to initial offerings of portions of a wholly-owned subsidiary of
a company that is already public (the so called equity carve-out). LiIllited wealth
or diversification needs are less of an issue if the owner of the COIllpany is anotller
company that is already public. Therefore, equity carve-outs are the ideal salllple to
f'tudy the decision to go public from tIle point of view of corporate cont.rol.
The model explains why carve-ollts increase the parent COlllpany value, why only
minority stakes are sold and why differential voting shares are so frequent.ly used
in these cases. The very high turnover in control (37%) experienced lly carved-ollt
subsidiaries confirms that an eventual sale is an inlpcrtant deterl11inant of carve-
outs and IPOs in generals. The larger return experienced by cOIllpanies that 801<1 a
subsidiary by carving it out first, confirlns the optinlality of a two-stage sale.
13
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IThe model is also applied to the reverse of an IPO: a "gOiIlg privat.e" t.rallsact.ioll.
By employing the saIne framework used to describe tIle decision to go public, I call
identify two different motivations for going private. A firlll lllay want t.o ret.llrn to
private ownership because it is worth nlOTe private than public. In suell cases t.he
decision to go public was a Inistake in the first place, or the type of potentia.! rival has
changed since the company ,vent public. Alternatively, a firln lllay (lecide to go privat.e
as an optimal step toward an optinlal insiders' ownership. If the iIlsiders' ownersllil)
is too low, then the firm may lose part of its value, because either insidera do not.
have the right incentives to sell, or they cannot prevent the rival frolll "stealing"
the company with a tender offer. Thus, it is profitable for insiders to lllove towards
tile optilllal ownership level. However, the optilllal way of reaclliIlg the optilllal level
of insiders' ownership is not the sinlple open nlarket purchase of SOllIe addit.ional
stock. In fact, in this way outside shareholders will enjoy for free the increase in t.he
value of the corporation's stock. On the contrary, by going private first., and t.hen
reverting back to public ownership (retaining the optilnal alnount of voting p01\Ter),
the incumbent management can internalize part of the capital gain pro<luced }Jy an
optimal insiders' ownership.
The first motive is more likely to apply to small companies, which went public in
a recent past. By contrast, the second motivation seenlS to fit best. the LBOs and
reversed LBOs of the 19805.
Chapter 2 studies the value of corporate control in Italy, by uSIng t.Ile prIces
of differential voting shares quoted on tIle Milan Stock Exchange. In the 11Iid 19808
nonvoting shares became a widely used instrument in Italy. More than Olle third of the
companies, representing more than half of the total capitalization of the MSE, issued
a nonvoting class of shares. Previous studies in other COllntries have already not.ice(l
that superior voting stock trades at a prelliiuln with respec.t to inferior voting stock
of the sanie company. The amazing feature of the Italian context is that on average
voting shares trade at a 80% premium with respect to their nonvoting count.erpart..
This premium exists despite nonvoting stock carries all the rigllts of the voting stock
(excepi the voting right) and has also some additional dividen(l rights. Ignoring the
14
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small additional dividend right, the price difference between. vot.ing arid nonvotillg
shares is equal to the value of a voting right. Therefore, the only vlay to explain
this price clifference is to explain why voting rights are so valuable. Voting rights
can be valuable only if they give access to some exclusive benefits not shared by
noncontrolling shareholders (private benefits of control). Sillall investors who daily
trade on the market will not probably have direct access to these private benefit.s, hut
they can cash their voting rights whenever a cOlnpetition for ('.ont.rol arises. 'I'herefore,
if the premium is determined l>y the value of the voting right t.here shOllltl lle ft
relationship between the prenliuffi attached to voting rights an(l t.lle structure of
ownership. This relationship is tested using both a tlleoret.ical lllodel, based tl!)on
Shapley and Milnor's (1961) theory of oceanic games, and other sinlple llle(\.Sllres of
ownership concentration. The results suggest tIle existence of a positive relatiollSlli}l
between ownership concentration and value of votes. The lligh level of voting prellliuJll
in Italy is at least partially explained by the magnitude of private benefits of cont.rol,
estimated to be about 30% of the value of the underlying assets. The pre(lictions of
the model are also corroborated by a case study of an actllal control cont.est. involving
a company with multiple classes of COlnlnon st.ock.
Chapter 3 conducts a sirnilar study in the U.S .. The exi5tenc,~ of a relat.ionshill
between prelnium attached to voting rights and ownersllip strllcture is cOIlfirllled. In
addition, six case studies of dual class cOlnpanies that experienced a slldden change in
the ownership distribution support the existence of such relationship. Vot.ing right.s
are Inore valuable when no party has absolute control of a corporatioll, alldwhen
more than one party have a significant voting stake.
In the U.8. dual class companies are more ra.re than in Italy (they were exclude(l
from the New York Stock Exchange until 1984), and not. all of tllelll have both classes
contemporaneously traded. Therefore, in contrast to the Italian dataset, the U.8. SRlll-
pie cannot be considered representative of the average Alnerican company. However,
it is possible to deduce from Grossman and Hart '8 (1988) nlodel that the COlllpa.nies
more likely to issue differential ,roting shares are those \vith larger private lJenefits of
. t
control. Therefore, it comes as a surprise that the estimated size of private benefi't.s
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in the U.8 is only 2% of the value of the COlnpany, versus the 30% estilllated in t.he
Italian sample. I conjecture that the cause of tllis discrepanc.y is a diverse legislat.ion.
American corporate law and especially practice is l11uch lllore attentive to abllse of
control power at the expenses of Ininority sharehol<lers.
Both Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 suggest that slLlall shareholders perceive the va.lue
of voting rights. Additional evidence in this sense is provided by Cllapt.er 4. 'I'his
chapter uses Italian data to test the theory of shareholder response t.o dllal cla.ss ex-
change offers proposed by Ruback (1988). A dual class exchange offer (DCEO) is
an offer to all the shareholders of a corporation to exchange shares of COllllllon st.ock
with superior voting rights for similar shares of the sallIe company, with inferior vot.ing
rights. Inferior voting shares are generally guaranteed a privilege, suell as lligher divi-
dends, to induce exchanging. Ruback conjectures that outside sIlareholders are likely
to face a prisoner's dilemnla. The dividend privilege indtlces out.side sharellolders t.o
give up their voting rights by exchanging. However, if out.side shareholders were able
to coordinate among themselves they would be better off not exchanging. In fact, lJy
exchanging outside shareholders will leave the lllajority of votes to insiders Rll(l lose
the premium of a potential takeover. Contrary to Ruback's conjecture, this chapt.er
shows that outside shareholders are not trapped in a coerc.ive equilibriulll in which
they are induced to a suboptilnal choice of inferior voting shares by a coordinat.ion
failure. The evidence suggests that the most likely equilibriulll is the alternat.ive one
in which only a fraction of outside shareholders choose the illferior voting sllare. The
fraction of voting shares retained is such that the lllarket value of one voting right. is
just equal to the value of the additional dividend attributed to nonvoting shares. Also
this finding confirms the vi~w tllat voting rights are valuable, even for snlall olltside
shareholders.
16
Referel1.CeS
AGHION, P. AND P. BOLTON 1992, "An Incolllplete Contract Approacll to Finall-
cial Contracting" Review of Economic Studies forthcollling.
GROSSMAN, S., HAR1',O. 1986, "The Cost and Bellefits of Ownersllip: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration" Journal of Political EC0110111Y August.
GROSSMAN,S. AND O. HART. 1988, "One Share-One Vote and the Market for (~or­
porate Control" Journal of Financial Economics 20: 175-202.
HARRIS, M., A. RAVIV 1988a, "Corporate Control Contests anel (~apital Structure"
Journal of Financial Economics 20: 55-86.
HARRIS,M., A. RAVIV 1988b, "Corporate Governance: Vot.ing Rights and Majority
Rules" Journal of Financial Eco71.omics 20: 203-235.
HARRIS, M., A. RAVIV 1989, "The Design of Securities" JOll.rn.al of Fi11a.ncia.l Eco-
nomics 24: 255-287.
HART,0. AND J. MOORE 1990, "Property Rights and Tl~.~ Nature of the Firlll"
Journal 0/ Political Economy December.
HART,0. AND J. MOORE 1991, "A Theory of Corporate Financ.ial Struct.ure Based
on the Seniority of Claims" mimeo MIT.
HART,0. 1991, "T~ 'ries of Optimal Capital Structure: A Prillcipal Agent Ap-
proach" mimeo MIT.
HART,O. AND J. MOORE 1991, "A Tlleory of Debt Based on the Inalienabilit.y of
Human Capital" mimeo MIT.
MILNOR, J. AND L. SHAPLEY 1961 "Values of Large Ganles II: Oceanic (~alnes",
reprinted in Mathematics of Operations Research, vol.3 n.4 (1978) p.290-307.
RUBACK R. S., 1988, "Coercive Dual Class Exchange Offers," Journal of Fin,an.cial
Economics 20: 153-173.
17
Chapter 1
Insider OWllership and the
Decision to Go Public
The choice of whether to remain a private or to beCOlne a Pllblicly traded COl11llany
is one of the most important and least studied questions in corporate finance. The
initial public offering (IPO) is frequently the largest equity issue a cOIporation ever
makes. Every year an average of one third of all the funds raised throngll COllllllon
equity issues is raised through IPOs. The IPO is also an important channel through
which the initial entrepreneur or the venture capitalist gets rewarded for his illitial
effort. Our understanding of the "going public" process is crit.ical to any at.t.el11pt 1lot.h
to increase equity financing and to stimulate entrepreneurial and vent.ure ca.pitalist
activities. The latter has been stated as an objective in the public policy debate on
capital gains tax.
Until the beginning of the 19808 the decision to go public could llRve »een con-
sidered a stage in the growth process of a corporation. This simple interpretation
cannot hold any longer. In the 19808 the U.S. experienced a major wave of going
private transactions among large and mature firms. The result was that, despite a
growing economy and a long bull market, in the 19808 the U.S. share in world Inarket
capitalization shrunk from 53.3% to 29.9%. Very little is known about why COlllpa-
nies choose to revert back to private ownership, and whetller this is a tell1porary or
a permanent situation. According to Kaplan (1991) these neo-private cOlnpanies are
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"neither short lived nor permanent." He estimates that only 50% of large leverage
buyouts return public within seven years after the LBO transaction. Furtilerillore,
7% of the companies in his sample went private again, after having returned to lJeing
public.
The only formal model of the choice of whether to be a public or a private firtll
that I am aware of is provided by Pagano (1985). He focuses 011 t.he ell trellreneu rs'
failure to internalize the positive externality produced by their decision to go pulJlie.
By floating his firm each entrepreneur increases the other entrepreneurs' diversifica.-
tion opportunities, but faces an individual floating cost. As a consequence, a Sillall
stock market may be trapped in a "bad" equilibrium, in which lilnit.ed diversification
opportunities discourage any single entrepreneur from list.ing his own firln and <liver-
sifying his portfolio. As a result the other entrepreneurs' diversification opportunities
are reduced even further.
The conventional wisdom suggests a simple trade-off between the costs and }Jelle-
fits of going public. On the cost side, there are the registration and underwriting costs
(on average 14% of the funds raised, according to Ritter 1987), the underpricing cost
(on average 15%, Ritter 1987), the annual disclosure costs and the well-known agency
problems (Jensen and Meckling 1976). On the benefit side, there are diversification,
the possibility of equity financing beyond the initial entreprelleur's lilllited wealth, a
less costly access to the capitalln.arket, an increased liquidity of the cOlllpany's shares
and some outside monitoring (Hollnstrom and Tirole 1990) ..
The above ingredients are certainly important to undersiandillg the pulllic vs.
private choice, but they do not provide the whole picture. First of all, Inost of
the costs are costs of moving to public oVlnership. Therefore, t.hese fact.ors a.re Illore
powerful in explaining a once-for-all switch from privat.e t.o public, rat.her t.ha.n a lJac.k··
and-forth movement. Traditional models can explain the discrete c.hoice to go pul,lic,
but they cannot explain the level of public ownership. One of the unique feat.ures
of this model is that it jointly determines whether a firlll should go public and how
much equity insiders should retain in a public firm. Secondly, with traditionallnodels
it is hard to explain why public companies may want to float their subsidiaries. On
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the contrary, this paper gives an answer to tllat question. Tllirdly, t.llere are stylize{l
facts that are difficult to interpret with a siluple trade-off story. Ritter (1984) report.s
that IPOs are more frequent in periods wIlen IPO underpricing is particularly severe,
that is to say that more firms go public when it is Illore costly to do so!!
The purpose of this paper is to model the private vs. public choice aloIlg tIle
corporate control dimension. I do not dismiss the fact that the other factors llleIltioned
above can influence
the choice to go public. However, I consider corporate control an illlportant an(l
previously unexplored aspect of the problenl. Furtherlnore, t.lle IIIO(}el will fOClIS on
the essence of the going public process, i.e., the (listrilJution of a cOlllpany's sha.res
among a large number of small outside investors.
I shall show how going public \vith a fraction of the COlllpany lllay enhance t.he
value of the remaining p.art, if control is a valuable asset, lllaking the init.ial en-
trepreneur better off. The intuition is fairly straightforward. Selling shares l)ut.
retaining control makes the incumbent nlore powerful in any subsequent. lJargain-
ing with potential buyers. Similar reasoning is advanced by tile Wa.ll /3treet JOtl.'''71.a.l
(3/22/1991) while commenting on the offerings of minority equity stakes of privat.e
firms by LBO fUIids:
By offeri1'1,9 only a slice of the ownership instea.d of 100% the /tI.nd 7110.71.-
agers keep the option of selling the rest of the cOl1tparty art a. Itigher price
sometime in the future, either to a corporate buyer or through a,dditio71a.l
public stock offerings.
The notion that a two-stage sale is more profitable than a uIlique sale contrasts wit.h
the basic notion that value is additive (i.e., two shares are worth twice as llluc.ll as Olle
share). The introduction of a control value allows me to derive the above lllent.ioned
effect in a fully rational setting.
Section 1.1 describes the models and the main assumptions. When an entrepreneur
considers the possibility of going public, he knows that in the future a potentiallJuyer
IThis is puzzling as long as I maintain the standard 8.5sunlption of a perfectly elastic deluand for
stocks. For evidence against it see Shleifer (1986).
20
will appear. The entrepreneur's wealth is deternlined by the alnount of surplus he
can extract from the buyer if the sale takes place. The entrepreneur can cha.nge
his amount of surplus by changing the proportion of profit. and control lle ret.ains.
In particular, he can strategically exploit tIle slllall shareholders' ability to free ride
on any improvement of the company profitability. Selling a. 111inority st.ake in t.he
conlpany, let's say 20%, to outside shareholders, before facing a negotiation wit.h a
potential buyer, the entrepreneur succeeds in extracting part of the buyer SllTl)l11S
through the small shareholders. In addition, he beconles less willing to sell to t.he
buyer at a later date, because now he has ft!ll control of the COlnpany but he ha.s a
claim on only 80% of the company profits. By doillg so, the ent.repreneur iIlcreases
his share of surplus. This mechanism is illustrated through two exaIllples at t.Ile end
of the section.
Section 1.2 analyzes formally the exalnples presented in sect.ion 1.1. TIle en-
trepreneur wants to increase as much as he can his share of surl>lus by elllploying
outside shareholders. However, if he chooses to retain a stake t.OO sIllall, he will lose
the incentive to sell control to a superior buyer later on. Tllis will decrease tIle value
of the compan~T and the wealth of the entrepreneur llilllseif. The solution of tile ini-
tial entrepreneur maximization problem deterlnines the opt.ilnal insider ownershil).
At the end of the section an example illustrates the robustness of t.lle eqtlililJriulll t.o
the possibilities of further sales by the incumbent after the IPO.
While I consider the value of control to be an important and previously llnexplore(l
determinant of the decision to go public, I do not dislniss others (diversificat.ion, liln-
ited entrepreneur's wealth and agency costs) that are inlportant too. In the Appendix,
I show that the previous results are substantially unchanged if I introduce diversifi-
cation gains, in the form of a tax on the equity stake retained by the eIltreprenetlr.
However, diversification gains destroy the robustness of the equilibriulll when tIle en-
trepreneur is allowed to sell additional shares a.fter the IPO. This nonrobust.ness is
inherent to models in which the insiders' ownership acts as a signal or as a COllllllit-
mente However, if the subsequent sales can only take place in discrete blocks, tllen I
show that the proposed equilibrium can exist, even in the presellce of retrading.
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Section 1.3 analyzes how the 111odel's predictions fit the st.ylized fact.s of the "going
public" process. I apply the framework of earlier sections t.o the init.ial offering of
portions of a wholly-owned subsidiary (the so called equity carve-out.), and to the IPO
underpricing puzzle. The model explains why carve-outs increase t.he parent COlllpany
value, why only minority stakes are sold and why different.ial voting shares are so
frequently used in tllese cases. The very high turnover in control (37%) experienced
by carved-out subsidiaries confirms that an eventual sale is an illlportallt deterillillallt
of carve-outs and IPOs in generals. The larger return experienced by cOlnpanies that.
sold a subsidiar)T by carving it out first, confirills the optilllality of a two-stage sale.
The Inodel sheds some new light on t.he IPO underpricillg puzzle, explail1iL~~ t.lle
supply ~Jide of the phenonlenon. The initial entrepreneur is illtereste(l llot just. ill
selling a portion of his firm, but in distributing this portion alllong slllall sllarellol(lers,
to use their ability to free ride. He is prepared to pay a price in terlllS of underpricing
to reach this goal.
In section 1.4 the model is also applied to the reverse of an IPO: a "gOiIlg priva.t.e"
transaction. By employing the same framework used t.o descril)e the decision to go
public, I can identify two different motivations for going privat.e. A firtll illay want t.o
return to private ownership because it is worth Inore privat.e than public. In such cases
the decision to go public was a mistake in the first place, or the type of pot.ent.ial rival
has changed since the company went public. These are 1110re likely firll1s witll a high
insiders' ownership, that face a rival very capable of dilut.ing t.he Illinorit.y proI>erty
right after a change in control. Alternatively, a firm luay dec.i(le to go private as
an optimal step toward an optimal insiders' oWllership. If the insiders' ownership
is too low, thel1 the firm may lose part of its value, because either insiders do not.
have the right incentives to sell, or they cannot prevent the rival frolll "st.ealing"
the company with a tender offer. Thus, it is profitable for insiders to lllove towar{ls
the optimal ownership level. However, the optimal way of reaching the Opt.illlal level
of insiders' ownership is not the sitnple open Inarket purchase of SOllle addit.ional
stock. In fact, in tIns way outside shareholders will enjoy for free the increase in
the value of the corporation's stock. On the contrary, by going private first, and
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then reverting back to public ownership (retaining the optilnal aInount of vot.ing
power), the incumbent managelnent can internalize part of the capital gain produced
by an optimal insiders' ownership. This type of publi..:-to-private t.ransactioll is lllore
likely to occur among companies with a diffused ownership, and to IJe challellge(l IJy
other bidders. Furthermore, t.his type of transRc.tion is expected to be reversed soon
aJterwards.
The concluding section summarizes the findings and S1.1ggests several directions
for future research.
1.1 The Model and Sonle Numerical Examples
I describe the model, the timing and the fundalnenta~ aSSUlllptions. After that, I
present two numerical examples that illustrate the intuitions of the lllodel. TIle gallle
is substantially different when the entrepreneur retains the nlajority of vot.es. Tilere-
fore, the first example shows the bargaining galne that. takes place in tIlis case, wllile
the second one describes the tender offer ganle t.hat takes ,lJlace when t.he inclllilbent
retains a minority stake.
1.1.1 The FraRle-work
An entrepreneur is the sole owner of a company. At tillle 0 he considers whetller t.o
go public or to remaiIl private. If he decides t.o go public he sho1.tld deterllline which
fraction 4> of the company he wants to retain afterwards. In the real world even st.art.-
up companies are rarely 100% owned by one individual. In Inost of the cases eitller a
venture capitalist or relatives and friends provide part of the initial equity financiIlg.
However, those initial investors are generally directly involved in the conlpany, sitting
on the board of directors and sharing managelnent responsibilities (and perquisites).
They are also generally protected by an implicit or explicit contract that prevellts one
party from selling his stake without ot~er parties' consent, bot.h before and after tile
IPO. Therefore, for the purpose of the lnodel these different OWllers can legitilnat.ely
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be considered as a single owner.2
There are two important facts that influence the owner's dec.isioll. TIle illcollle
produced by the company consists of an observable and verifiable COlllponent vi and
by an observable but nonverifiable cOInponent Bi, that, following the literatllre, I will
call private benefits. Whetl the incumbent sells shares to outsi{le shareholders, Ile can
only clailn to give them a fraction of the verifiable inCOlne the COllllla.ny will l)fOduc.e
in the future. Only the person who is in control of the COlllpany c.an enjoy Bi. At.
time 1, an individual or a corporation interested in buying t.he COIllpany arrives. This
potential buyer, "rival," has different valuations of the COlupany (v r and Br).3 To
make the problem interesting I will assume that the total valtlat.ion of the rival is
bigger than the total valuation of the inculllbent (i.e., Br + vr > Bi +vi ).4
3
comlany liquidat.ed
V==O
Product.ion t.akes place
2
comiany is sold f
or not
1
potnt!al buyer
conles In
o
Entlpo decides bli
whether to go pu c
Without loss of generality I assunle tllat no production activity takes place be-
tween date 0 and date 2, that the company is worthless after t.ime 3 and t.hat, t.he
(risk-free) illterest rate is zero. At time 2 the bargaining between the inCUlllbent. an<l
the rival takes place. Depending on the stake retained by the incunlbent tile bargain-
ing can take two forms. If the incUlnbent maintains the majority of the votes the
2There are other situations that a.re meant to be captured by this InodeI. One is the relat.ionship
between an LBO fund (like KKR) and previously acquired companies (like RJR Nabisco or IJurscell).
Another one is the relationship between a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiary. This
last case is different f!om the previous two because value ll18ximizing behavior by a single owner
is not a legitimate assumption if the parent company is a public cOlnpany with diffuse ownership.
To include this case I assume that the management of the public company is pushed towards value
maximization by a. disciplinary takeover threat.
3The possibility of a dilution of minority property rights is not explicitly nlodeled, but it is
subsumed in the difference of security and private benefits of the two parties.
4 A similar analysis caD be made for the case B' +v'" < Bi +vi • In this case the init,ial entrepreneur
wa.nts to structure the corporation so that the rival will never prevail. What makes the case less
interesting is tbat going public is never strictly better than remaining private.
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only way for the rival to prevail is to buyout the inculnbent. The price at whicll tlley
transact will be a weighted average of the two reservat.ion prices, where t.ll€ weight.
1/J E [0, 1] is supposed to capture the incumbenf.'s bargaining power. If the inCUIII1Jent
does not have tIle majority of the votes the rival can eit.her lnake a host.ile hiel for the
company or bargain directly with the incumbent. It is assulnecl that aft.er t.he IPO t.he
entrepreneur retains control of the company unless he releases it willingly to SOllleone
who buys his stake, or loses it in a control contest in which the ri,ral obtains lliore
than 50% of the votes. The rival's choice of the way to prevail will be deterIllinecl by
the relative cost of the two strategies.
The acquisition of control by buying shares froID outside shareholders requires a
formal tender offer. In the basic model only unrestricted and unconditional t.ellder
offers are allowed.5 In the tender offer subganle I aSSUllle that outside sllarellolders
are atomistic, i.e., they de- not perceive themselves as pivotal in the tender offer OUt.-
come. This is the context in which Grossman and Hart (1980) proved that outside
shareholders are able to free ride on the ilnprovelnent implemented l)y a rival. It. is
an extreme assumption that approximates the case of snlall individual shareholelers.6
This is consisteni with the fact that indivirlual investors are, by far, tIle Illost illl-
portant buyel's in IPOs.7 A recent study by Barclay and Holderness (1991) gives
empirical foundation to this assumption. They show that block trading followed IJy a
change in control produces a 22% market adjusted return in the followil1g year.s By
contrast, block trading that does not lead to a change in control produces a -6.6%
market adjusted return. This difference proves that is not the infofIllation release(l
by block trading, but the changes implemented by the new controlling sharellolder
that matter, and that outside shareholders capture a significant proportion of tllese
gains (or losses). Similarly, I assume that all the tender offers are lllade to sllcceed
5A tender offer is unrestricted when it is for 100% of the shares. It is unconditional if the price
offered does not depend on any event, in particular on the number of shares tendered.
aSee Holmstrom and NalebufF (1988).
7Weiss (1989) estimates tha.t in the first quarter after an IPO individua.ls own JDOre than 88% of
the shares offered. This compares with an average of 56% of all the equities outstsnding.
8This figure is obtained averaging the market adjusted return for the 41 conlpanies that were
eventually acquired (33.4%) and for the 45 companies that changed controlling shareholders, but
remained public (11.2%).
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with probability one.
In ord~r to focus only on the value of control, I aSSUllle that everybody is risk
neutral, that the two contestants are not liquidity constrained and that all of the
valuation parameters are common knowledge.
I also initially assume that the initial entrepreneur cannot diverge frOIll the one
share-one vote rule and is prevented by law from ilnposing super Inajority rules. At
the end of section 1.2.3 I will discuss how the results are Inodified if t.hese assulllpt.ions
are dropped.
1.1.2 ExaRlple 1: The Bargaining Game
This example illustrates the optimality of a two-stage sale. For notational Silllplicity
I assume that in the bargaining the two parties evenly split the surplus from t.ra<le
(i.e., the bargaining power of the incumbent is equal to 1/2).
The initial entrepreneur is able to produce $100 of verifiable incollle if he runs tile
company between periods 2 and 3. In doing that he can reap $40 in terlllS of llrivat.e
benefits. The potential buyer, who arrives at time 1, is able to produce $140 in t.er1115
of verifiable income, while extracting only $10 of private benefits. The ent.reprelleur's
total valuation of the company (Bi +vi) is equal to $140, while the potent.ial hilyer's
is $150. Therefore, there are $10 of potential gains {roln trade. If the ent.reprenellr
keeps the company private at time 0, the bargaining at t.ilDe 2 will be over the wllole
company.9 Given the stated assumptions on the bargaining process, at til11e 2 tIle
entrepreneur will sell the company at $145, i.e., his reservation price ($140) plus the
amount of gain from trade he is able to extract from the buyer ($! * 10).
Now assume that at time zero the entrepreneur sells 10% of the company to outside
investors. In this perfect foresight world, outside shareholders are prepared to pay
for 10% of the shares only 10% of the verifiable income produced by whoever will run
the company between times 2 and 3. Therefore, in order to COlnpute the proceeds
9This does not imply tha.t the buyer needs to buy 100% of the company, but that the entrepreneur,
owning all the COmp8t1y, takes into account the value of 100% of the sha.res in the bargaining at tinle
2. Given the symmetry in information it is irrelevant if the rival pays the incunlbent in cash or in
company stock.
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of the IPO I should determine first who will prevail at tillle 2. Note that it is llot
guaranteed that the rival will prevail at time 2. In fact, the ent.repreneur arrives at.
time 2 with the entire control value but only 90% of t.he securit.y value. Tllerefore, a
transaction can take place only if the inculnbent valuation of llis stake (not that of
the entire company) is less than or equal to the buyer valuation for tllat st.ake, i.e.,
Bi+4>vi S Br +4>vr, where </> is the stake retained by t.he entreprellellr. This condit.ion
is satisfied for rp == 0.9. In fact, the seller reservation price for the 90% stake is $130,
while the buyer's one is $136. The potential gains froln trade is $6 The entrepreneur,
selling the majority stake at t==2, gets his reservation value plus one half of the trade
surplus. Tllis adds up to $133. Given that he still has an incentive to sell at t.illle
2, the outside investors will value their shares according to the rival's cash flow, i.e"
$0.1 * 140 == $14. Therefore, the total proceeds of the sale a.re $147, strictly lllore
than the $145 he would have obtained maintaining the firIn private.
Incumbent Buyer
Valuation Valuation
Incumbent wealth
if 4> == 1
InCUlnbent wealtll
if cP == 0.9
InCUlllbenf. wealth
if cP == 0.7.5
Bi = 40
vi = 100
145 147 150
I
Table 1.1: Exalnple 1
A two-stage sale allows the incumbent to extract nlore surplus froIll the buyer.
Through the IPO the initial owner cashes out a portion of tile trade surplus, without
having to share it in tIle bargaining. At time 2 the two parties will IJargaill over
the remaining surplus, and the entrepreneur will get a const.ant fraction of it (in
this case 1/2). Therefore, by selling in the IPO the inculllbenf. profits through usillg
strategically the outside shareholders' ability to free ride on the rival illlprovelllent.s.
Slnall outside shareholders cannot be brought into the bargaining gallIC because they
are dispersed, and they have no incentives to enter it because they can free ride.
The IPO credibly cOlnmits the entrepreneur to excJ.ude a fraction of the COlllpany
profits from his valuation. In this sense insiders' ownership, even if it is sllread
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among different people, differs from outsiders' ownership. Even if insiders (lid not
bind themselves to a joint sale, the entrepreneur cannot obt.ain a bett.er price l)y
claiming that he is not linked to them in any wa:y, because llis clailll wOllld not be
credible.
The natural subsequellt question raised by this model is whether tIle proposed
insider's ownership is an optimal stake for the entrepreneur to retain at titlle zero.
This question will be properly answered in section 1.2. However, I present llere the
intuition of why this is not the case. If the inc.umbent sells € lllore shares at. date zero,
then his reservation value is
(0.9 - e) 100 +40 == 130 - 100 €,
and the buyer's reservation value is
(0.9 - €) 140 + 10 == 136 - 140 f.
The gain from trade is $(6 - 40 e). Therefore, the incumbent receives
1
130 - 100 f + '2(6 - 40 f) = 133 - 120 f
(1.1 )
(1.2)
(1.3 )
dollars from the sale of his 90% stake at tilne 2. The proceeds fronl t.he IPO are
$(14 + 140 e). Therefore, the total proceeds of the entrepreneur are $(147 + 20f),
ITtore than the $147 obtained selling only 10% at time zero.
This trick is not endless. The entrepreneur can at most extract all of the surplus
froln the rival. In this numerical example the buyer reservat.ion value for the whole
company is $150. Therefore, the entrepreneur succeeds in extracting the entire surplus
by selling 25% of the shares in the IPO. In fact, ¢J = 0.75 solves the equation Bi+ ePV i ==
B" +4wr • Selling 25% first and 75% at time 2, the entrepreneur obtains $150. At the
same time a stake equal to 75% is the minimum stake retained by the entrepreneur
that still gives him the incentive to sell at time t=2. If the entrepreneur sells a larger
fraction at date zero, his valuation for that stake becomes larger than that of the
rival, so no trade can take place at tinle 2. Expecting that, outside investors are not
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prepared to pay more than vi per share (becallse they know that the entrepreneur
will manage the compa.ny). This implies that if the entrepreneur sells 1110re than 25%
of the shares in an IPO his totOol wealth (value of the C.Olll.lJany plus proceeds CrOll1
the sale) drops to $140, i.e., B i +vi.
1.1.3 Example 2: The Tender Offer Galne
This exa.mple shows the different nature of the ganle when tile inCUlll»ent ret.ains
a minority stake. Moving from a stake of 50% to one of (50 - €)% the inc.\llllbent.
loses the ability to extract part of the buyer private benefits. When t.he inCUlllbent.
does nut retain a majority control the buyer lIas the option to overconle 111111 tllrough
a tender offer to outside shareholders. Outside shareholders are a powerful device
for extracting security benefits from a buyer (because they can free ride), hut. t.hey
are very poor in. bargaining over private benefits, because out.side shareholders <10
not directly value them.10 This aspect modifies the result obtained in the previous
example. The choice of a stake that equates the incumbent valuat.ion wit.}} the rival
valuation, i.e., solves Bi + <jJv i = Br + 4>vr, is not optilllal if the solution falls in t.he
[0,0.5) range.
In order to show this I will slightly modify the previous exanlple. The valuat,ioIl
parameters of the incumbent are the same, so is the total rival valuation. TIle only
change is tllat his verifiable income component is now $115 and his private IJenefit.s
are $35. Here the stake that equates the incumbent vaillation with the rival valuation,
is 33j%. Assume that the entrepreneur retains just that stake.
In this case the rival can get control by buying out the incunlbent or by luaking a
tender offer to outside shareholders. The rival can lllake an unconditional tender offer
just above Bi +vi, i.e., $140, for all the shares of the cOlnpany. In the next sect.ion I
will prov(~ that this is the rival's optimal stra~egy. The incl1111bent cannot resist such
lOOutside shareholders are small and dispersed. They will never succeed in taking over the COIU-
pany and enjoying the private benefits. However, they can value them if there is more than one
potential rival. In ract~ if there is perfect competition in the market for control it does not lna.tter
who will face the rival. However, given the existence of private benefits of control the IDarket will
hardly be competitive. The paper takes the other extreine in which there is only one rival. The
effect will remain, although weaker, with many rivals.
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Incumbent Buyer
Valuation Va1\lation
Incumbent wealth
if <P = !
InClll111Jent wealt.h
if c/J = 0.5
131~3 148.75
Table 1.2: Exalnple 2
a strategy with a counteroffer, because the whole company is worth only $140 t.o hinl.
Outside shareholders will tender anyway (because they recei\re $140 per share tllore
than the $115 they will otherwise receive). With a 33~% stake the inrqtllbent is not.
decisive, so he prefers to tender for the same reason. Therefore, the rival can get. t.he
company by paying slightly above $140. However, given that he has this opt.ion, he
can do even better.
The tender offer option modifies both the inculnbent and the buyer reservation
value in the bargaining. In a tender offer the incUlnbent receives $46~ (i.e., 333% of
the price paid for all the company, that is $140). Therefore, his outside reservat.ion
in the bargaining has dropped from $733 (Bi +<pvi) to $ 46j. The buyer reservation
value changes too. He is able to buy the company with a tender offer at $140. By
buying the whole company with a tender offer the rival gets a utility of $10, i.e.,
his valuation of the company ($150) less the price paid ($140). Therefore, in direct
bargaining with the incumbent he is prepared to pay up to a price P t.llat. lllakes hilll
indifferent between buying directly or nlaking a tender offer, i ..e.,
1 1
10 = 35 +- * 115 - - * P.3 3 (1.4)
The I.h.s. is the utility from the tender offer. The r.h.a. is the utility frolll buyillg
the 33l% stake from the incumbent. This is given by the private benefits obtained
controlling the company ($35) plus the security benefits to which is entitled the stake
purchased ($i * 115) minus the cost of that stake (l * Pl. This equation yield" a per
share price P equal to $190. In this case, the buyer is ready to pay an extra prellliulll
to the incumbent provided he relinquishes control in a friendly lllanller. TJlis ext.ra
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prelniunl is not an additional extraction of surplus. TIle rival ,viII still pay $140 ($190
for 33i% of the shares and his security benefits, $115, for t.he relnaining t.wo t.hirds).
Therefore, the extra premium is not extracted froln the buyer but. subt.racted frOlll
outside shareholders.
The premium subtracted frolll outside shareholders is equal t.o $~( 140 - 115) ==
$16~. Given the assumption of equal bargaining power, the two pa.rt.ies will split. t.his
gain evenly, so the incumbent will receive $i * 140 -1- ~16~ == $.55 for his 33~% st.ake.
The proceeds of the IPO are $~*115 = $76~. Therefore, the total revenues for tIle
incumbent are $131j. This is less than what he could llave obtained nlaintaining the
firm private ($145) or retaining just 50% of the shares ($148.75).
Note that at tilne 2 there is always rOOl1l for an agreelIlent between the inCUJll}Jent
and the rival, which avoids a tender offer. The incUlnbent receives a prellliuln on his
shares and the rival saves part of the premium he should have
paid to outside shareholders. However, the real loser is tIle entrepreneur llilllself,
who, at time zero, cannot sell shares above $115 (the rival's security IJenefits). The
important point is that at the time of the IPO the entrepreneur cannot credibly COlll-
mit he will refuse a direct transaction witll the rival at tilne 2. TIle absence of a
commitment technology is very costly for the entrepreneur when he wants to retain a
minority of shares. His wealth drops from $140 (total proceeds under COllllllif,11lent.)
to $131i (total proceeds in the absence of a commitment). In fact, if the ent.repreneur
could credibly commit to refuse a direct transaction at time 2, then outside share-
holders would also receive $140 per sllare. Therefore, even if he retained a Illinority
position, the entrepreneur could sell his shares in the IPO for $140 inst,ead of $115. 11
The existence of a commitment technology, thus, can only reduce the value loss of
going below 50%, but cannot eliminate it. In fact, with all insider stake below 50%
the incumbent can never extract any private benefit frOin the raider. Tllis loss of
bargaining power if the company is not lllajority controlled can explain the pressure
for antitakeover amendments and differential voting shares (I return to this issue in
11In this case takeover legisla.tion can play an importa.nt role. A rule that mandates a buyback of
all the outstanding shares after any change in control, even if privately negotia.ted, will provide this
commitment technology.
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section 1.2.3). In the example the optimal ownership level under one share-one vot.e
is 50%. In general, whenever the total value of the firlIl for the illC\llllbent. is larger
than the rival's security benefits (Bi + vi > v r ), the optil11al insi(lers' ownership is
greater than or equal to 50%. By contrast, when this condition is not. lllet, it. lllfty
be optilnal for the incumbent to relinquish control. The intuitioll is that when the
security benefits are the most important conlponents of the rival's valuation, t.hen
outside shareholders are the nlost powerful device to extract tilelll. III a world wit.h
no private benefits, in which the initial entrepreneur faces the possil}ility that. a tllOre
efficient Inanagement tealn will arrive, the optililal ownership st.ruct.ure is a dispersed
one. In such a situation a superior rival will just walk inside tile COIIlpany an<l start
to tnanage it. In this case olltside shareholders will be able t.o enjoy the wllole sUf}llus
of the improved management. All of these cases are reviewe(l forlllally in the next.
section.
1.2 The General Solution
The nature of the game is substantially different depending on whether t.he inculllbent
retains control or llot, as I have shown in the numerical exaluples. Therefore, ill t.he
following analysis I will look separately at the optilllal insider ownership when it is
constrained to be greater than or equal to 50%, and when it is constrained t,o be
less than that. Thereafter, I will compare the maxinlR in tIle t\VO regions. This is a
legitimate procedure only if there is a maximulll in both regions.
The only problem arises at 50%, where the value of the firlll can be discont.inuous.
The situation in which both parties have 50% of the votes has not yet been specifie{l.
I assume that in this situation the inculllbent will prevail (let '8 say that in the case
of a tie the chairlnan's vote counts for two). Then the interval [0.5,1] turns out to l)e
compact. In some cases a maximum does not exist in the [0,0.5) interval. However,
I can perform the comparison with the upper limit, and a maxilllunl in the wllole
region always exists.
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1.2.1 Case in 'Which lIlajority is retained
This section analyzes the optinlal majority insiders' ownership, i.e., t.he 01>t.iJllal c,hoice
of cP in the [0.5,1] interval. Under the 111aintaineel assulllpt.ion t.hat. B i +1,i < Br +t,r,
the first best implies a tra,nsfer of control of the COlllpany frotll the ent.rellreneur t.o
the rival at time 2. Therefore, the entrepreneur, wllO at tittle zero internalizes all
costs and benefits of his choice, wants to COll111lit hilIlself to sell the cotllpany a.t. elat.e
2. In the absence of a conlmitment technology, t.he incUtllbent can Otlly lllaint.ain a.
stake sufficiently large that he has the incentive to sell at (late 2. This is eXllressed
by the following constraint:
(1.5 )
This constraint guarantees that at tilDe 2 the rival's valuation of t.he incuillbenf.'s
stake is bigger than or equal to the incumbent's valuation of that stake.
The entrepreneur objective function is maximizing his total wealth. This is
equivalent to maximizing the value of the firm at time zero. The total value of
the firm at time zero is given by the proceeds froln tIle IPO (( 1 - ¢>)vr ) and l)y
the price for the control block that the incumbent succeeds to obtain at tittle 2
((1 - 1/J )[Bi + tf>v i ] + ~,[Br + lj>vr)). Therefore, the entrepreneur objective funct.ion
is
s.t. {1.5).12
Result 1 If the incumbent is more efficient than the rival (vi > t,r ), then the com,pa.71.y
is worth more private (</> = 1). The mazimum value of the company is (1 -1f' )[Bi +
vi] +1jJ[Br + vr].
12More formally the value of the firm is equal to expression () .6) for Bi + <pvi S Br +q,vr , and
Bt + vi otherwise. In fact, if constraint (1.5) is violated, then the company will never be sold to the
rival. Noting that for tP = 1 expression (1.6) is bigger than or equal to Bi + vi, I caD restrict my
search for the maximum in the area in which constraint (1.5) is satisfied.
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Proof: ~~ = (1-.y,)(v i -vl') > o. Therefore, ¢ = 1 (private company) is optimal.
In this case outsiders' ability to free ride is not only useless btlt ha,flllftil. Out.siders
risk being trapped with a less efficient (in terlns of verifiable incoll1e) rival. It is bet.t.er
that the incumbent arrives at the bargain considering the verifiable inCOllle of all t.he
shares, because this reduces the bargaining power of t.he rival.
Result 2 If the incumbent is less efficient than the riva.l (t,i < v r ) and !la.s snt(l.llc1~
private benefits (Bi ~ Br ), then tile compa.ny is worth 1110re pttblic a,fl,d th,e opti711al
mGjority insider ownership is 0.5. The mazinlum value of the conlpa71Y is (l-l,b)[Bi+
O.5v i ] + 1JJlBr +O.5vr]+ O.5vr.
Proof: ~~ = (1 - ¢)(vi - v") < o. The condition Bi :::; BI' assures that the
constraint is never binding, therefore the optimal <P is the slnallest feasible (i.e., 0.5).
In this case the incoming rival is so superior that the probleln of COllllllitting to
sell does not arise. The optimal strategy is maxilllizing the surplus extraction using
outside shareholders as much as possible in this region (selling 50%). Later on, I will
show that this is the situation in which the introdltction of differential voting shares
is optimal.
Result 3 If the incumbent is less efficient than the rival (vi < 1,r) btlt h,as lar.qer
private benefits (E i > Br ), then the company is worth more ptlblic a.1~d the opti711a.l
majority insider ownership is equal to max {0.5, ~~-:::.~.r}. The maximum value of the
company is min{Br + vr, (1 _1/J)[Bi +O.5v i ] + .,pIBr +O.5vr]+O.5vr}.
Proof: ~~ = (1 - .y,)(vi - v") < O. If the constraint is not binding then ¢ = 0.5
as before. If the constraint is binding the optimal 4> is the solution of the equation
Bi +¢Vi = BI' +¢VI', i.e., ¢ = ~~:~t.
This is the intermediate case. The desire to extract nlore surplus frolll tIle rival
pushes the entrepreneur to sell a larger fraction of the company at time o. However,
he should maintain the desire to sell once he arrives at tittle 2. This induces hill}
to stop at the equity ownership that makes him just indifferent to sell or to retaill
control at time 2.
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1.2.2 Case in "Which lIlajority is not retained
When the initial entrepreneur retains less than 50% of the shares, tllell the lJargaining
process at time 2 is completely different. In this case, the rival can choose between a
direct purchase of the minority stake and a ten(ler offer to outsi<le sharehol<lers. If he
chooses to make a tender offer to outside shareholders he will choose the least. cost.ly
bid such that the incumbent does not have a feasible CO\lnt.er offer. To resolve t.he
entrepreneur optimizing problem at time zero, I should resolve tile tender offer an<l
the bargaining s'..:bgame first.
First of all, let's consider what the rival cost. of prevailing through a. t.ender offer
18. In the basic model only unrestricted and unconditional t.ender offers are allowed.
The incumbent is prepared to pay up to Bi + vi for all of t.he shares. The opt.inlal
rival's bidding strategy is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If only unrestricted and uncondiiional tender offers are a.llou1ed, then
the least costly way for a rival to prevail is tender' offer at 111a.x{Bi + vi, 1,r}.
Proof: The buyer should outbid any feasible incumbent's counteroffer and at the
same time !nduce outside shareholders to tender.~
If Bi +vi > v r , then the binding constraint is given by the inculllbent reaction. A
similar offer at any lower price will trigger a counter bid by the inculllbent. This is
obvious given that the proposed strategy is an offer tilat just equals the inculllben.t,
reservation price for the company. At tllis price outside shareholders want t.o tender,
otherwise they get v r < B i + vi. The incumbent is forced to tender too. In fact, he
does not have a feasible incremental bid (he cannot bid nlore than Bi + 1,i fDr all of
the shares). Given that he cannot resist he is better off tendering, because outside
shareholders will give the majority to the rival anyway. If he tenders he will receive
c/>(Bi +vi) for his stake, which is bigger than the ¢v r he will receive by keeping his
stake.
If Bi +vi ~ V,. , then the binding constraint is given by outside shareholders. If he
offers less than v", outside shareholders will never tender, because by not tendering
they will receive v". So v,. is the minimum price to induce outside shareholders to
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tender. This price ~~ above the incumbent. reservation value, so tltis has no feasilJle
counterbid. So vr is the minimum winning bid.
o
Let's first consider the case in which the incull1bent total valttation is })igger t,han
the rival security benefits, i.e., Bi +vi 2 v r • 1'he solntion of tIle tencler offer Sli~Jgallle
is: the rival offers Bi + vi for the whole cotnpany and every})ocly t.enders. 1'his
solt\tion directly affects the bargaining power of the two cont.enders in rase of R. clirert.
negotiS\tion. The incumbent knows that he can get at 11108t 4J( Bi + t,i) for Ilis st,akf',
if he enters a control contest with the potelltial buyer. However, at. t.inle 2 it is not. in
the interest either of the buyer or of the seller t.o ent.er a cOllt.rol cont,t'st.. The l)uyer
has to pay a premium to all shareholders. He is willing to pa.y an ext.ra prellliulll
to the incumbent, if this relinquishes control in a friendly 111anner (saving llilll tIle
prelnium to outside shareholders). When he buys the entire conlpany witlt a tender
offer, the rival gets a utility equal to Br + vr - Bi - t,i dollars, i.e., his valuatioll of
the company less the price paid to acquire it. Therefore, in all arlnslellgt.h l)argaining
with the incumbent he is prepared to pay up to a price P that tllakes hilll inclifferent.
between buying directly or making a tender offer, i.e.,
(1.7)
The I.h.s. is the utility from the tender offer. The r.h.s. is tIle utility frolll buying a
tP stake from the incumbent. Therefore, the buyer is prepared to pay up to
Bi +vi - (1- c/»vr
p =----------
4>
(1.8)
per share, to avoid a control contest.
The two parties will split the surplus deriving from a direct agreelnent according
to their bargaining power (1/J and (1 - 1/J)). The surplus is given by the difference in
the two reservation prices times the quantity traded:
(1.9)
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Therefore, the incumbent's proceeds from the sale at tilDe 2 will IJe
(1.10)
The proceeds from the IPO are still (1 - ¢» v r • In this case the ent.repreneur
maximizes:
Result 4 If the rival security benefits are less than the in.ctt711beni total t7aluatio71,
(v" < Bi + vi) then the company is worth more private tll,an, public.. 171. the in,lerva.l
[0,0.5) the optimal insider's ownership does not ezist. The upper lin1.it of the value of
the company is below the mazimum value of th.e conlpany ifl. the intert7al [0.5,1J.
Proof: From equation (1.11) it is easy to verify that V is strictly increasing in <p;
therefore the closer 4> is to 0.5 the better, but 0.5 does not belong to the interval. The
value of the company at time 0 is equal to the total price paid by the rival at tillle
2. If the rival has the option of a tender offer he will never pay nlore than Bi +vi.
This is the upper bound of the value of the company in the [0,0.5) interval, and this
is less than or equal to the maximum value of the company in the illterval [0.5,1].
o
In this case selling more than 50% of the shares is clearly a dOlninated alternative.
On the contrary, when the rival dominates the incumbent only with tIle verifiable
income he is able to produce, then the value of the company is indepeIldent of the
insider stake.
Result 5 If the rival security benefits are bigger than the incumbent total valuation
of the company (vr > Bi +vi), tl"en the company value is independent of the mi710rity
insider ownership. The value althe company is v r , for any value of <P E [0,0.5).
Proof: The incumbent will never accept a price below v,. because when he refuses
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he will get v,. for sure. In fact, the rival still has incentive to buy the COlllpany frOll1
outside shareholders, and this is feasible if he offers v r per sllare. So by refusing t.he
incl1nlbent gets v,. anyway. There is not rOOlI1 for d. (lirect agreelllent between t.he
rival and the incumbent at the expense of outside shareholders. In fact, the rival has
to pay outside shareholders v,. anyway (because they free ride), therefore he is !lot,
prepared to pay any extra premium to the incUlnbent.
o
The inculnbent knows that outside shar~holt.lerscan free ride on t.he rival itnl}rov~­
ment in verifiable income. He also knows that, if the rival has nonnegative llrivat.e
benefits, he can buy the company even if he has to pay it v r • l'}lerefore, a lilinorit.y
incumbent can rationally reject any offer for his stake below v T , because he knows
that he will get v,. for sure.
Under the assumption that tIle rival values the company more than the incunlbent
(Bi + vi < Br +v r), the condition that the rival seCllrity benefits are bigger tJlan the
incumbent total valuation of the company (v r ~ B i +vi) is autolnatically satisfied
whenever the rival private benefits are nil (Br = 0). Therefore, when a raider has 110
private benefits, then tender offers may take place in equilibriulll, and they are tIle
most efficient Inechanism for allocating control.
Result 4 indicates that when the rival security benefits are less than the inculllbent
total valuation (vr < B i -t- vi), then the optimal insiders ownership, in the whole
interval [0,1), is a majority stakeo The size of this nlajority stake is deterlJlined
according to Results 1-3. On the contrary, when v r ~ Bi + vi the global nlaxilllUlll
is not so straightforward.
In this case there are two opposite forces at work: on the one hand the rival
security benefits are so high that outside shareholders beCOUle the most powerflll
instruments for extracting surplus from the rival, so the inCUlnbent would like t.o
increase their presence in the company; on the other hand, giving up control prevents
the extraction of the rival private benefits. If the rival han no private benefits at all,
then the problem can be easily solved: the entrepreneur sells the entire conlpany t.o
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outside shareholders. If B" is positive, then the power of the two extractiorl de·,ic.es
should he compared.
The comparison needs to be done when v r 2:: B i + vi; tllis iillplies v r 2 vi.
Therefore, the maximum value of the company is given by Results 2 and 3. Note
that if constraint (1.5) (given by the buyer's valuation) is binding, then t.he lllajorit.y
ownership extracts all of the buyer surplus. This ilnplies that a n:linorit.y st.ake CRllnot
do strictly better than a majority one. Therefore, the comparison is relevant wilen
constraint (1.5) is not binding. In this case the nlaximunl value of the cOlllpany ill
the [0.5,1] interval is {I - .,p )[Bi +O.5v i ] +.,p[Br +O.5vr]+O.5vr (see Result 2). In tile
[0,0.5) interval the company value is v".
Therefore, comparing the two values yields tllat a minority ownership is IJetter if
(1.12)
This is equal to
(1.13 )
In the case in which the incumbent bargaining power is zero ('l/J = 0), ret.ailling
majority is optimal if O.5v" < Bi + O.5v i , or O.5(v r - vi) < B i • This result is very
intuitive. By selling half of the corporation to outside shareholders, while retaining
control, the entrepreneur can receive all of his private benefits, while extracting half
of the security benefits from the rival through outside shareholders. A <lispersed
ownership permits to extract all the rival surplus deriving froln security benefits
(v" - vi), but no private benefits. Therefore, a dispersed ownership strtlcture is
preferred to a concentrated one, when the value of the additional surplus extracted
let.ting outside shareholders free ride, O.5(vr - vi), is bigger than the size of the
incumbent private benefits, Bi. In fact, if the incumbent loses the majority of the
votes on the one hand he loses the possibility of requiring the full value of his privat.e
benefits to the rival, on the other hand he can better extract the rival's security
benefits through dispersed shareholders. The above inequality guarantees that the
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overall effect is positive. For future reference the above results are SUllllllarized in tIle
following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the rival security benefits are less titan the ill,curn.bent tota.l va.ltt-
ation of the company (vr < Bi + vi), then the optimal in.sider ownership is a.ltL1ays
greater than or equal to 50%, and is determined according to Results 1-3.
If the rival security benefits are bigger than the incumbent total valt/.a.tion of th.e
company (vr ~ Bi +vi), but O.5vr < [Bi +O.5v i ] +VJ[Br - Bi + O.5(t,r - vi)] then. the
optimal insider ownership is still determined according to Resttlts 2 and 3.
If the rival security benefits are bigger than, the incttn1.benf total valuation. of the
company (vr > Bi + vi), and O.5vr > [Bi + O.5t,i] + 1J'[Br - Bi +O.5(1,r - 1,i)), theni
the optimal insider ownership is any value below 50%.
Whenever the optimal level of insiders' ownership is below 50% the theory does .
not indicate any particula.r level. In practice, the level chosen by the incumbent \\Till
depend upon the minimum level that guarantees working control to the incunlbent
until the rival takes over. In fact, if the incumbent's private benefits are positive
(Bi > 0), then the incumbent wants to continue managing until the rival a.rrives.
At the same time, when the rival comes, the inculnbent wants to let the otltside
shareholders determine the allocation of control. For this reason the irlcuillbent '8
minority position should not be too large, in order to leave roonl for a t.ender offer by
the rival.
1.2.3 Dual Class Stock and SuperlDajority Rules
If Br is strictly positive, but the incumbent does not succeed in extracting all of the
rival surplus, then the introduction of dual class stock is beneficial to hilD. (~onsider
the difference between Exa.mple 1 and Example 2. In the first case the inculnbent
succeeds in extracting all of the buyer's surplus, in the second not. This difference
derives from the different combination of private alld security benefits in the buyer's
surplus. In both cases the incumbent wants to arrive at thebargaiiling at tillle 2
having alread.y sold all of the surplus and retaining a Rtake for which he has the same
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valuation as the rival. However, if this stake is below 50% t.he inculllbent loses tile
mOllopoly on control. The incumbent would be better off if he could llrecillde t.he
tender offer option to the buyer, even retaining less than 50% of the shares. SUPllose
that at tillie zero he introduces the rule tllat a buyer sllould either be al>llfoved l>y t.he
board of directors, or be voted in by 80% of the shareholders. In tllis case an insi(ler
retaining a 33% stake will block any nonfriendly acquisition. This device allows llitn
to extract all of the surplus even in situations like EXRIDple 2.13 The sallle result.
could be reached using dual class stock. For exanlple, if he sells 50% of t.he vot.ing
stock and 12% of nonvoting stock jn the IPO the incunlbent will be able t.o retain tIle
majority of the vot~s with just 33% of the security benefits.
The idea is that outside shareholders are better in ~xtracting security benefit~,
but a majority insider is tougher in bargaining over a private benefits intensive stake.
With supermajorit)T rule or dual class stock the entrepreneur has the best of bot.ll
worlds: outside shareholders can be used to free ride on the btlyer sec.urity benefits
and, at the same time, the retention of control allows direct bargaining over privat.e
benefits. This confirms the Grossman and Hart (1988) intuition that. deviation frol11
one share-one vote can be optimal when both contenders have privat.e benefits. On
the contrary, if Br = 0, the introduction of dual class shares is useless. In this case
dispersed shareholders are the best mechanism to extract the rival surpills, and a
majority control may be harmful.
One might wonder what is the maxinlum amo~nt of surplus that the inculllbent
can extract from the rival. By using differential voting shares an incunlbent can
extract all of the rival's surplus deriving from a superior managerial ability (i.e., his
superior security benefits). Besides extracting all of the rival security benefits, tIle
incumbent can extract an amount of private benefits equal to his own privat.e benefit.s
(for simplicity here it is assumed that the incumbent bargaining power is eql1al to
zero). The intuition is very simple. Suppose there is just one share with all the
voting power and no security benefits, and all the other sllares are nonvoting. Then
laThis is the case of the ATT takeover of NCR. NCR had this type of supermajority rule and
succeeded in raising the ATT offer from $90 to SilO per share.
41
the nonvoting shares sold to outside sllareholders are able to extract all of the rival's
surplus deriving from security benefits (v r - vi). In bargaining with t.he rival over't.lle
voting control the incumbent can obtain ~'Bi+(1- 7/' )Br. So if 1/.' == 0 the incuIllbent.
can at most get B i • Therefore, the difference between Br and B i , if positive, c,all
never be extracted by the incumbent.
However, the initial entrepreneur can always extract all the rival's surpltls by
introducing a sort of poison pill. For example, in the situation mentioned above tIle
initial entrepreneur can also extract the surplus Br - B i by writ.ing in the corporate
charter that if a change in control will take place a SUIIl equal to Br - B i per share
(remember that the total number of shares has been norillalized t.o one) slloul(} l)e
paid to outside shareholders. This contract is identical to a type of l>oisOIl pills t.llat
goes under the name of "flip-in plans". Under suc.h plan each shareholder is given a
right to purchase the target shares at a deep discount if there is a. change in c.ont.rol.
The discount can be interpreted as the side paymeni Br - Bi guaranteed to Olltsi<le
shareholders. In this situation, the rival ends up paying v r for the nonvot.ing sIlares,
and Br for tIle voting share (Bi to the incumbent and Br _Bi to outside shareholders).
In other words, the rival pays out his whole valttation for the COIllpany (Br + v r).
Obviously, the value of this poison pill for itldividual investors will be reflecte(l illto
shares' prices at the time of the IPO. In this way the initial entrepreneur is allie t.o
extract the whole rival's surplus, by fully exploiting his ability of preselling t.lle tra,(le
surplus to dispersed shareholders,
1.2.4 The Possibility of Retrading
Up to now I did not consider the possibility that the entrepreneur could trade sllares
in his company after the IPO. There are some rules that limit his ability to do so. SEC
Rule 144 requires a neVi prospectus for a sale that in any three-lnonth period exceeds
either 1% of the total shares outstanding or the average weekly trading volume,
whichever is greater. Furthermore, almost all of the IPO prospectuses contain a clause
that prevents the oiferers from selling any more shares without the underwriter's
consent in a six to eighteen month period following the IPQ. These rules just lliake
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further sales more costly, but they do not prevent them. Therefore, it is ilnportant
to check whether the above strategy '8 time consistent, i.e., if t.he entreprelleur, Ollce
he is allowed to retrade, wants to do so and consequently dest.roys tIle candidat.e
equilibril1m.
The results above are weakly robust to tIle possibility of retrading. I will show this
using Example 1. If at tilne 0 the entrepreneur sells the optilllal alllount (25% of t.he
shares), he does not gain by selling additional shares at a later date. After titlle 0 he
cares only about his 75% of the shares. Without any additional sale his 75% is wort.ll
$115 (40+0.75* 100). If between time 0 and titlle 2 he decides to sell additional sllares,
he will get only vi per share. In fact, outside investors know that when he crosses t.llat.
threshold the entrepreneur will never sell at tilDe 2. The sale of any positive aillount
of shares a will make the 75% stake worth $40 + (~ - a)100 + a 100 = $115, i.e., as
before. Therefore, the ent.repreneur does not strictly gain by selling additional shares.
Buying back some shares also clearly makes the entrepreneur worse off. Sill1ilarly, t.he
potential buyer, if he were present at time zero, would not be willing to lJlly SOttle
shares at that date. In fact, he does not realize any capital gaill on t.hose shares (t.hey
are already traded at v r ) a.nd he does not gain more control. If he buys SOllIe of t.llelll,
his bargaining power at time 2 will decrease. In fact, if he does not take over lle
will suffer a capital loss on his initial stake. This decreases his reservation value and
therefore his bargaining power. Therefore, the equilihriuln is weakly rol)ust.
In the Appendix, I show that the previous results are subst.antially un(~hanged if
I introduce diversification gains, in the form of a tax on tile equity st.ake retain.ed
by the entrepreneur. However, diversification gains destroy the robl1stness of the
equilibrium when the entrepreneur is allowed to sell additional shares after tthe IPO.
This nonrobustness is inherent to nlodels in which the insider's ownersllip acts as a
signal or as a commitment. However, I show that if subsequent sales can only t.ake
place in discrete blocks, then the' proposed equilibriuln can exist, even in the presence
of retrading.
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1.3 Empirical Evidence
This paper does not provide a complete theory of the decision to go public., but
presents a model of one important aspect of this decision: the val'ue of corllorate
control. At the same time it provides a model that deterlnines jointly tIle size of
insiders' ownership and the acquisition technique.
In the following I present empirical evidence suggesting that corporate control is
indeed an important aspect in the decision to go public and tllat t.his lllodel is able
to explain some real world phenomena.
1.3.1 Equity Carve-Outs
The initial public offerings of previously wholly-owned subsidiaries of public corpo-
rations provide a sort of controlled experilnent for the Inodel above. A subsidiary
can easily get financing through the parent company. If there is only one risk factor,
then no additional diversification can be obtained by breaking up a conglolllerate.14
Therefore, limited wealth or diversification needs cannot be citef} as determinatlts of
the decision to go public. This creates i,he perfect environment to study the decision
to go public as a two-stage sale. Why some firms carve-out their subsidiaries B.nd what.
the gains are from doing that are still open ql1estions in the literature. One sugge&ted
interpretation is that market trading provides some additional inforl11ation. Aillong
other things this additional infornlation can be used to write incentive contracts for
the subsidiary management.
The work of Schipper and Smith (1986a and 1986b) and a follow-up study l)y I{lein
et ale (1990) provide the stylized facts on equity carve-outs. The announcelnent effect
of an equity carve-out is an astonishing 2% excess return. to This compares with a
negative 3% excess return experienced by the same cOlnpanies in normal seasoned
equity issues. The preference for retaining a majority stake is confirlned by both
studies. In the Schipper and Smith sample of 73 carve-outs betweell 1965 and 1983,
---------------
14Even if there are multiple risk factors but markets are dynamically complete, then no additional
d!~er!Jification can be obtained by breaking up a conglomerate.
15Retutn in excess of the market adjusted change.
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53% of the companies offered less than 20% of their shares and only 11% of thelll sold
more than 50% of thei.L shares. In 6 out of 8 of those last cases the parent COlllpany
retained voting control through differential voting shares. In the whole SRlllple 20%
of the companies made use of differential voting shares. This was a reillarkal>ly high
number, especially at that time.16
Schipper and Smith suggest that the opportunity of writing incentive contracts
using the subsidiary stock price is a possible reaSOll for equity carve-outs. Tllis sllould
be a motive that lasts through time. The highest costs of public ownership are })orne
in the "going public" process, t11erefore it should be the ca,se tllat once a subsidiary
has been carved out, it remains a public company afterv/ards. On the cont.rary, bot.h
Schipper and Smith and Klein et ale find that t'a carve-out is almost always followe<l
by either a parent reacquisition of the subsidiary's outstanding shares or a disposal of
the parent's remaining interest" (Klein et ale 1990, 2). The latter Rtudy follows t.lle
1966-1983 carve-out sample until December 1988. At that date 48% of the carved-
out subsidiaries had been reacquired, 37% sold off and only 15% st.ill rel11ailled a
publicly traded subsidiary. Furthermore, all of the survi\l·ed carve-outs took place in
1982-1983, i.e., in the last two years of the sample. TIle median tillle before a sell-off
is 1 year and 4 months, and before a reacquisitioll, 4 years and 6 111011t.hs. So t.he
remaining 15% carved out subsidiaries may eventually be either sold or reac,quire<l.
For example, I found that between December 1988 and Decelllber 1990 an additional
COlnpany was sold off. The reaction of the parent stock price to t.lle secolld event.
(sell-off or reacquisition) was positive arid significant (+3.67%) for tIle sell-offs and
roughly zero for the reacquisitions (0.81%).
The very high level of turnover in control confirms the intuition underlying t.he
model that an eventual sale is a major deterlninant of the decision to go public. In
most of the cases the parent company retains control, as suggest.ed by the nlo(lel. The
proportionally large use of dual class shares, to retain control while selling lll'ore tllan
50% of the security benefits, is consistent with the lilodel's prediction on the use of
181n 1986 only 5% of the Amex companies and 4% of the Nasdaq conlpanies had dual class
arrangements. See Seligman (1986).
45
dual class shares as a surplus extraction device.
In the Klein et al. study there is also some evidence that tile t.ot.al excess ref.Ufll of
this two-stage sale exceeds the typical excess return of a direct sell-off. l'his sttllport.s
the idea that the strategic use of public ownership increases t.he bargaining power
of the parent company. One might wonder why all the conlpanies {lo not use this
selling strategy. First of all, this is the optimal technique only when tile rival is able
to produce more security benefits than the incumbent (colllpare Reaults 2 and 3 \\Tit.h
Result 1). Otherwise, a direct sale is better. Secondly, the parent cOInpanies in these
carve-outs are public companies. Therefore, they do not necessarily always lllaxilllize
shareholders' value.
A slight modification of the model can explain the large nltlllber of reverse t.ra.ns-
actions too. Imagine that at tinle zero the arrival of a potential buyer is uncertain.
For the sake of argl1ment, let assume that it is conllIlon knowledge that at t.itlle 2 a.
buyer will appear with probability 0.5. Given the assumption of risk neut.ralit.y t.he
results of section 1.2 will follow through, substituting the valuat.ion paraillet.ers wit.h
their expectations. In this £rame,vork the announcelnent both of a carve-out and
of an eventual sell-off should have a positive effect on the value of the outstandiIlg
shares, as it is observed in the data. After date 2, when the possibility of a lJllyer has
vanished, even the minor cost of public ownership luay induce the parent COI1IIJany
to buy back the subsidiary. It is not surprising that. this announceillent has no inl-
pact on the parent share price (0.81%), as far as it is COllllllon knowledge that. any
selling opportunity has vanished. This modified framevlork explains ·Nhy 50% of t.he
carve-outs are reversed some years later.
Therefore, the model is consistent with the empirical evidence of carve-ouf,s.1 i
What is not explained by the model is why a public parent COlllpany, probalJly con-
trolled by managers, is willing to maximize the share value. This Illay be a reason
17In & written note Rydqvist reported to me that this paper pushed him to look a.t the relationship
between IPOs and takeover activity irt Sweden. In a sample of 60 equity carve-outs, he found that
the subsidiary was acquired within 5 years in 48% of the cases and bought back in 35%. In a
corresponding sample of 160 IPOs, 35% of the new public companies were taken over within 5 years
aod 11% went back private.
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why we do not see so many carve-outs! However, sell-offs are typically done by pub-
lic companies under a takeover threat that pushes the Illan.ageillent towards value
maximization. This may be the case for carve-outs as well.
1.3.2 Initial Public Offerings
The persistent failure of traditional models to explain the underpricing puzzle and
the IPO "hot market phenomenon" (recurrent periods in which tile underpricing level
and the IPO volulne are jointly higher) has pushed researchers towards an explana-
tion based upon fads. For example, Lee, Shleifer and Tllaler (1991) find a relation
between the IPO volume and the closed end fund discount, that, according to t.helll,
represents an indicator of individual investor sentiments toward the equit.y 111arket.
Under ihis interpretation "hot tnarkets" arc demand driven: a fad induces overopti..
mistic valuation of new equity issues, and entrepreneurs rush to offer their cOIIlpanies.
Recent evidence of long-run underperformance of IPO (Ritter 1991) is also suggestive
in this direction.
The model of section 1.2 addresses only the supply side of the IPOs, but does
that in a rational setting. Besides the theory of fads, previous explanations of t.he
underpricing phenomenon failed to explain why initial entrepreneurs really wanted t,o
sell, and why they were prepared to pay such a huge prenliuln to sell their shares. For
example, Rock (1986) model explains the demand side of the IPO. The 1110(lel aSStlllles
that there are some informed investors who know the real value of the firlll, but are
prevented from buying all the shares by some unspecified constraints. Small outside
shareholders are supposed to buy the remaining shares. However, they are uninforilled
about the true value of the company, therefore they will require a premil\lD to enter
into the auction. In fact, they face a "winner curse" problell1. However, Rock '8 tnodel
does not explain why it should be optimal for the initial ent.repreneur to sell to tJle
public, paying the cost of a huge underpricing, rather than selling to a restrict.ed
group of large institutional investors (private placement). In other ,vords Rock's
model is able to explain the demand side of the underpricing tllrough tile winner
curse phenomenon, but it is completely silent on the supply side.
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The present model provides the perfect conlplelnent to Roc.k's lllodel, explaining
the supply side. The initial entrepreneur wants to distribute a fraction of t.he COlll-
pany shares among small shareholders. Only dispersed shareholders do not. solicit.
any control and can easily free ride on any illlprovenlent. This is the reason wIlY tIle
entrepreneur does not want to sell to a limited number of investlnent bankers. IIow-
ever, if there is some uncertainty as to the value of the securities, and SOllle iIlvestors
are better informed than others, then some underpricing is neceRsa.ry t.o attract Sillall
uninformed investors.
Note that in this model the underpricing cost is not really borne by the ell-
trepreneur. He sells the company shares at an iIlterlnediate price between vi a.nd
v r • Therefore, he fails to realize the highest price he could get in a world 0.: perfect,
information, but he does not lose money. In his hands those shares were worth only
1,i • Furthermore, if the pric~ obtained is above what he could have got.ten for those
shares from direct bargaining with the rival at time 2, i.e., [vi +V'(vr - vi)], then lle
actually gains from going public, in spite of the underpricing cost. This explains wh)r
the announcement effect of a carve-out is positive, despite the fact that t.he parent
cc.mpany will have to suffer the cost of underpricing on subsidiary shares.18
If one is willing to make certain assumptions about the behavior of security benefit.s
al1d of private benefits during the cycle, then the model of section 1.2 is also able to
explain some of the established facts in IPOs. According to the Inodel, a COlllpatlY
should go public when the optimal insider ownership is below 100%. Wllenever
there is an interior solution, the optimal insider ownership is given by the parallleter
A, which is the ratiQ of differential private benefits to differential security benefit.s
(~~:~."). This implies that if the security benefits difference is positively correlat.ed
with the stock market index, while private benefits are not, then you should expect,
waves of IPOs when the stock market is high and very few IPOs when the lllarket
is bust. In other words, if a rival is able to increase cash flow by a fixed proportion,
then a generalized increase in the value of cash flows (a stock market. rise) Inakes Illore
valuable the use of a two-stage sale. The same can be said for the industry clustering
18Sehipper and Smith note that this is smaller than the usual underpricing, but still positive.
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of IPOs. In periods in which an industry is doing particularly well, lllore IPOs should
take place. This is an alternative explanation of the correlation between IPO Vo~ul11e
and "investment sentiment," which does not rely on fads.
1.4 The Decision to Go Private
Going private is the opposite of going public, therefore the t,vo phenolllena deserve a
conlffion explanation. However, both the theoretical and the eillpiricallit.erature llave
analyzed them separately. One purpose of the present model is to build a COllllllon
fralnework able to explain both of theIne
The model in section 1.2 determines when it is optilnal for a firlll to go public and
what the optimal level of insiders' ownership is. If all existing public firllls have c.hosen
their status according to that model and the outside conditions have not change(l,
then there is no reason for a firm to go private. However, if one is willing to adillit
that some firms may have mistakenly chosen to go public, or that the environillent
has changed since their initial decision, then the model can be profitalJly used for
predicting the patterns of going private transactions.
One possibility is that some firms Inade the wrong decision) choosing by lllistakes
to go public when the optimal choice would have been to relllain private. The lllodel
(Result 1) predicts that when the incumbent is more efficient than the rival (vi> t,r),
then the company is worth more private. In fact, in this case outside shareholders
cannot free ride on a better rival. On the contrary, when the firll1 is sold, outside
shareholders are obliged to bear part of the cost of an inferior rival. In fact, publicly'
traded shares will be worth only v,. < vi per share under the rival's nlanageillent. Un-
der these circumstances the market price of the company shares (v r ) will be less than
their value for the incurnbent (vi). Thus, it is convenient for the incutnhent to buy
them back. Outside shareholders have no interest in holding on to the COlnpany. In
fact, the company will be eventually sold to a rival that dilutes Illinority sharellolders
(remember that vi > v'r), so they will be worse off. Once the mana.genlent has started
the. going private transaction an inferior rival can prevail only by paying an atnount
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equal to the incumbent's valuation of the whole company (Bi + vi).19 Therefore,
the incumbent management is always better off starting a going I)rivate transaction.
Once the company is private we may expect that it will be sold off later on, lJut we
do not expect that it will ever go public again.
The analysis in section 1.2 has been done under the assumption that the inc.ulllbent,
has a smaller valuation of the company than the buyer (Bi +vi < Br +v r). A Silllilar
analysis can be done for the opposite case Bi +vi > Br +v r. Under this aSSUlllption it
is never optimal for a firrn to go public. Furthermore, if a similar company is public,
it risks acquisition by an inferior rival with larger private benefits (Br > Bi). In fact,
ill some cases the inferior rival can induce the incumbent to sell hilIl his controllillg
stake.20 In this case also it is profitable for the incuillbent to go private, and it. is
not in his interest to go public again. In contrast with the previous case we do not.
expect that the company will be sold later on. Both of these cases can be labeled
8uboptimality of public otvnership, because it is not optimal for the firln to be pulJlicly
oWlled.
However, the decision to go private may arise also in companies that ShOllld be
publicly owned according to the model of section 1.2. This is the case of cOlnpa.nies
in which the level of insiders' ownership is below the optil11al level. I will show tllat
the best strategy for the insiders to reach the optimal level of ownership is not tile
direct one (i.e., buying on the market the differeIlce between the optilllal stake Rn(l
their actual stake), but it is a two-step procedure that involves going private aIld tllen
returning to public ownership soon after.
Let us first consider the simplest case in which insiders own Inore than 50% of
the voting powe:, but, nevertheless, their level of ownership is still too low to induce
them to sell (i.e., Bi + 4>vi > Br + </ror even if Bi +vi < Br +vr). This ilnplies that.
at the current level of insiders' ownership the management will not be willing to sell
190nce the manageJuent has started a going private transaction it ca.nnot accept a rival's offer
at Bi + <pv' restricted to the management stake cPt without triggering a legal suit by minority
shareholders. Therefore, the initiation of the going private process credibly commits the incUlllbent
to take into account 100% of the company shares.
20H the incumbent retain less than 100% of the shares (4J < 1), then we may have Bi + q,vi <
BP + q,v" even if Bi + vi > B" +v" .
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to a superior rival. As a consequence the market price of publicly held sllares will be
vi. In such a situation insiders have an arbitrage opportunity. In fact, the total value
of the company at the current level of ownership is simply B i +vi (i.e., the value of
the management stake, B i + </>vi , plus the value of publicly traded shares, (1 _.4»vi ).
By choosing the optimal level of ownership, insiders can obtain as llluch as Br + t,r >
Bi + vi from the eventual sale of the company.21 However, the lllost profitable wa.y
for the insiders to reach the optimal level is not through a direct acquisition of the
additional quota. Even assuming that insiders are able to buy tIle whole all101lnt.
desired without any impact on the market price vi, this will not be the best strategy.22
By simply buying an additional stake insiders will leave to out.side sllareholders a
fraction 1 - <jJ* of the capital gain v T - vi produced by the readjustment. In fact.,
when the insiders own the optimal amount, outside shareh/~lders can legitilllately
expect insiders to sell the company to the rival. Thus, publicly tradecl shares will be
worth v r •
Alternatively, insiders may decide to make their company private. A freeze-out
merger will allow the insiders to pay only vi per share. Even a lawsuit cannot provide
them more than that: under the current InaIlagement those shares are objectively
worth V i •23 Immediately after going private the same conlpany should want to ret.urn
to public ownership, because, by assumption, the company is worth lllore public (pro-
vided that insiders retain the optimal amount). Under the assumption that insiders
initially own more than 50% of the shares, this arbitrage opportunity exists only for
them. In the more general case the potential rival may intervene with an alternat.ive
bid at the time of the going private transaction. This is consistent with the fact that
30.6% of such transactions between 1980 and 1983, and 49.7% of tnose between 1984
and 1987 were accompanied by a competing bid or a prior takeover speculation (Lehn
21"Under the assumption that the optimal level of insiders' ownership is above 50% the incuntbent
can extract all of the rival surplus (see Result 3).
22H outsiders realize that the insiders are buying shares to readjust their ownership to the opt,imal
level, they will not sell their shares at less than v", because, if they hold on, their shares will he
worth v". This will make this strategy totally unprofitable.
28Here the implicit assumption is that the value of the shares under the potential rival is not
verifiable in court.
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and Poulsen, 1989). Even if the illcumbent nlanagement faces potential cOlllpetition,
he ma.y still want to go private. If he waits for the rival to COllIe, he will be obliged
to sell at a lower price. Therefore, the incumbent tries to bring the COlllpany privat.e,
hoping that the timing makes it harder for the rival to bid, so he can buyout t.lle
company below the rival's expected price.
After going pri-vate, the incumbent management has the right incentives to sell
and he will do it. This matches the stylized fact that LBOs are followed by large sales
to strategic buyers (Baghat et ale 1990). According to the type of asset the inCUlllbent
"Rill choose a direct sale or a two-siage sale. This formalizes also the idea of "keeping
an option of selling the rest of the COlnpany at a higher price to a corporate buyer," as
proposed in the mentioned Wall Street Journal article about the IPOs of cOInpallies
owned by LBO funds.
The model is not adequate to explain the large managelllen t buyouts of the lat.e
1980s described by Kaplan and Stein (1991). Their sample of deals over 100 lllillion
dollar shows a very low level of insider ownership both before and after the buyout.
By contrast, the model seems appropriate to explain the behavior of a large nUllll)er
of smaller deals. In their sample of 72 going private proposals between 1973-1980, De
Angelo et ale (1984) find a median management ownership of 50.9%. In their salllple
of 263 going private transactions between 1980 and 1987, Lehn and Poulsen (1989)
find that the average management ownership is 23.4%. The average Inanageillellt
ownership of firms above the median is 41.0%. Therefore, even in the 19808 going
private transactions in firms with large level of insider ownership are relatively fre-
quent. Lehn and Poulsen also find a positive relation between undistributed casll flow
and the probability that a firln will decide to go private. They attribute this relation
to Jensen's free cash flow theory. However, the result can be interpreted different.ly
in the context of tIle model presented in Section 1.2. A rival can easily divert cash
to his own purposes. So a cash-rich company is more subject to the risk of finding a
rival with a higher valuation for the whole company, who has lower security benefits.
These are exactly the condition of Result 1, in which it is optinlal for a flrni to reillain
(go) private.
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To summarize, the model predicts that companies that risk dilution lIlay deci(le
to go private even if the high level of insider ownership prevents any possible host.ile
takeover. These compallies will not return to public o,vnership after\vards. Alter-
natively, companies that are potential takeover or acquisition targets filay wallt to
go private. Their objective is not to avoid a chaIlge in control, but to nlaxilllize the
return of the incumbent from the eventual sale. This second Jllotivation will be lllore
frequent among firms with low levels of insider ownership. These firins are expected
to be sold or to revert to public ownership shortly afterwards. Tllese illlplications c.aIl
be used to allalyze the very different pattern of how LBOs return to public ownership,
as found by Kaplan (1991).
1.5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the decision to go public from the point of view of corporate
control. The access to the market of publicly traded security is viewed as a me~ha­
nism for diffusing equity ownership. Small outside shareholders can free ride on any
improvement in the verifiable income component produced by a change in control.
The initial entrepreneur can use this mechanism strategically t(~ extract lllore surplus
from a potential buyer.
The 100% initial ownership of the entrepreneur avoids the possibility that tllis
mechanism is used to entrench an inferior management. This is still true when tIle
possibility of additional subsequent sales is taken into account. Only if SOllIe pressure
towards diversification is introduced, tIle possibility of further sales will jeopardize tile
equilibrium. However, it is proven that, if further sales should take place in discret.e
blocks, then the equilibrium still exists.
The sale of a minority stake in the company enhances the total value of the firlIl.
If diversification is not an objective, then the value of the company generally drops
when in8ider ownership goes below 50%.24 This is due to the nonlinearity in the value
24Note that the value of the company cannot be obtained simply by multiplying the market price of
a share by the total number of shares, because this procedure ODlits the control premium associated
with private benefits.
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of control.
Wh.enever private benefits are large enough, control is never sold in all IPO. In
this case differential voting shares can he an optilllal device for increasing diffuse own-
ership, while retaining control. When private benefits are nil, then diffuse ownersllip
guarantees the maximization of the value of the COlllpany.
The model presented is consistent with patterns observed in equity carve-out.s.
Furthermore, it is able to address jointly the going public and t.Ile going private
processes, shedding some new light on the timing and sectorial clustering of IPOs
and on their initial underpricing. This model also explains WIlY the entrepreneur
wants to sell in the way he sells, despite the underpricing cost. Similarly, it suggests
a testable implication for the pattern of reverse LBOs.
More research, boih theoretical and empirical, should follow in this area. The
model does not consider agency problems and monitoring mechanisnls. Tllese are
crucial problems that affect a public corporation. Nevertheless, every year an average
of 170 companies decide to go public. This deserves further explanation. At the sallIe
time, more fact.s about IPO, beyond the underpriciIlg probleln, sllould be studied. 26
How many of these companies decides to go public because of wealth constraint.s?
How does the choice to go public affect the capital st.ructure? How does it affect the
dividend policy? Answers to these questions would increase our understanding of the
decision to go public and of corporate finance in general.
25An example in this direction is Ritter (1991).
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1.6 Appendix: Extensions of the Model
1.6.1 Diversification Gains
In the text I do not explicitly consider the cost borne by the incunlbent l)ecause,
to retain a controlling block, he forsakes diversification opportltnities. However, tIle
need of diversification may be an important deternlinant of the decision to go public.
It is important to analyze how this factor interacts with control considerations.
The easiest way to model the diversification gains is to introduce a tax on tile
percentage of company shares held, while maintaining the risk neutralit.y assuIllpt.ion.
So I assume that the cost of carrying a fraction 4> of tIle firlIl froln t.inle 0 t.o t.itlle 2
is equal to T dollars.
I could introduce a similar cost after time 2. If this cost is borlle both by tIle
incumbent and the rival, then it will have no effect. If only the inculilbent bears this
cost (let's say, for example, the rival is much wealthier and so he is better diversified),
then the only effect will be a reduction of the proceeds from the sale of a given equity
stake (the lack of diversification reduces the incumbent reservation value). Therefore,
I will maintain that there are gains from diversification only between tinle 0 and titIle
2. For space reasons I will limit the analysis to the case in which the rival security
benefits are smaller than the incumbent total valuation of the COlupany (v r < Bi+vi ).
A similar analysis can be conducted in the opposite case.
If I maintain the assumption that the incunlbent callnot trade in the COlllpany
shares between time 0 and time 2, then there are no substantial changes in the results
derived in section 1.2. Both with a linear and with a convex diversification gain ihe
entrepreneur would either adhere to the previous choice or diversify completely l)y
selling the whole company_ The reason is very si.mple. Let </>* be the optilnal choice
according to the Inodel in section 1.2. I have shown that when 4> moves form <jJ* to
t/>* - f there is a, discrete jump in the value of the firm. In fact, either </>* - f violates
constraint (1.5), and the buyer will never be able to buy the company, or 4>* = 0.5,
and any smaller stake makes the incUlnbent lose control. So in both cases it is not,
convenient for the incumbent to bear that cost for jttst an € gain in diversification.
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Therefore, the only alternative is cOInplete diversification. Let's COlllpare the case in
which c/>* = 0.5 with a complete diversification. The value of the COlnpany for tile
entrepreneur when 4> = 0.5 is
(1.14)
This is obtained by inserting 4> = 0.5 in expression (1.6) and Stlbt.racting the cost. of
lack of diversification (0.5 *T). The value of the company for the entrepreneur wilen
4> = 0 is
(1.1.5)
This is obtained by inserting cP = 0 in expression (1.11).
Assuming, for notational simplicity, that the incumbent has no bargaining power
(1/J = 0), then retaining a majority is preferred if
(1.16)
or
(1.17)
Retaining control is better if the diversification gains and the ilnprovelnent in secu-
rity benefits implemented by the rival are smaller than twice t.he incunlbent private
benefits. The factor 2 is due to the fact that half of the other benefits can be obtained
while still retaining a 50% control.
1.6.2 Robustness to Retrading
The no retrading assumption is a very strong one. When the entrepreneur is allowed
to trade at intermediate dates between 0 and 2 and he gains froIn diversifying, tllen
the equilibrium presented in section 1.2 is destroyed. The reason is very SiIIlple. At
time 0 an optimizing entrepreneur chooses to sell shares and to retain just the alnOltnt
that makes him indifferent between selling to the rival at time 2 and keeping his stake
56
(and I have imposed that in this case he prefers selling). lIe does that to lllRXilllize
'~he amount of surplus extracted. The fact that he retains the incentive t.o sell lilakes
the outside investors willing to pay v r per share. However, if one Jllinute after the
initial public offering he faces the possibility of selling additional shares he C8.11110t
restrain himself f:Lom doing that. In the absence of diversification gains lle is just
indifferent between selling and keeping his stake. If he sells, he will get only 1" IJer
share, because now he has lost the incentives to sell to the rival at tillle 2. However,
the value for the incumbent of retaining those shares is also vi. This is the knife edge
situation presented in. the numerical example in section 2.4. On the contrary, when
he obtains some gains from diversifying, he strictly prefers to sell. These addit.ional
sales before time 2 destroy the incunlbent incentives to sell to the rival at t.itlle 2.
Obviously, outside investors will not pay v r per share at the IPO, if they know they
will be cheated later on.
Therefore, there are only three possible candidate equilibria: sell just 50% of tIle
company, diversify completely or remain private. A 50% stake nlay be an equilil)-
rium because of the discontinuous jump in the value of the COlllpany at that level.
Let '8 suppose that an entrepreneur who has sold 50% of his shares in an IPO faces
the possibility of additional sales one minute after. Now his objective becolnes tIle
maximization oi the 50% stake he has retained, not the lllaxilllization of tIle value of
all the company. If he does not sell additional shares, the value of Ilis st.ake is given
by26
If he sells and goes below 50%, the entrepreneur will get:
Note that the value of the stake at 0.5 is above the value at 0.5-. The derivat.ive of
261 assume here that constraint (1.5) is not binding at <p =0.5.
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V w.r.t. 4> is given by
(1.20)
The first addendum is positive by assumption, so if
(1.21 )
then it is optimal for the entrepreneur to stick to a 50% thresllold. On the cont.rary
if inequality (1.21) has the opposite sign the incumbent wants to d.iversify fttrtlter.
By giving up control the incumbent gives to the buyer an advantage equal to the
reduction in his reservation value (B i + vi - v r ) times tIle buyer ba.rgaining power
(1 -"p). If this advantage is bigger than the diversification gain, then he prefers not
to sell. This makes a 50% ownership a time.,consistent equilibriuIll (that is, robust to
retrade).
1.6.3 The Effect of MinillluDl Sale Provisions
The nonrobustness to retradin.g is not a unique feature of this Illodel, but is sllared
by all of the models in which the insider's ownership acts as a sigllal. For exalllple, in
Leland and Pyle (1977) the credibility of the signal disappears if tIle entrepreneur is
able to sell more shares immediately after the IPO. Silnilarly, in Jensen and Meckling
(1976) the agency costs of dispersed ownership can be correctly anticipat.ed by olltside
investors only if insiders are able to commit to retaining their stake. Otherwise,
insiders will prefer to sell additional shares later on, increasing agency costs. However,
we do observe insiders who own strictly more than 50% of their c.olnpany. In their
sample of majority owned companies Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find average
holdings of 64% with a median of 60%. This phenomenon deserves an explanation.
The simplest explanation is that it is impossible for the inculllbent to sell addi-
tional shares unless he sells them in discrete blocks. As I have already Illention.ed,
SEC Rule 144 permits small additional sales. However, if an insider wants to change
his position substantially he cannot do it piece by piece, but should Illake a registered
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sale. The fixed costs of this procedure make it unprofitable below a IllinilllUlll thresll-
old. This limitation to discrete sales can make an interior equilibriulll sustainable.
The intuition of the above results is the following. The previous equilibriulll was
destroyed by the possibility of selling shares in an infinitesilIlal alnount. Every tillle
the incunlbent sells, he gains the diversification cost T but he has only a nlinor ilJlpact
on the value of his stake, because he has already sold part of it. On the contrary, if
he is obliged to sell a discrete amount the adverse price impact on the percenta.ge lIe
sells can be large enough to offset the diversification gains. The paradoxical result is
that in t.he presence of diversification gains the inculnbent increases his stake,2i tIle
reason being that the extra stake serves as a collateral to his COIDlllitment t.o c.once(le
to the superior rival.
Define as p the minimum amount the inCUlllbent can sell. ASsul11.e tllat after the
IPO the entrepreneur retains just 4>* +p - €, where </>* is the optilllal insi{ler stake
in absence of retrading. Keeping the additional stake p until titlle 2 the inc,ulllbent.
will get from it p[v i + 1jJ(vr - vi)] in bargaining with the rival. The cost of holding
this additional stake 18 Tp. If, just after the IPO, the entrepreneur decides to sell
the minimum quantity p, he will not have any incentive to concede after tilDe 2.
Therefore, the proceeds from that additional sale are pv i • However, once he has lost
the incentives to concede, there is no reason why he should retain a stake bigger than
50%.28 Therefore, by deviating, the incumbent can gain the diversification cost of t.he
fraction above 50%.
If the incumbent maintains his holdings until time 2 his utilit.y front t.lle continu-
ation game after the IPO is
(1.22)
27Even if it is not intuitive, this result is supported by Demsetz and Leho's (1985) analysis of
corporate ownership. They find that the standard deviation of Inonthly returns is positively and
significantly related to the degree of ownership concentration.
28This is neceSS8lY beeanse the rival is still around.
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The utility obtained by deviating and selling is
(1.23)
The entrepreneur will prefer to stick to his commitment if
(1.24 )
By definition of </J*:
(1.25 )
Therefore, equation (1.24) yields
(1.26 )
Equation (1.26) simply requires that the capital loss on the additional stake p (given
by the I.h.s.) is bigger than the gaill from further diversification obtained by deviating
(given by the r.h.s). Solving equation (1.26) yieids
> T(q,* - 0.5)
P - 1jJ(vr - vi) - T • (1.27)
It remains to be established whether the mininlum p that sustains an equilibriulll
is realistic as the minimum size for a registered sale. Suppose tllat the diversification
costs are about 10% of the income produced in the future (T == 0.1vi) and tllat the
incumbent bargaining power is 0.5. Let's say the rival can produce 1.5 times the
verifiable income produced by the incumbent and that the optimal inside ownership
in absence of retrading is 60%. Then from equation (1.27) p should be bigger tha.n or
equal to 6.6%. This is a realistic dimension of a minimum registered sale, Therefore,
in the presence of diversification gains the optimal amount of insider ownership that,
is time consistent is 66.6%.
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Chapter 2
The Value of the Voting Right
A Study of the Milan Stock Exchange Experience
Common stock entitles shareholders to receive a dividend and to vote on corpo-
rate matters. 'l'he value of the right to vote seems trivial in day-to-day operations,
particularly since decision making is a public good in large corporations. For this rea-
son, the fundamental valuation theory asserts that common stock should be priced
as an appropriately discounted sum of future dividends, and it att.aches no value to
the voting right. However, many empirical studies have found that comnlon stoc.k
with superior voting power trades at a premium with respect to "nornlal" COlnlnon
stock. Levy (1982) and Horner (1988) have also shown tha.t larger differences in
voting power are associated with larger price differentials. This suggests that vot.ing
rights are indeed valuable. However, this leaves open the question of what deternlines
the value of a voting right in the first place.
The only two studies that address this question in a systematic way are Ryd.':tvist
(1987) and Robinson and White (1990). To explain the premiuln of the COIlllDon
stock with superior voting power, both of them use the Shapley valuell The Shapley
value measures the relative power of block of shares, as a function of the distribution
of ownership.
Explaining the price difference between differential voting shares is not only inter-
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esting by itself, but also provides a way of testing our conjectures between ownerGllip
concentration and company value. For example, M9Jrck, Shleifer ancl Vishny (1988)
find a piecewise linear relationship between managerial ownership alld the value of a
company, as expressed by Tobin's q. However, they cannot distinguish between the
effect produced by ownership in reducing the agency costs and the effect produced
on the value of votes. Differential voting shares provide a way to isolate this second
effect. Therefore, by using differential voting shares it is possible to test a relat.ionship
between ownership. structure and market value of control. It is evell possil)le to esti-
mate the average value of corporate control as a percentage of a cOlnpany's expect.ed
flow of future dividends.
The purpose of this paper is to apply the sanle conceptual fralllework as Rydqvist.
and Robinson and White, to differential voting shares traded on the Milan Stock Ex-
change (MSE)l in order to estimate a relationship between ownership concent.rat.ion
and vote valuation. Besides the theoretical model, obtained in a cooperative fraille-
work in which agreements among shareholders are possible and enforceable, this stu(ly
presents other simple measures of ownership concentration, to identify the illlportant
features of the relationship between ownership and the value of votes.
The sample is, by itself, very interesting. In Italy even public cOlnpanies llRve
many large shareholders. A similar pattern is present among dual class conlpanies,
which represent 50% of the total market capitalization. On average, the first. five
largest shareholders own 81% of the votes, much lllore than 28.8%, the percentage
reported for a large sample of U.S. corporations by Silleifer and Visllny (1986). At.
the same time, in Italy the average premium attributed to voting shares is about.
80%. This figure does not take into account that nonvoting shares are entitled t.o
an additional dividend. Taking this into account, the average premiulll rises to 90%.
This is by far the largest price difference found in any study.2 In Italy not only the
lThe MSE is by far the most important Stock Exchange in Italy. There are several regional Stock
Exchanges, but they have an insignificant amount of tra.nsactions.
2Levy (1982) finds an average premium of 46.5% in Israel, Lease et aI. (1983) of 5.44 in the lJ.S.,
Rydqvist (1987) of 6.5% in Sweden, Horner (1988) of about 20% in Switzerland, Megginson (1990)
of 13.3% in England and Robinson and White (1990) of 23.3% in Canada.
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average premium, but also the variance in premia across firIns, is very large. While in
a couple of cases the premium is negative, in others it goes as high as 400%. Tile size
of the premium has induced some Italian econoluists to doubt the rationalit.y of t.Ile
market valuation (Castellino 1989; Penati and Di Corato 1989). However, tllere is no
sign of reversal towards more "reasonable" prenlia: the cross-sectional average of the
premia was 65.6% at the beginning of 1987, 71.8% in 1988, 100.2% in 1989 and 83.6%
in 1990. The size and the variability of these prelnia, and tile higll concentration
of ownership make the Italian case the perfect environnlent to test a relationsllip
between ownership concentration and market valuation of voting rights.
The main result of this paper is that t.he market value of votes does depend on
the distribution of ownership. The value of votes is higher when there are Illany large
shareholders in a company and nobody controls 50% or more of the votes. However,
voting rights retain a positive value even if one shareholder controls a lllajorit.y of
votes.
By assuming that the value of control is a constant proport.ion of the value of a
company, measured as expected flow of future dividends, the paper obtains an esti-
mate of the level of control value in Italy. The control value js approxilllately 30% of
a company's value. This remarkable level can partially account for the extraordinary
level of the voting premium in Italy.
The first section of the paper introduces the reader to the characteristics of tIle
securities studied in the paper. The paper focuses on the price differential between a
common stock with one voting right per share, and a comnlon stock witll no voting
rights. The nonvoting common stock ca.rries with it the right to an extra dividen{( in
addition to the one distributed to all shareholders.
Section 2 presents the theory of the relative pricing of these two types of securities.
If voting rights are valueless, the relative price should depend upon t.he different.ial
dividend right. However, corporate control may be valuable, because it. gives access t.o
some exclusive benefits not shared by noncontrolling shareholders. In this case votillg
rights, which give access to these benefits, should be valuable too. To deterlnine their
value, I use an extension of the concept of the Shapley value, known as the theory of
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oceanic games.3 This theory is suited to the case in which a sillall nUlllber of large
shareholders coexist with a large number of infinitesimal shareholders (as in pulJlic
corporations). In this franlevlork, by assuming that the value of corporate control is a
constant fraction of the value of a company's assets, it is possible to establish an exact
relationship between ownership distribution and the premiunl of voting shares over
nonvoting ones (voting premiunl). A similar specification is obtained by adapting
Zwiebel's (1991) model of the ownership structure to conlpanies with two classes of
stocks.
Section 3 describes the sample used. It includes all the companies having IJot.ll vot-
ing and nonvoting stock traded on the Milan Stock Exc.hange (MSE) for at least two
years between 1987 and 1990. The dual class stock companies do not look significantly
different from the other Italian companies. They have sinlilar market capitalizat.ion,
earnings-to-price ratio and even ownership distribution. Section 3 presents also SOJIle
summary statistics anc the sources of the data used in the empirical analysis.
Section 4 contains the results of the regression analysis along the line suggested
by the model in section 2. The model employs the Shapley value of votes lleld by
small shareholders as a measure of vote value. This Inodel can explain between
5% and 15% of the cross sectional vnriation in each of the four years considered.
The Shapley value captures two essential features: first, the sharp increase in the
voting premium when a company is not majority controUe{l; second, the nonlinear
distribution of power in nonmajority-controlled cOlnpanies. IIowever, the Shapley
value fails to take into account possible future change in the o\vnersllip structure.
In particular, even majority-controlled companies maintain a positive vote value. In
these cases the percentage of votes controlled by a potential challenger (i.e. by tile
largest minority shareholders) captures the probability that a control contest will
eventually take place. The irnportance of expectations about future possible changes
in the size and dimension of the main shareholders is tested by using COllI panies owned
by the Italian government. Government-controlled companies have, on average, a
3The name derives from the fact that the continuum of infinitesimal minor players is referred to
as "an ocean to emphasize the almost total absence of order or cohesion" (Milnor and Shapley 1978,
290).
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lower voting premium. How·ever, this difference has decreased over the years, at tile
same time as privatization rumors have become more intense and credible.
Given Italian disclosure practices, it is difficult to identify the dates when lllajor
changes in the ownership structure take place. However, a recent control cont.est,
which started after a sale contract was publicly breached, allows a Silllilar stu.dy.
This case study is described in section 5. The company analyzed is Mondadori, a
publishing company involved also in newspapers. When the contest started, t.llis
company had three classes of stock traded on the MSE: a vot.ing class, a nonvoting
class and a class allowed to vote only on modifications of the Article of Incorporation.
This feature allows us to determine the price of two different COlllponents of tIle VOt.iIIg
right: the right to elect the directors and the right to vote on modifications of the
Article of Incorporation. The market valuation of the different COlllponents reacts as
suggested by the theory. The dramatic jump in the price of a vote at the beginning
of the control contest is consistent with the theoretical prediction of the 1110(lel.
The last section summarizes the results and indicates the directions for futtlre
resf:arch.
2.1 The Institutional Background
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief description of the important features
of the Italian securities studi ~d in this paper. The characteristics of these securities
are developed in greater detail in the Appendix. In Italy, besides a one sllare-olle vote
common stock, there are two other types of shares: preferred and savings. Preferred
shares have limited voting rights, while savings shares have no voting rights at. all.
There are no multiple voting shares, which "Here outlawed in 1942.4
Preferred shares guarantee th.e holder preferential dividend t.reatlllent and pre-
ferred claims on company assets in liquidation or ba.nkruptcy. A preferred shareholder
may not vote for the election of the board of directors, but he lllay vote on all t.he
4The Civil Code of 1942 exempted multiple voting shares in existence at that time. Only one
company (Saffa) still has a trivial amount (0.4%) of nlultiple voting shares.
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other important issues, like changes in capital structure, nlergers, etc. SOllIe analogies
with the U.8. preferred shares should not deceive. U.8. preferred shares prolllise a
fixed dividend and a fixed sum in case of liquidatioll. By contrast, Italian preferred
shares promise a minimum dividend and a minimum repayment in case of liquidation
and maintain all the upside potential of a COlnlnon stock.
Savings shares are entitled to a minimum dividend, equal to 5% of the par value. III
addition, whenever a dividend is paid to common stock, savings shares are ent.itled to
receive an equal dividend plus 2% of the par value. In the case of liquidation, savings
shares enjoy seniority over other shares in an amount equal to the par value, and tlley
have equal rights to what is left, after redeenling the par value of all sr. arehol<lers.
However, savings shares do not have any voting right.
The possibility of issuing savings shares was introduced by a spec.iallaw in 1974.
The law was intended to promote stock ownership among small invest.ors. TIle law
specified the minimuln privileges with respect to dividends and preferred c.lailIlS.
Issuing companies are allowed to increase them, not to reduce theI1I.
All the privileges are stated in terms of the shares' par value, which is the legal
lower bound for the subscription price. However, nlost of the shares are isslled at a
multiple of the par value and almost all of them are traded at a tnultiple. For exailiple,
at the beginning of 1990 the market value of a nonvoting share was on average 5.6
times as much as the par value, and the a.verage size of the extra dividend privilege,
in terms of the market value of the shares, was 0.88%.
Besides the case study in section 2.5, the following analysis ,viiI focus only on,
savings shares. On the MSE savings shares are more widespread than preferred
shares. As an example, at the beginning of 1990, 88 conlpanies had savings shares,
and only 13 had preferred shares. In addition, savings shares allow a better estiluate
of the value of a voting right. In the absence of any privilege, the price estiIllate of a
voting right would simply be the difference between the price of a voting share and
the price of a nonvoting (savings) share. Because of the differential dividend rights,
a correction is required. Despite that, savings shares provide a very sitnple lllethod
for computing the value of a vote.
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Savings shares may be seen as composed of three elements: a conlnlon share witll-
out voting rights, the right to an additional dividend ( equal to 2% of the par value)
and the right to a minimum divid.end (equal to 3% of the par value), when "norlllal"
common stock does not pay any dividend.5 In the saInple the right to a minilIlu)ll
dividend provided a differential payment only 6% of the titnes. The paylnellt corre-
sponded to less than 1% of the market price of a nonvoting sllare, l)ec.ause t.he par
value is equal, on average, to 18% of the market price of a nonvoting share. Therefore,
this right has little economic value. Thus, in the subsequent ana.lysis I will take int.o
account the extra dividend right of the savings shares, but I will overlook t.lle value of
tile minimum dividend. The effect of this choice is to llnderestilnate the value of tile
voting right.6 I think that underestinlating in this way produces slnaller errors tilan
trying to take into account the actual value of the right to a very sInal1 InillilllUJll
dividend.
2.2 Relative Pricing of Differential Voting Shares
I begin this section by considering the theory of the relat.ive valuation of C.OIIIIIIOll
and savings shares under the assulnption that a voting right is valueless. Then, I
consider how the vote value may affect the relative pricing. This task is perforllled in
three steps. First, I briefly review the possible source of this value, i.e., the value of
control. Then, I describe how the value of control translates illto a positive price of a
voting right traded on the stock exchange. I focus on the link between the investors'
valuation of a vote and the market price of a vote. Eventually, I derive a testallie
specification of the two classes' relative pricing, when votes are valuable.
5In practice a nonvoting share pa.ys: dt + (2%parldt > 0) + (5%pa,rldt = 0), where d, is t.he
dividend paid to all shareholders. This can be rewritten as the right to receive d t + (2% pa.l') +
(3%parldt =0).
6The value of a voting right (RT) is computed as the difference in the pric.es of a voting and a
nonvoting share (P11 - Pn11)' corrected by the additional dividend privilege (A). If p is the value of
the minimum dividend, then the estima.te of the value of a voting right is liT = Pv - Pnv - a =
RT-p~ RT.
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2.2.1 Relative Pricing if Control Is Valueless
Assuming that the voting right is valueless, the price of conllllon stock in a bubble-free
economy is equal to the appropriately discounted SUIIl of future dividends. In tllis
case, the price of a nonvoting share should be equal to the price of the corresponding
voting security plus the discounted sum of the additional dividends. Thus, a voting
share sells at a discount with respect to a nonvoting share. This discount is equal t.o
the discounted value of the additional dividend yield of nonvoting shares.
I define the risky discount factor appropriate for compally i dividend flow as r;'.
Then, the price of conlpany i voting share (P~t) is given by:
00 di
pi _ E """' t
vt - L-J (1 + ri\t
t=l t)
(2.1 )
where d~ is the amount of dividend paid to all shareholders by COlllpany i in period t..
Non-voting shareholders are also entitled to a fixed SUIll, on tile top of the dividend
distributed to all shareholders. This fixed sUln is of the order of 111agnitude of 2 t.o 5
cents per share. I call it fi. The amount €i is paid whenever a cOlllpany's earnings are
positive. This implies that fi is much less volatile than d:. The appropriate discount
factor, thus, should be different from the common dividend disco\tnt. factor r;. It.
should be the discount factor of a U.S.-type preferred share. This is closer to a bond
rate rather tllan to the required rate of return of the risky stock r;. Defining it as p~,
then the price of a nonvoting share (P~vt) is given by
(2.2)
As a result, the voting premium of conlpany i (V pit), defined as tIle prellliulll of
the voting stock over the nonvoting one, is given by
(2.3)
Assuming that the discount f~ctor p~ is constant through tilDe and the additional
dividend is paid in every period, it yields
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· fi
VP: = - ipi 'P nut
(2.4)
where pf- is the add.itional dividend yield of nonvoting shares. Of course, common
1&011«
shares trade at a discount with respect to savings shares, if v0ting rights are valueless.
This discount is equal to the additional dividend yield divided by tile discount factor
pi.
Equation (2.4) provides an estimate of the relative valuation of the two stocks
in the absence of any value of a vote. The first two ro\vs of Table 2.2 present the
average voting premium and the average size of _pE between 1987 and 1990. Usillg
n"t
the average value of the privilege and values of the discount factor p varying IJet,ween
5% and 20%, I obtain an estimate of the VP varying between -5% alld .. 20%. By
contrast, the actual average value of the voting prelniunl is 81%.
2.2.2 Relative Pricing if Control Is Valuable
The actual size of the premium suggests that voting rights lllight indeed be valual)le.
In the following I explain why votes may be valuable and how it is possible to llleasure
their value.
It is important to keep in mind that there is a possible alternative approac)l in
studying the premium attributed to voting shares. One 111ight interpret. the prellliulll
as a {orIn of mispricing, like the closed-end fund disc.ount (Lee, Sllieifer, and l'haler
1991). As I mentioned in the introduction, though, large prelllia are botll persistent
and pervasive. In addition, if voting rights are valueless, by short-selling a Cotnlllon
share and buying a savings share one might create a perfectly Iledged arbitrage.
Unfortunately, this arbitrage is risk-free only for infinitely living agellts. Titus, noise
traders' sentiment may still create a w'edge between the prices of the two classes. In
section 4 I will present some evidence that institutional investors are evenly present.
in both classes. This reduces the likelihood that noise traders induce a systelllatic
mispricing in either of the two classes. For all these reasons, in the following I will
disregard the mispricing alternative and I will focus only on the value of tIle vot.ing
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right.
The Value of Corporate Control
The first economic analysis t.hat recognizes the value of corporate control is Mallue
(1964, 1965). He identifies four sources of control value: lllonopoly power deriving
from the control of a competiti,te firm, cost-saving technology and otller ecollolllies of
scale, desire for salaries and other perquisites associated with control of a corporatioIl,
and "the substantial gain that can be realized in the price of the shares when the
company receives improved management"(1964, 1430).
As Grossman and Hart (1980) point out, improved performance, associat.ed wit.h
better management or with cost-saving techniques, is a public good s\lbjec.t. to a st.an-
dard free rider problem. Nobody should be willing to pay a prellliulll for cont.rol in
the absence of the right to exclude non-contributing shareholders frOlll control l)ene-
fits. In Manne's list only salaries and perquisites are clearly private goods. The 11art.
of the control value that has the same characteristic as a private gOO(j is referre(j as
private benefits. In the literature the notion of private benefits is quite vague. IIarris
and Raviv exemplify private benefits as "psychic benefits derived fronl controlling a
large enterprise, the ability to transfer resources to one's private use, and the alJilit.y
to use one's position to further one's private goals" (1989, 258). Other main exalllll)es
are: the possibility of diluting minority shareholder propert.y rights aft.er a takeover
(Grossman and Hart 1980), and the benefits {roin vertical a.nd lateral int.egratioll
(Grossman and Hart 1986). Shleifer and VishllY (1986) point out that a large sllare-
holder may internalize a fraction of the capital gain, produced by a value illlprovillg
takeover, through his initial toehold.
The Value of a Vote
If control provides some private benefits, then voting rights, which attribute cOlltrol,
should be valuable too. Their 'value would depend on the way c.ontrol is allocated.
In most cases the allocation of control can be represented by a normalized lllajorit.y
game, whose payoff function is given by
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I if w(S) > 0.5
v(S) = -
o if w(S) < 0.5,
where w(S) is the percentage of votes held by an individual (or a coalition) S. Tllere-
fore, whoever obtains the majority gets the control value, llere norlilalized to 1, and
the remaining shareholders get nothing.
In order to determine the value of a block of votes I should deterinine first the out-
come of the bargaining among all of the shareholders about controllJenefits. There is
not yet a satisfactory noncooperative theory of n-person bargaining gallles.7 There-
fore, in the subsequent analysis I will use concepts derived in the cooperative fralIle-
work, in particular the Shapley value concept. People unconlfortable with this ap-
proach can see it as a tentative analysis aitned to investigate whether such concepts
have any predictive power in a world of self-interested individuals. In part.icular, tIle
empirical analysis will try to highlight what are the characteristics of the Sllapley
value that makes it a meaningful meaSl1re of voting power.
In a cooperative framework, agreements among players are possible and enforce-
able, and utility is transferable without cost fronl one player to another. The existence
of voting trusts (quite common in Italy) provides sOlne elnpirical support to tllese as-
sumptions. In this context, the value of a block of shares can be computed as t.he
probability that votes of this block turn a It.>sing coalition int.o a winning one, i.e.,
they are pivotal. This value is called the Shapley value. Forlnally, given a control
game v, the Shapley value for player i is:
i pivotal
81 (n - 8 - I)!
, 'n.
(2.5)
where 8 is the number of players in a coalition, n the total nUlnber of players and
7The noncooperative rationaliza.tion of the Shapley value provided by Gut (1989) is not viable in
this case, because it requires that the marginal contribution of agel.ts' resources (in this ca.se votes)
is always positive. In a voting game the marginal contribution of agents' votes after a coalition has
reached the majority of votes is zero.
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the summation is taken with respect to all of the feasible coalitions such that tile
coalition with s players is a losing one and the coalition witll S llleillbers plus IJla.yer
i is a winning one. The following example should help to clarify tIle concept..
Example 1: There are 4 shareholders in a corporation. The first two sllarellolders
own 35% of the votes each, the third shareholder 20%, and tIle last one 10%. The
value of each stake is given by the probability that this stake is pivotal. One lllight.
imagine that coalitions are formed by randomly drawing players alld lining tilelll up.
In this example the total number of feasible coalitions is 41 = 24. Player 1 is }Jiv(,t,al
every time he is drawn second and his predecessor in the line is either player 2 or
player 3 (forming a coalition with player 4 will give only 45% < 50% of t.lle votes).
There are four possible alignments (coalitions) of this type. Player 1 is also pivot.al
every time he is drawn third, and players 2 and 3 are not jointly drawn ]Jefore hinl.
This happens four other times. He is never pivot.al if he is drawn first. or fourt.h. In
sum, he is .pivotal eight out of twenty-four times, so his Shapley value is eqtlal t.o
284 = 1. Appl)Ting the saIne reasoning to the other players yields: 4>2 == i, 4>3 == ~ an(l
cP4 = o.
The Shapley value cP and the percentage size of the holdings induce the Sattle
ranking on the players, except that two players witll unequal holclings Illay have the
same value, as in the example above (Shapiro and Shapley 1961). llowever, the
Shapley value is not proportiorlal to the size of the holdings. In the eXRlllple al)ove a.
20% stake is worth as much as a 35% stake, while a 10% strtke is worthless.
Modern corporations rarely have an ownership structure like tIle one in t.he ex-
ample. In public companies, besides a slllall nunlber of large sllareholders, there
are very large numbers of small shareholders, owning few shares each. Shapiro and
Shapley (1961) and Milnor and Shapley (1961) extend the Shapley vallie concept. to
the limit case, in which a finite number of large shareholders face all infinite nUln]Jer
of infinitesimal shareholders. This represents a good approxilllation of the owner-
ship structure of public conlpanies. Besides sOlne technical details, tIle Shal>ley vallIe
concept extends straightforwardly to this type of games, called oceanic games.
Also in this type of games the Shapley value of a large player i can be COlllpute{1
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as the probability that player i is pivotal. This is given by
where the limits of integration are given by:
0.5 - w(S U i) 0.5 - w(S)
t1 =< > and t 2 ==< > ·
a a
(2.6)
(2.7)
Here w(S) is the fraction of votes oi the coalitioll S, M is the total nUlllber of large
players and a is the fraction of votes held by sInall shareholders. The expression
< x > means the median of 0, z and 1. The sUlnlnation is taken across all possible
coalitions formed by major players without player i.8
Formula (2.6) concerns major players only. The Shapley value of the ocean (<<))
can be easily obtained by using the efficiency property of the Shapley value (i.e., the
sum of the individual Shapley values lIlust be equal to the value of the gaIne, that. is
1):
M
«P = 1 - L ¢i.
i=l
(2.9)
(2.8)
The cooperative justification of the Shapley value is much weaker in this ext.ended
framework. One hardly believes that small shareholders literally join a c.oalit.ion
with large players. Furthernlore, the process of forlning Silllilar coalit.ions seelllS far
from costless. A different justification can be obtained stressing the probabil\stic
interpretation of the Sha.pley value" Suppose that coalitions do indeed take place in a
random fashion, as implied by the Shapley value. However, whenever one share in the
ocean is pivotal, then the pre-existing coalition sllould make a tender offer to all of
the oceanic shares. This tender offer faces the potential competition of the coalit.ion
8The similarity of equation (2.6) and the finite-number-of-player Shapley value (given by equation
(2.5)) is clearer remembering the beta function identity:
t z'{I- z)m-,-ldz = 81 {m - 8 - 1)1
Jo m!
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formed by the other large shareholders left out of this coalition; therefore tile bidfling
coalition can win only by paying out the entire benefits of control (ill this case equal
to 1). Let's define a as the fraction of votes held by the ocean, and nOflllalize to 1 t.he
number of voting shares. Then, whenever the ocean is pivotal, it will receive 1/a per
share. As a consequence the expected value of the block of votes lleld by the ocean is
equal to the probability that one share of the ocean is pivotal (<I», titlles the proceeds
obtained in such an event (l/a). Therefore, the relative Shapley value of tIle ocean
(RSO = ~) represents the expected value of one oceanic share.
As an application I COlnpute the Shapley value in an oceanic gatne. The holditlgs
of the two players are actual figures from an Italian corporation at. the end of 1989,
and the results will be useful for the case study in section 2.5.
Ezample 2: Player 1 owns 42.6% of the votes and player 2, 28.3%. The relllainillg
29.1% is held by the ocean. The Shapley values of the two large players are 4>1 == 0.56
and 4>2 = 0.06. The Shapley value of the ocean is 0.38. Dividing the Shapley value
by the relative holdings I get the IJer-share value for the ocean: RSO == 1.30.
The example suggests another possible interpretation of the Shapley value. The
56% voting power of player 1 can be interpreted as the fact that player 1 would l)e
the controlling party 56% of the time. Then player 2 will be the rulillg party only 6%
of the time, and 38% of the time a control contest will take place. '!'able 2.1 presents
sonle hypothetical distribution of ownership with one, two, and three large players,
and the corresponding Shapley value. For example, a unique large player with 40%
of the votes holds 2/3 of the power. By contrast, two large shareholders, with 20% of
the shares each, have 22.2% of the power. Correspondingly, the voting pOVler of t.he
ocean as a whole raises from 1/3, in the first case, to 55.6% in the second one.
To give a better sense of the behavior of the relative Shapley value of t.Ile ocean
I plotted in Figure 1 the value of RSO in a two player game. The vallIe of t.he t.wo
players' holdings has been truncated at 45%, because when both players approacll
50%, the value of the few remaining votes held by the ocean goes to infinity. When
one player owns more than 50% of the votes, RSO is zero, beCatlSe the ocean is never
pivotal. As you might notice, RSO is highly nonlinear. It is lower when the two large
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players jointly own less tIlan 50% of the votes, and increases exponentially when
the percentage held by the ocean decreases and the percentage owned by each large
shareholder increases.
2.2.3 EUlpirical Specification
The previous section presented how to obtain the value of a block of votes in a sitnple
majority game. This section will show how those computations can be appliecl t.o
explaining the dimension of the VOtil1g premium.
In the real world, voting rights are attached to shares, wliich are also valualJle
for their expected flow of dividends. The value of a COlnpany j can be divided illt.O
two elements: the value Bj of private benefits, enjoyed by the winnin.g c.oalition,
and the value Vi of security benefits, distributed pro rata to all shareholders. As a
consequence, the price of a voting share (Pj) can be written as:
· · lfi
P; = RT3 + Ni' (2.10)
where RTi is the value of a voting right, and Ni the total nUIllber of sllares of COlllpany
j. Similarly, the price of a nonvoting share (P~v) is
. V jpJ _
nv - Nj· (2.11 )
The purpose of this section is to obtain an expression of RTi that is a function of
observable variables. In order to reach this goal the framework of sect.ion 2.2.2 sholtld
be slightly modified to take into account that the control value is Bi (and not 1), ancl
that each share is also valued according to its proportion of security benefits ("*).
Although I will drop the company index j in the following steps, everything should
be read as referring to a particular company.
Initially I consider a game with a finite number (1) of players. The fraction of
voting shares owned by individual i is given by
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(2.12)
(2.13)
i N~
w ==-,Nv
where Nv is the total number of voting shares of conlpany j and N~ tIle nUlllller of
voting shares held by individual i in company j.
In this context the value of a coalition Shaving N; voting shares is given by
{
!:!.LNs V +B if w(S) > 0.5
v(S) == -
!jf.V if w(S) < 0.5,
where w(S) = !!J: is the fraction of votes controlled by coalition S.
Therefore, the Shapley value of a block composed of N i voting shares is defiIled
as
,J..i (") = 2:R[V(Si U {i}) - V(Si)]
'rv v III! '
where R rUI1S over all I.II! different orders on I, and Si is the set of players prececling
i in the order R. The tertIi inside squared brackets is equal to
{
~V + B if W(Si U {i}) 2: 0.5 and w(Sd < 0.5
!jjV otherwise.
Therefore, the Shapley value of a block of voting shares can be written as:
(2.14)
where cPi ( v) is the Shapley value of a simple majority whose payoff function is giv~n by
the characteristic function v(s) on page "/2. The purpose of this t.ransforlIlation is t.o
obtain an observable variable. The value c/>i(v) can be computed by using actual dat.a
of the 5% owners in company j, while lj>i(11) cannot, because B and V are unobservable.
Let's now consider the Shapley value of one nonvoting share. A nonvoting sllare
does not have power in allocating control, therefore it will not receive any all10unt of
private benefits. Its Shapley value will simply he:
78
,;,.i (A) V
o/nv V == N·
By using equation (2.15), equation (2.14) can be rewritten as
(2.15 )
(2.16)
The same reasoning can be applied to the extension of the Shapley value to tIle
theory of oceanic games a Therefore, by choosing as individual i t.he ocean of slllall
shareholders, equation (2.16) can be rewritten as
(2.17)
where c) is the Shapley value of the ocean.
Market trading takes place among small shareholders. Large sharellolders trade
their block outside the stock exchange. Therefore, t.he market price of voting right.s
should reflect the Shapley value of these votes when they are held by the ocean. In
particular, the value of all of the voting shares held by the ocean should be equal t.o
the Shapley value of the ocean. Then equation (2.17) can be rewritten in terIllS of
share prices as
(2.18)
Equation (2.18) says that the value of N° vot.ing shares is equal to the value of
N° nonvoting shares plus the expected amount of private benefits those shares will
attribute. The expected amount of private benefits is conlputed as the total size
of the private benefits times the probability that these N° shares are pivotal. TIle
Shapley value ~ represents this probability. By dividing both sides of equation (2.18)
by N: I will obtain
(2.19)
Rearranging and using the fact that N: = aN" yields
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<ltB
Pv - Pnv == RT == -u.
a lV v
(2.20)
Equation (2.20) says that the value of one voting right (RT) is equal to the
expected size of private berlefits it gives right to. In the presence of a pro rata
distribution of private benefits only the second term ( #" )would be present. However,
control benefits are not distributed pro rata, but are allocated according to a lllajority
game. Therefore, the second terln is multiplied by a factor represent.ing the relat.ive
power of those votes. This factor is the ratio ~, i.e., the relative Shapley value of
the ocean (RSO) as defined above. Figure 1 shows how this proportion varies as a
function of the ownership structure in a two player gaIne. In particular, wlleIl t,lle
stakes of the two players are very unequal, then the expected slice of private benefits
received by the ocean is very small. By contrast, when both shareholders have a large
(but minority) stake, then the proportion of private benefits received by the ocean is
larger than its pro rata share (i.e., RSO is bigger than 1.).
By using the definition of RSO equation (2.20) beconles
RT = RSO :v (2.21 )
Equation (2.21) comes close to the stated objective of expressing the value of a.
voting right in terms of observable variables, but it still contains an ullobservalJle
component: the size of private benefits B. Very little is known about the size or the
determinants of these private benefits. Therefore, I need an identification aaSUIIlption.
I will assume that private benefits are a constant fraction of the security benefits:
B=f3V. (2.22)
This assumption is clearly ad hoc. A possible interpretation is that I want to esti-
mate the average relative size of private benefits, and I aSSUIIle that tIle idiosyncratic
component in the relative size of private benefits is uncorrelated wit.h Iny right han(l
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(2.23)
side variables.9
Inserting equation (2.22) into equation (2.21) yields
RT ={3 RSO V.
Nv
By dividing the value of a voting right by the price of a nonvoting share (Pnv == ~)
I obtain
RT RSO ~ RSO
- = f3 v = (3-,
Pnv N 1r
(2.24)
where 11" = l:ft is the proportion of voting shares in the capital structure. 'l'}lerefore,
in the absence of any difference in dividel\ds between the two classes of st.oc.ks t.he
voting premium (VP) is equal to
vp = Pv - Pnv = {3 RSO.
Pnv 1r
(2.2,5 )
In the Italian context I should consider the fact that nonvoting shares pay an
additional dividend equal to €. Therefore, by employing eq,uation (2.4) I get
VP = {3 RSO _ ! _f_.
11" P Pnv
(2.26)
This specification is composed only of observable variables and, thus, can be used in
the empirical analysis.
The predictions are that {3 is positive, and the c.oefficient of _pE is negative alld
ntl
equal in absolute value to the inverse of a discount factor. Evell if I do not hC'.,ve an a
priori value for the discount factor, I can restrict the predicte(l value of this coeffic.iellt
between -5 and -20 (corresponding to a p between 20% and 5%).
The previous formulation assumes that the existing ownership structure is exoge-
nous. The same empirical specification can be obtained by endogenizing the large
9In other words, I assume that Bj = (,8+uJ) Vj, where U is an independently distributed randOlll
variable with mean zero. Provided that E[ultfl] = 0 this assumption allow to interpret the results
as the assumption of constant relative private benefits. However, this ra.tionalization is not without
cost. In fact, nothing guarantees that the idiosyncratic cOlnponent in t.he relative size of private
benefits is uncorrelated with the voting power of ma.rket votes.
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shareholders' choice of which stake to retain. The d~rivation IS presented in tIle
Appendix.
2.3 Data
The sample consists of all the companies having both a voting and nonvoting stoc.k
traded on the Milan Stock Exchange (f\1SE) for at least two years between 1987 Rn{l
1990.10
The spread of nonvoting shares on the MSE is a recent phenonlenon. Althougll
nonvoting shares were allowed on the MSE since 1974, at the beginning of 1980 only
six minor companies had introduced a nonvoting class of COllllllon st.ock. Only ill
the mid-1980s did this instrument become really popular. In particular, between
1985 and 1986 44 companies introduced a new class of nonvoting shares. For this
reason, my sample starts at the beginning of 1987, when there were 65 dlIal-class
stock companies listed on the MSE. The end of the salnple is at the beginning of
1990, when 88 companies with dual class stock were present. Excluding cOlnpanies
with less than two years of data I end up with a panel of 288 firlll-years. I exclu(le
from my sample nonvoting shares convertible into voting shares, until their conversion
right has expired.11
The data on the ownerslup structure, on the number of shares outstanding, and
on the dividend privilege are takerl from a stock exchange handbook, II Taccuirto
dell'Azionista. It is an annual publication issued the January of each year, which
contains the Dlost current data as of December 31st. For this reason I consider tIle
price data in the first five trading days of each year. These are taken fronI a financial
weekly publication, Milano Finanza. The voting premium is quite stable over a short.
period of time. By contrast, it is impossible to recover the ownership structtlre during
the year.12 For this reason, I prefer to avoid tinle averaging the prelllia across long
1DOnly companies listed on a stock exchange can issue nonvoting shares. The law provides an
automatic enlistment of the nonvoting share in the S.E. in which it.s voting counterpart is traded.
lilt is worth mentioning that the price differential between voting shares and convertible nonvoting
shares is roughly zero.
12Major shareholders are obliged to report their trades within 30 days to the Italian equivalent of
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period because this would have mixed up the effect of ownersllip on the voting prelllia.
A comparison between the price differentials at the beginning of 1990 and all average
over the first half of 1990 fails to show significa.llt differences.
2.3.1 SUInlDary Statistics
Table 2.2 presents the general characteristics of this salnple. These characteristics are
almost identical to those found in other companies on the MSE. The average capit.al-
ization (1263 billion Lira, roughly 1000 lnillion dollars) is slightly above the average
across the entire MSE in 1989 (992 billions Liras). This difference is produc.ed by a
few very large companies like Olivetti (a computer nlaker), Montedison (a cilelllist.ry
conlpany) and Fiat (a car maker and the largest COlllpany for Inarket. capitalizat.ion
in the sample). Although not all large companies have a nonvoting stock,13 it is
remarkable that nonvoting stocks are not concentrated in snlaller cOlllpanies, like in
the U.S ..
The average earnings-to-price ratio of the saInple iG 0.06. This corresponds t.o
a price-earning ratio of 16.6, a little high by U.8. standards, bl1t hardly unusua.l
in Europe and particularly in Italy. In Italy the average pric.e-earning rR.tio dllriIlg
1990 was 16.5. The average additional dividend paid to nonvoting shares (1.06%)
represents 40% of the average dividend yield across all MSE cOlnpanies (2.73% ill
1989). Therefore, on average nonvoting shares have a dividend yielcl 1.4 titlles a.s 1)ig
as the average dividend yield on tIle MSE. This deepens the puzzle over the size of
the price differential.
Even the average size of the largest shareholder in my salllple (52.2%) is roughly
equal to that one of the entire population: 56.7% in 1987 and 55.5% in 1990. This
might seem a very large number. The Italian corporate sector, tllough, is charac.ter-
ized by a very concentrated ownersilip structure. Even alllollg listed corpora.tions,
the average percentage of votes held by the largest shareholder is above 50%, IIlllell
the SEC (CONSOB), but this agency does not release them to the public.
13Fol example, Assicurazioni Generali, an insurance company of approxiInately the sante Inarket
capitalization as Fiat, has none.
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greater than 15.4%, the percentage reported for large U.8. corporations by Silleifer
and Vishny (1986). The difference is even more striking if one looks at the holdings
of the five largest shareholders: 28.8% in the U.8. and 81% in It.aly. As shown in
Figures 1 the relative Shapley value of the ocean is more variable when there is lllore
than one large shareholder. The widespread presence of large shareholders in t.he Ital-
ian sample nlakes it a perfect environlnent for studying the effect.s of the ownersllill
structure on voting right prices.
2,3.2 O\\rnership Data
I .~'~nerally report the ownership data as presented by tIle st.ock excllange Ilandbook,
with two exceptions. First, I combine the holdings of different cOlllpanies in a sul)-
sidiary whenever these companies are majority controlled by tile sallIe parent COIll-
pany. For example I consider tllat IFIL corporation owns 54.1% of Toro corpora.t.ion,
because the two majority-owned subsidiaries of IFIL (Sicind and Spafind) OWl} re-
spectively 32.9% and 21cl% of Toro voting shares. This approach is c.onservative,
in the sense that it tends to underestinlate the actual concentration of ownershi I) .14
Nevertheless, more than 50% of the cOlupanies in the salllple are lllajorit.y-owned.
The second exception concerns voting trusts (Patti di Si71,da.cato). Whenever the
shares of the members of a voting trust are not deposited in a llolding COlllpany, I
prefer to report the holdings separately. Voting trusts represent a fOflll of c.oalition,
like the ones discussed in section 2. This proves that large sharellolders are alJle
to forra coalitions that redistribute the benefits of control alnong their lllelu}Jers.
However, the legal status of voting trusts is not clear. To be legal, votillg trusts should
not totally bind the voting power of their members. Furthernlore, tllese agreeillents
should be limited in time to a few years. Therefore, even if the actual voting IlOVler is
somehow constrained, the future bargaining power, at the next renewal, will de!len<!
on the Shapley value of the individual holdings. For these reasons I prefer to (livide
14In fact, in some cases effective control is exercised even with sI11aller blocks. Suppose that IFIL
had just 49% in one of the two subsidiaries tha.t owned shares in Toro (~orp. According to the above
definition Toro would result nonmajority owned, but de facto IFIL would control it pretty closely.
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voting trust holdings into the separate individual holdings of t.heir lllellibers.
I follow the handbook's convention for falllily holdings. Wilen t.lle llandbook
divides family holdings among the fanlily DleIllbers, so do I. Otherwise, falllily holdings
are reported as a llnique block. In particular, the votes are relJOrt.ed as a nnique Illock
whenever a family established a holding COlllpany to keep its lllellllJer vot.es t.oget.her.
It is generally true that faIllily nlembers tend to vote toget.her. However, it, is Ilot,
unusual that disagreelnents among tileIll cause a control contest (as SllOWll lly t.he
case study in section 2.5). Anticipating possible dissidence, lIlany falllilies create a
family holding company, whose only purpose is to Inaintain together the controlling
block of shares. In this way possible disagreelllents arise inside t.he privately hel(l
holding company, and not inside the public COIllpany. In t.llis last (',ase it is certainly
correct to consider all the shares as a block. In the ot.her cases I (10 not. have a llet.t.er
guideline than the handbook's convention.
There are very few data on who owns the nOIlvoting shares. Most of thelll are
issued in bearer form and there is no reporting requireillent. SOllie clues lliay COllIe
from mutual funds, that are obliged to report their COlllposition every quarter. Their
holdings, as a proportion of the outstanding nUIllber of shares of eacll class, are tilt.ed
towards nonvoting shares. However, theJ· Inaintain a large proport.ion of vot.ing shares
too. For example, at the end of 1988 all the Inutual funds together OWlle(1 13.4% of
Fiat common stock, 22.13% of Fiat preferred stock, arid 17.81 % of Fiat nonvot.ing
stock. In the case of Montedison they owned only 3.84% of the outstanding voting
stock and 22.53% of the outstanding nonvotillg one. TIle law re<luires t.hat. t.he nUlll-
ber of outstanding voting shares be always greater than the SUIIl of the out.stan(ling
preferred and nonvoting shares.15 Therefore, even if they had equal prices, t.he lllarkef,
capitalization of voting shares would be larger. For tllis reaSOll t.lle t.il t. is COllI plet.cJy
reversed if I look at the amount of dollars (actually LlfClS) invested by IJlut.ual funds
in each type of securities. For example until the end of 1988 fllut-nal funds as a whole
invested 2 times as much money in voting Fiat shares as they did in Fiat llreferre<},
and 5.8 times as much money as they did in nonvoting Fiat shares.
15The rationale of the law is to avoid an excess concentration of voting power.
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2.3.3 Liquidity
These problems make particularly difficult to judge the liqui(lity of tile t.wo classes.
There are always more voting than nonvoting shares outstanding. However, a larger
proportion of voting shares are held in block and never traded. As a result, t.he
turnover (number of shares traded over number of shares outstanding) is generally
larger for nonvoting shares. However, the number of shares traded an(f the tota.l
value of transactions is higher for voting shares. Pagano and R,oell (1990) COlllllut,e
the Roll (1984) Ineasure of bid-ask spread itnplicit in the weekly ret.urns of It.alian
stockS.16 The voting shares have a slightly larger bid-ask spread than t.he nonvot.ing
shares (0.2% more).17 This suggests that the large discount of Ilonvot\ng shares is
not caused by an inferior liquidity.
2.3.4 Shapley Value CODlputations
To compute the Shapley value of the ocean, I arbitrarily define as large players th.ose
who owned 5% or more of a company vot.ing's shares. The cutoff is not (~rucial,
the value-per-vote of a major player approaches the va.lue per vote of tile ocean, if
the major player's stake tends to zero (Milnor alld Shapley 1978, 'I'lleorelll 4). By
using this cutoff I never obtaine more than eight large player~. By dividing t.he
Shapley value of the ocean by the fraction of votes not in the hands of la.rge lliayers,
I obtain the relative Shapley value of the ocean (RSO). SUllllllary stat.istics for R,SO
are presented in Table 2.2. Not surprisingly, more than half of t.he tiIlles RSO has a
value of zero. This happens whenever a sillgle shareholder owns Inore than 50% of
the votes. This is a consequence of the way in which the Shapley value is (lefined. It
corresponds to Manne's intuition that "if one person owns 51 per cent of the shares
of a company, nothing will be paid for the vote attached to the other shares" (1965,
lOOn the MSE the trading mechanism is an open outcry. Therefore, there are no 111e-8sures of
actual bid·ask spread.
17Pagano and Ro~1l sample includes 69 companies, 26 of that have dual class shares. IJowever, in
1988 (the last complete year in their sample) the estimated spread of the voting and that of the non
voting shares are jointly positive only in 12 cases. Therefore, the comparison is limited to the~e 12
cases.
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117). However, this is in contrast to the results of the elnpirical analysis, whicll are
going to be presented next.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Empirical Findings
This section examines the claim that the ownership structure det.erlllines tile size of
the voting premium. I compute the voting prelniulll by using the data on different.ia.l
voting shares traded on the MSE, as presented in Section 3. Tllrougho~t t.he pa.l,er I
Inaintain the assulnption that both types of stock are correctly priced. Tllis illlpHes
that the price difference between voting and nonvoting shares is a co~rect estilllate of
the value of the voting right. Besides the specification obtained in Sec.t.ion 2, I t,est.
other alternative specifications, which differ froIII the previous ones ill t.he Illeasure
of owrlership concentration employed. The purpose of tllese alternat.ive ~pecific.ations
is to identify the features of the Shapley value that lllakes it a llleaningful SUllllllary
statistic for studying the effects of the ownership struct.llre on vot.e valuat.ion.
As a starting point, I estimate the basic specification
RSO f
V Pit = a + (3 (--)it + 1 (-)it + 1tit
1T" Pnv
(2.27)
by OLS separately for each year. As you might recall RSO is relative Sha!l!ey value of
the ocean, 11" is the percentage of voting shares outstanding, and P:~) is tIle additional
dividend yield guaranteed to nonvoting shares. The results of tllese regressions are
reported in Table 2.3. The coefficient 13 always has the expected
sign and it is significantly different from zero at a 1% level in three out of fOUf
years. According to equation (2.22) f3 can be interpreted as the percentage of privat,e
benefits relat,ive to the value of underlying assets. Therefore, in Italy private l)enefits
of control represent between 15% and 42% of the value of the underlying asset.s. In
Sweden Rydqvist finds a percentage between 3% and 8%, while in (~anada a Silllilar
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model fails to show a significantly positive slope. I8
The coefficient I is always negative, as expected, and is always significant.ly (lif-
ferent from zero at a 5% level. Its size varies substantially during the different. years,
but it is always included in the predicted range, i.e., the inlplicit discount factor is
included between 20% and 5%. The regression explains betweell 5% anfl 15% of tile
cross sectional variability.
The only puzzling fact is the high level of the illtercept, which varIes ]>etweeIl
60% and 103%, and is always significantly different fOfIll zero. These levels i1i1llly
that in a majority-owned COlnpany, which pays the sallle dividend to }Jot.h t.ype of
stocks, the average level of the voting preilliuln is between 60% alld 103%, wIlen t.he
theory would predict no premium at all. This result is not just an odel effect. of the
specification used, but it is an intrinsic characteristic of the saillple. More than 50% of
the companies in the sanlple are majority controlled, nevertheless the llledian vot,ing
premium is 74%. The average voting prelnium allloIlg nlajority controlled cOlllpanies
is 72.3%, well below the average among nonmajority-owned cOlllpanies (102.6%), })ut.
still positive and significantly different froln zero. In section 2.4.3 I will disc1.1SS tIle
possible sources of this unexplained prelnium.
There is not a lot of time variation in the ownership structure of the cOlllpanies
during the sample period. There is just one case of a large change in the RSO. In
Cofide, a holding company, RSO changes froln 0 to 3.57 IJetween 1987 and 1990;
meanwhile the voting prelnium changed froln 75% to 200%. C4iven tIle percent.age of
voting shares (67%), the increase in the voting premiunl is in line wit.h tIle estilllate(l
coefficients.19 By maintaining this company in the saillple, a third differeIlce estilllator
confirms the results of the OLS regression. However, the level of the RSO of Cofi{le in
1990 is abnormally high: twice as much as the second highest RSO ill the SRlllple and
four times the average RSO among non tnajority ownecl cOlnpanies (0.9). Figure 2a
18Robinson and White test a siolilar Dlodel among Canadian conlpanies that do not require an
equal payment to both classes of stock in case of a takeover and reject the lllodei. On the contrary,
the model h&.s some predictive power among companies that do require paytllent to both clas8es of
stock in case of a takeover. For the interpretation of these results see Robinson and White (1990)
19The estimated change in the voting prenlium according to the pooled regression in Table 2.3 i5
156.6, just below the actual change (125).
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presents the plotting of the pooled sanlple, where the 1990 observation for C~ofide
has been included. Figure 2b shows the sallle plotting excludillg this o\lt.lier. As it.
is clear, the outlier is a very strong leverage point.. Therefore, I prefer t.o bias t.he
results against any possible effect of RSO on the votillg preilliulll lJy (lropping this
observation fronl the sample. On the one hand, t.llis choice excludes t.he only wide
variation in RSO, making nleaningless an analysis of the t.itl1e variat.ions. On t.he
other hand, the results are not contaminated by the presence of atl out.lier ..
The last column of Table 2.3 presents t.he result.s of an OLS regression obta.ined
by pooling the four years in the salnple. In this case the standard errors are not. only
heteroskedasticity robust, but they are also corrected to aCCOtlnt for possillie serial
correlation anlong the residllals of the same cOlnpanies ill different years. 20
The results are substantially the sanle. The proportion of privat.e benefit.s over
security benefits, represented by the slope coefficients {3, is 29.4%, and t.he ililplicit.
estimate of the discount factor is 10%. The regression explcl·:Is 7% of t.he t.ot.al vo.ri-
ability.
One might be concerned with ~he fluctuations of the f3 coefficiellt. in tIle different.
years. The tnaintained assumption is that private benefits are a const.ant fract.ion of
security benefits. Therefore, it is inlportant to notice that in a pooled regression wit.h
tilne varying {3 the equality of the four coefficients cannot be rejec.ted at a 5% level
(the F test is equal to 3.61).
2.4.2 Alternative Specifications
Having establislled that the Shapley value of the ocean is an inIportaIlt deterillinant
of the 'voting premium, I now explain which characteristics of t.he Shapley value lllake
this Ineasure so atLractive. In other words I want to COIllpare the t.heoretical sllecifica-
tion obtained in a cooperative framework (equation (2.27)), with different. at.heoref.ical
specifications, in order to identify the appealing features of the Shal)ley value. First
I analyze other measures of ownership concentration and their explanat.ory llower.
20These standard errors corresponds to GMM standard errors. where the underlying serial corr€'-
l~tion is assumed. tv be uf oidci 1'1, Whcic II is the Iluluber of cOlupanies.
89
Then I decompose the main features of the Shapley value and det.erllline whicll are
the most important.
In contrast with the Inodel of Section 2, the variables introduced in this sect.iOll do
not derive from a rigorous nlodel, but instead try to capture a "COllllllon sense" not.ion
of ownership concentration. The logical link between ownersllip structure alld vot.e
valuation is based upon the probability that different parties conlpete for t.he vot.es
traded on the market. The likelihood of a cOll1petition depends UpOll tile relat.ive
size of the different shareholders. The simplest. 111easure of t.he likelillood of a cont.fol
contest is given by a nonmajority dUffillly variable, that t.akes value 1 whenever no
sllareholder owns more than 50% of the votes, and 0 otherwise. l:'his variable is
expected to have a positive coefficient, the reason being that. a cOllt.rol contest. is lliore
likely whenever no single party has absolute control over the corporation. Alt.ernative
measures of the effects of the ownership structure are the size of the la.rgest. shareholder
and the size of the second largest shareholder. The more votes the largest sha.reholder
controls, the less likely a control contest is. A controlling shareholder who owns only
10% of the votes is very vulnerable to hostile takeovers. Vice versa, a controlling
shareholder who owns 45%.0£ the votes is very unlikely to be challengecl. By COlltrast,
the more votes tllat are controlled by the second largest. sllareholder, t.he lllore likel)T
a control contest is. In fact, a larger second shareholder is lnore likely to challenge
the dOlllinion of the first one.
The Shapley value measure has the advantage of SUlll111arizill~ t.he entire dist.ril)u-
tion of ownership into one number. One particular feature is that of RSO rises wilen
two shareholders have large equal stakes in a COlllpany. A simple proxy for tllis effect
is the product of the percentage stakes of the two largest shareholders. III fact, t.lle
closer the two stakes are, the larger the product will be.
The previous measures are proxy for the likelihood of a takeover. However, the
vote valuation should reflect the expected differential paylllent in case of a t.akeover.
A possible measure of the size of this differential payment is given by the percentage
of share~ held by the ocean. If a control contest ever breaks up, then the fewer vot,es
are available an the market, the 1110re valuable they are. Therefore, the fraction of
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votes held by the ocean should have a negative illlpact on the vote valuation ..
Table 2.4 reports the results obtained fronl substitutillg SOllIe atheoretical proxy
for the RSO measure in the basic specification (2.27). All the different. proxies have
the expected sign, and except for the fraction of votes held by the ocean, all a.re
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. In particlliar t.he nOlllllajorit.y (IUlllllly
captures most of the effects of the Shapley value. The coefficient.s are very Silllilar
and so is the explanatory power of the two regressions: R-squared is equal to 7.0%
in one case and 7.5% in the other. This silnple dUlnlIIY is luore illforlnat,ive t.IIan t.he
actual ownership of the largest shareholder (R-squared equal to 6.4%). This suggest.s
that the 50% level is indeed an ilnportant threshold of ownership. The variable wit.h
the largest explanatory power is the size of the second largest. shareholder (7.8%). An
increase of 1% in the number of votes controlled by the second largest. shareholder
raises the voting premium by 2%. The inIportance of the relative size of tile second
largest shareholder is also clear by looking at the regression that uses t.lle pro<luct. of
the stakes of the two largest shareholders.
Therefore, except for the fraction of votes Ileld by tile ocean, all of t.llese differ-
ent proxies have very similar explanatory power. The two proxies using the size of
the second largest shareholder have slightly more explanatory power than the l>asic
specification, which elnploys the Shapley value. To understand where t.his additional
explanatory power comes from, I computed the saIne regressiollS for t.he sllbsalIlple
of nonmajority-owned companies. The results are reported in Table 2.5. As you lllay
see, the variable obtained using
the Shapley value is the only one that is borderline significant. These facts suggest.
that the theoretical specification has some explanatory power even IJeyon(1 t.he SiIllple
nonmajority dummy. Furthernlore, the Shapley value variable is the only one tllaf,
has a coefficient similar to the coefficient obtained by runlling the regression on t.he
whole sample.
By contrast, the estilnated coefficient of the size of the second largest sharehol<ler
has even an opposite sign with respect to the estilnate obtained on t,he whc,le SRlllllle.
Furthermore, the regression. employing the size of the second largest sharehol(lers,
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instead of RSO, has less explanatory po,ver (R-squared 3.1% vs. 4.8%). This fact
suggests that these proxies derive their additional explanatory power witll respect to
RSO only from majority controlled companies. When one party owns lllore tllan 50%
of the Yotes, the dimension of the second largest shareholder is a good proxy for tIle
probability of a control contest. The Shapley value of the ocean does not captllre
this effect, because it takes for granted the existing ownership structure. TIlerefore, a
more complete theory should take into account the expectation about future changes
in the ownership structure.
One of the main features of the Shapley value is that it is a nonlillear funct.ion of
the percentage of shares held by the ocean, even restricting the at.tention t.o nonJua.-
jority owned companies. Therefore, it is interesting to COlllpare tIle results olJtaine(l
by employing the basic specification with the results obt.ained frOlll adoptillg a. SiJIl-
ilar specification, which irlstead attributes an equal power to all the oceanic vot.es.
Let's suppose that power is distributed in proportion to the percent.age of vot.es held.
Therefore instead of having
I will have
VP (2.28)
(2.29 )
The results of this regression a.re reported in the second COIUlllll of Table 2.5. This
alternative specification has less explanatory power tllan the basic regr:':'JSiOll (2.9%
Ys. 4.8%). This suggests that the nonlinearity feature of tIle Shapley value is an
important. one.
To summarize, the Shapley value captures two essential features: first, the sharp
increase in the votillg prelnium when a COlnpany is not Inajority controlled; secollcl,
the nonlinear distribution of power in nonmajority controlled cOIllpanies. IIowever,
the Shapley value fails to take into accouni possible fut.ure change in tIle ownership
structure. In particular, even majority-controlled conlpanies lllaintain a positive vote
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value. In these cases the percentage of votes controlled by a pot.ential challenger
(i.e., by the largest Ininority shareholder) captures the probability that a control
contest will eventually take place. The next section will test whether tIle level of the
voting premium present amorlg majority-owned conlpanies can be explained lJy t.he
probability that a change in the ownership struct.ure will prodtlCe a cont.rol cont.est..
2.4.3 A Possible Explanation for a Positive Intercept
The high level of the intercept is certainly disappointing. Tile lllodel call explain
between 5% and 15% of the cross sectional variability, but. it leaves UneXl)}aine{1 a
voting premium Jf about 80%, which roughly corresponds to the average level of the
voting premium in the whole sample. Rydqvist too finds a positive aIld significant.
intercept, but it is on average about 5%.21 Sinlilarly Robinson and White find a
positive and significant intercept between 5% and 12%. Therefore, while it is COllllllon
that even a nlajority-owned COlnpany retains a positive voting llrellliulll, in Italy tIle
size of the voting premium alnong Inajority-own.ed cOlnpanies is certainly abnorlllai.
An 80% premium deserves an explanation.
The hypothesis of a temporary mispricing does not hold. Altllough the level of
the intercept ha.s changed over time (see Table 2.3), it does not show any particular
trend over the four year period. Four years is a long tilne for a Illispricing t.hat, in
principle, could be arbitraged away.
One possible explanation for the prenlium is that voting rights are indeed valuable
even in majority-controlled companies, the Illain reason being t.hat control grollps are
not eternal- they may loose control sooner or later. According to this interpretat,ion
the prelnium found in majority-owned cOlnpanies reflects the expected value of voting
rights when the controlling shareholder loses his nlajority.
This hypothesis implies that companies that are Inajority o\vne{l l>y t.he It.alian
government should have a much smaller premium. The governlllent is less likely to ]le
obliged to relinquish majority for liquidity reasons, and until recent.ly t.lle prOSll~c.t,s
21 In the regression he also control for the market capitalization of each firtu. This variable has a
negative effect on the voting premium, and it can in part account for his lower intercept.
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of privatizations were nil. For this reason I insert into equation (2.27) a dUlllllly
for government-owned companies. All these cOlnpanies are ll1ajority owned by SOllIe
government agency. The results are presented in Table 2.6. As you lllay see tIle
state dummy has a negative effect on the voting prellliuxll. This effect. is significant.ly
different from zero at a 1% cOllfidence level. State-o\\Tned cOlllpanies llRve all aver-
age voting premium equal to 34%. This is still very high with respect to that of
other countries, but substantially below the level of other Illajority-owned cOlllpanies.
Therefore, although the proposed interpretation cannot fully explaill tIle puzzle of
such a large intercept, it can certainly account for part of it.
If the intercept reflects the expectations about. fut.ure changes in t.he ownership
structure, then the premia of state-owned cOlnpanies Sl10111d reflect the prosllects of
privatizations. At the beginning of 1987 nobody expected any privat.izat.ions. During
1988 the Italian government did indeed sell a fraction of an ilnport.ant. investIllent. l)ank
to private investors.22 During 1989 the expectations of other privatizations rose. The
bottom of Table 2.6 presents the average level of the voting prellliull1 in stat.e-owned
companies in these four years. The average preIniunl was 10% in 1987, dropped to
4.5% at the beginning of 1988, then jumped to 34.8% at. the beginning of 1989 and
to 37% in 1990. To avoid problems connected with a cha.nging COlllpositioll of the
sample, I restricted the sample to state-owned conlpanies present in 1987. If I include
the two other state-owned companies that issued a second class during t.lle sa!l1ple
period, the effect is even stronger. Therefore, the prospect of pOBsil)}e privatizat.ions
dramatically increased the voting prelniunl of state-o\vned cVlllpanies.
These facts seem to confirm that the 30% prellliulll of st.at.e-owIled c.olllpaIlies
can be attributed to an expectation of future privatizations. Therefore, t.he 60%
additional premium of other majority-owned cOlnpanies can be attributed to a higher
probability that a change in the ownership structure will produce a cont.rol contest..
22This is tb~ case of Mediobanc8, partially privatized in 1988. This company is not in the saluple
because it does not have two classes of stock.
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2.5 The Mondadori Control Contest
Despite the very high market price of voting rights, takeovers are not a frequent
phenomenon ill the MSE. Therefore, it is interesting to study whether, when t.lley (10
take place, the market price of voting rigllts react accordingly to the prediction of the
model. In this section I will consider the 1110St recent (Decelllber 1989) cont.rol cont.est
irlvolving a company with multiple classes of shares. The COlllpany is Mondadori
corporation, the biggest Italian publishing conlpany, which also owns t.he lllajor It.alia.n
newspaper. At the time of the takeover Mondadori had three t.ypes of COllllllon stock
traded on the MSE. This fact permits us to analyze, during a cont.rol cont.est., t.he
value of two different components of the right to make decisions.
In the aggregate, corporate decisions vested in the shareholders as such consist. of
(1) the right to elect the directors, which illdirectly entails the power to Jnanage the
company (designated RT1 , above, and possessed only by ordinary shares); an(l (2)
the right to vote on modifications to the Articles of Incorporation (RT2 , possessed
by both preferred and ordinary shares, but not by savings sllares). TIle latt.er right.
is potentially quite powerful, in view of the fact that all classes of sllares enjoy ]lre-
emptive rights to new shares offerings. Depending on the pre-existiIlg nUlllber and
distribution of ownersllip of the .preferred and ordinary shares, Illajority control over
RT2 could in theory compel the issuance of new ordinary sllares to }loth c.lasses of
shareholders in sufficient nUIIlber to transfer lllajority of control of RT1 to pre-existing
holders of majority control o~.rer RT2 • However, the lnechanislll by which this llligllt
be accomplished is complicated and protracted, so that in "nornlal" cirCUlllstances
the vot~s that matter most are FlTt , as can be setn in Figure 3.23
At the beginning of 1987 RT2 was valueless, while each R111 was wort.h about
7000 Lira ($5.8). At tllat time the !llajority of the company was in t.he llands of the
23For example, assume that a company has 50 ordinary shares and 50 preferred shares. Group A
owns 39 ordinary shares and group B owns just 11 ordinary shares, but all 50 preferred ones. Group
A is managing the company because it has the ~ajority in electing the board of directors, but group
B can take over the company just by proposing and approving a new issue of ordinary shares (he
has the majority to do that) in a ratio of 2 new ordinary shares for each old share of whir-hever t.ype.
Eventually group A will have 117 ordinary shares and group B 122 ordinary shares plus 50 preferred
ones, thus also the majority in the elections of the board of directors!
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heirs of the founder, through a financial holding (AMEF) that owned 50.3% of trhe
ordinary shares. Involved in AMEF were also two big entrepreneurs, De BeIledet.ti
and Berlusconi.24 l'he first owned also a direct participation in Mondadori, consist.ing
of both ordinary and preferred shares. During 1988 and 1989 De Benedett.i increa.sed
his holclings of preferred shares (this is clearly reflected in the price of RT2 in Figure
3). At the same time he obtained an option to buy one of t.lle heirs' holdings in
AMEF in one year. 25 Unexpectedly, the Mondadori heir decided to sell his sllares of
AMEF to Berlusconi, violating the previous agreement with De Benedetti aIld giving
Berlusconi control of AMEF, and through it the control of Mondadori, at least. as RT1
votes were concerned. At this point on November 30, 1989, t.he Italian count.erpa.rt,
of SEC suspended the listing on the MSE for two weeks. De Benedet.ti sOllght t.o
enforce his previous agreement with the Mondadori heir t.hrough the COllrts and, at.
the same time, proposed a new issue of ordinary shares in a ratio of four Ilew ordinary
shares for each old share of any type held. Having 17% of the ordinary shares (t.hat.
represented 54% of RT2 ) and 71% of the preferred, he was very likely t.o sllcceed in
gaining approval of such a proposal. He was using the lllechanislll descrilJed above
in an effort to secure full control. However, Berlusconi objected t.o De Benedet.t.i
proposal in court because, he argued, the proposal was agaillst tIle corporat.ioIl '8
interest. These events took place between Novelnber 30 and Deceillber ] 2, wllile all
types of shares were suspended from trading. The relat.ive lloldings of the t.wo players
and the relative Shapley value of the ocean are t.he ones report.ed in exalllple 2 in
Section 2.
Let's look at the price data for the days in which the stock was officially t,raded. 26
After the announcement of the breach of sale contract the price of RT2 alillost, (lo111Jled
(see Figure 4). Its price (about 18000 Lit., $14.4) is about tllree t.inles as Illuch as it
was three month earlier, when there was no prospect of a control cont.est.
24The former is CEO of Olivetti, and a very active financier; the latter is the "king" of Italian
private t~levision networks.
25The story is extremely complex, so I win omit some details, while keeping the important features.
More details can be found in the WSJ 4/3/1990.
26Italian newspapers reported that some trade just outside the stock market took plB.f,e in the
days in which the sha.res were suspended, but reliable data on these trades are not available.
96
By looking at equation (2.21) you can see that before any control contest has
started the price of a right RT2 is equal to
RTTlb _ tfl !!-
..L2 - ,
aNu
(2.30)
where the index b indicates the price before the cont.rol contest. ,!'he beginning of
a control contest implies that the ocean is indeed pivot.al, tllerefore the value of a
votj,ng right becomes
(2.31 )
where the index a indicates the price after the news of a control COllt.est. wa.s release(l.
Therefore, the model predicts that the ratio between the price of a voting rigllt before
and after a control contest has started is given by
(2.32)
Therefore, the observed variation in RT2 is fully consistent with the Illodel.
TIle rising value of RT2 before November 30th reflects the pttrcllases of preferred
shares by De Benedetti. Despite the fact that lJetween 1987 a.nd 1989 De BeIle{letti
was the only one to buy preferred shares on the Illarket for control llurposes, as is
clear from his holdings at the beginning of the control contest,2i tllese I)Urc}lRses
significantly raised the price of RT2 • So, even if he did not face direct. COllllletit.ion,
he produced a dramatic rise in prices.
In September and October 1988, for the first tilne ever, there was an at.t.enlpt to
take ove~ d, company (Interbanca) using the preferred shares. As it is clearly ShOWll
by the jump of RT2 in Figure 3, this had immediate effects on the value of the RT2 of
Mondadori. The Inarket realized that a company Inay be a takeover target even \vhen
a group has a majority control over RT1 if it does not have tile tnajority over RT2
(as in the Mondadori case). Therefore, RT2 can be interpreted as the value directly
connected with a takeover, while RT1 is the value of an access to the lllanagelJlent of
27Besides De Benedetti's 73%, the only other significant owners were sOlne mntual funds that
together owned 2.4%.
97
a company.
This case stJ.dy shows that the market is able to distillguisll betweell tile d.ifferent.
compon~n.ts of the vote value. The price response at the beginning of the cont.rol
contest is consistent with the model of Section 2. The overall Illovenlents of t.he
prices of the two vote components support the notion that tIle vote value (lepen(ls
upon the distribution of ownership.
2.6 Conclusions
Traditional finance theory disregards the vote component in pricing COlIIlllOIl st.ock.
This omission would not be 50 llarmful if the vote value COIllponellt were sIllall an(l if
its variability at the tilne of major corporate evellts were insignificallt. Usillg a sallIpIe
o£ Italian companies with dual class shares I sllow tllat neitller of tllese COIldit.ions
is verified. The market price of a vote is a significant COlllponent of tIle value of a
common stock and it is a highly nonlinear function of tIle distribution of ownership.
The use of a cooperative concept, like the Shapley value, to 1110del the effect. of
ownership distribution on the value of votes is proved t.o lJe qtlite suc.c.essful in ex-
plaining the relationship between ownership and value of votes. The Shapley vallie
captures two essential features: first, the sharp increase in the voting prelllitll11 wIlen
a company is not majority controlled; second, the nonlinear (listribution of power ill
nonmajority controlled compallies. However, the Sha.llley value fails to take int.o ac-
count possible future change in the ownership structure. In partic.ular, even llla.jorit.y-
controlled companies maintain a positive vote va.lue. More researc.h, both theoretical
and empirical, needs to be done in order to fully understand t.Ile dist.ribution of Ilower
and the value of voting rights in public corporations.
However, these findings connecting ownership concentratioll and vote valuat,ion
challenge not only the tra.ditional way of pricing assets, but also lilost of the elilpirical
results obtained by extrapolating the market price of a s}lare to the Inarket value of
the entire company. Events that modify the ownership distribution, like target.ed
stock repurchases or the arrival of a new large shareholder, should be reconsidere<l,
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explicitly taking into account the iInplicit change in tile lIlarket. price of votes that
those events would produce.
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I2. 7 Appendix A: An Alternative Derivation
This appendix provides an alternative derivation of the specificat.ion (2.2.5) In t.he
text, in which the large shareholders' choice of the st.ake to ret.aill is endogenous. 'fhis
result is derived by applying Zwiebel's (1991) llloclel to a dual c.la.ss stoc.k COlllpany.
Zwiebel derives the optimal ownership structure as a sequential choice of two t.Ylles
of shareholders, having different financial resources. In the Silllpiest versiOll of his
model Zwiebel assumes that block shareholders divide privat.e bellefits according to
the Shapley value of a majority voting gRIlle. Type 1 shareholders, the richest. Olles,
choose first, allocating all their wealth in one COlupany. The type 2 shareholders (less
wealthy, but still large enough to get a fraction of private bellefits) (lecide to invest
their wealth in a company according to the share of private benefits tlley call get..
Besides an integer problem, in equilibriulll type 2 shareholders sllould be illclifferent
with respect to the company in which to invest their fun(ls. Let's call nl, tIle wea.lt.h
of type 2 shareholders. In equilibriunl the anlount of privat.e bellefit.s t.lley can obta.in
by investing their wealth m in different companies sllould be equal. Tllerefore,
(2.33)
where nt = Rr;,i is the number of votes that 1n dollars invested in company j vot.ing
rights can buy, and ¢i(nt) is the Shapley value obtained by holding 1tt vot.es. By
dividing all the terms by m I obtain
lj>i(nt) Bj
ntRTi
k
m
!(, (2.34)
Resolving equation (2.34) with respect to RTj yields
(2.35 )
In practice I do not observe the value of the type 2 shareholders' wealtll, so I
cannot compute the amount nt. However, equation (2.35) can be rewritten as
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I 1 ¢>i (71·t ) B iIi wi Nt' (2.36)
I
where wi is the percentage of votes that a type 2 player can acquire in COlllpany j
with a wealth equal to m. Milnor and Sllapley prove (1961, Theoretll 4,296) tllat tIle
value-per-vote of a major player approaches the vailie-per-vote of the oc.ean, if tile
major player's stake tends to zero. Therefore, if the type 2 shareholders' stake is not
too large, then
<pi
-.,
oj (2.37)
where ~j is the Shapley 'talue of the ocean in COlllpany j and oj is tile proportion of
shares held by the ocean in company j. By substituting equation (2.37) into equation
(2.36) I obtain
Also in this case I need the identification hypothesis tllat private benefits are
a constant proportion of security benefits. By exploiting this assulllpt.ion all(} by
dividing both terms by the price of a nonvoting share, I get
I
1 q,i Bi
K a j Nt·
f3 <pi Ni
K ~ Nt'
(2.38)
(2.39 )
or
Vpi (3 qJi
---K 01r
f3 RSO
----K 1r (2.40)
I
I
I
Equation (2.40) is observationally equivalent to equation (2.25). Tile ollly differ-
ence arises in the interpretation of the slope coefficient. In equation (2.25) tile slope
coefficient is simply the proportion of private benefits relative to security benefits
across all companies. By contrast, in equation (2.40) it is the proportion of private
benefits divided by the value of private benefits per dollar obtained by type 2 sllare-
holders. In the empirical analysis I will maintain the first interpretation, but it ShOllld
he clear that everything can be restated according to tllis second interpretation.
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2.8.1 Preferred Shares
I
2.8 Legal Appendix
"Preferred" shares are regulated by article 2351 (paragraph II) of tIle 1942 (~iviI
Code. The Articles of Incorporation of each COlllpany Illay establisll s}lares, preferred
as to the distribution of profits and in liquidation of the COlllpanJt, tilat. have their
voting right restricted to the "extraordinary asselnbly", (the annualllleeting at which
shareholders are requested to vote on modifications of the Articles of Incorporat.ion,
included new shares issues, mergers, etc.).
Ilnportantly, the law does not fix any nlinilllulll privileges. TIle only l)indilig
limitation on the voting right is that preferred shareholders lllay not vote to elect tile
members of the board of directors. In practice, the privilege consists in t.he fact. t.hat.
ordinary shareholders cannot receive any dividen(ls until preferrecl shareholders have
received a minimum dividend equal to a figure that varies between 5% and 12% of
par value. This right is not cumulative. Furt.hertDOre, it does not guarantee a return
in excess of returns to ordinary shareholders, once the lllinilllUlll dividend lIas lJeen
satisfied. Because the actual nlarket price of the shares is generally Illany tinles its
par value, the actual value of dividend preferenc~ is draillatically diluted. Preferred
shares may not account for more than 50% of the capital of a COInpany (at par value).
2.8.2 Savings Shares
Law 7/6/1974 n.216 introduced the possibility, lilnited to cOlllpanies that. have t.heir
ordinary shares listed on a stock exchange, of issuing shares without any voting rigllts,
explicitly denominated savings shares. In contrast with preferred shares, t.he law
precisely establishes mininlum privileges for these securities. Illdividual cOlllpanies'
articles of incorporation may only enlarge these privileges (an opportunit.y SOlllet.illles
exploited). Furthermore, the law establishes additional privileges unique to savings
shares: (1) The3T are the only kind of share in Italy that nlay be issued in bearer
form (article 14, paragraph III); (2) a holder of savings shares for the inCOllle clerived
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frOII} these can choose between two fiscal treatlIlents, tIle ordillar)T treatlllellt or a
~"ithholding tax of 15%, which allows hil11 to exclttde the divi(leIlds frOll1 llis personal
income tax. With the first he must register his sllares (article 20 paragrapll IV). The
nlinillluin privileges connected with the life of the COlllpallY are (article 15)
1. Profits Innst be distributed first to the savings shareholders ltp to 5% of tile IJar
value of their shares.
2. Dividends may be distributed to ordinary sllareholders only if t.he divi(len<ls
received bJf the savings shareholders exceed those received by ordillary sllare-
holders by 2% of the par value of savings shares.
3. Savings shares rights to the 5% minin1unl dividend are cunlulative for two years.
4. Any distribution of profit, in any form, nlust give to savings sllares at. least. t.he
same rights of those of any other shares.
5. In case of liquidation, savings shareholders enjoy seniority over other sha.res in
an amount equal to the par valu.e.
6. In case of reduction of capital because of losses, the savings shares llla.y be
redllced only after the par value of all other shares has been re(luced to zero.
The stated privileges are impressive. The only prolJlelll is tllat tlley are alwa.ys C.011-
neeted with the par value, a legal fiction that has no econOlllic c.ontent. Therefore,
as I have already said, these privileges are much snlaller in percentage of tile lllarket,
value. The sum of savings shares and preferred shares lllay not exceed the nUIIIIJer
of ordinary shares. The rights of saving shareholders are safeguarde<l l>y a "col111non
representative" elected in a special meeting of the shareholder3 of this class.
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Table 2.1:
Examples of Shapley Values
For each player the first column reports the percentage of votes held, and the second COlUll1ll
the percentage of power attributed by the Shapley value.
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 OceaIl
Per. Shape V. Per. Shape V. Per. Shape V. Per. Shape V.
10 11.11 0 0.00 0 0.00 90 88.89
20 25.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 80 75.00
30 42.86 0 0.00 0 0.00 70 57.14
40 66.67 0 0.00 0 0.00 60 33.33
10 10.94 10 10.94 0 0.00 80 78.13
20 24.49 10 10.20 0 0.00 70 65.31
20 22.22 20 22.22 0 0.00 60 55.56
30 41.67 10 8.33 0 0.00 60 50.00
30 36.00 20 16.00 0 0.00 50 48.00
30 25.00 30 25.00 0 0.00 40 50.00
40 64.00 10 4.00 0 0.00 50 32.00
40 56.25 20 6.25 0 0.00 40 37.50
40 44.44 30 11.11 0 000 30 44.44
40 25.00 40 25.00 0 0.00 20 50.00
10 10.79 10 10.79 10 10.;9 70 67.64
20 24.07 10 10.19 10 10.19 60 55.56
20 22.40 20 22.40 10 10.40 50 44.80
20 23.96 20 23.96 20 23.96 40 28.13
30 40.80 10 8.80 10 8.80 50 41.60
30 36.46 20 17.i1 10 11.46 40 34.38
30 35.80 20 24.69 20 24.69 30 14.81
30 33.33 30 33.33 20 33.33 20 0.00
30 33.33 30 33.33 30 33.33 10 0.00
40 61.46 10 5.21 10 5.21 40 28.13
40 53.09 20 8.64 10 8.64 30 29.63
40 41.67 20 16.67 20 16.67 20 25.00
40 41.67 30 16.67 10 16.67 20 25.00
40 33.33 30 33.33 20 33.33 10 0.00
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Figure 2-1:
Relative Shapley Value of the Ocean in a Two
Player Game
/
/
/
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Table 2.2:
Summary Statistics
The voting premium is the grand average of V Pit, where V Pit is tIle IJercentage pre-
mium of voting over nonvotiIlg shares for company i at the beginning (first. five trading
days) of year t. The dividend privilege is the percentage size of the a(lditional divi-
dend yield of the nonvoting shares at the beginning of each year. 11'" is the percent.age
of voting shares iTt the capital structure of c.onlpany i at the beginllillg of each year.
The percen.tage of voting sha,res is the nUlllber of vot.ing shares over t.he total nUlllber
of outstanding shares at the beginning of each year. The size of the biggest (second
biggest) shareholder is conlputed as the percentage of the voting shares lle](} at. t.he
beginning of each year by the largest (second largest) shareholder. RSO is tIle Shap-
ley value per vote of the ocean of small shareholders (those who own less t.hal} .5%
of the votes). Earnings-to-price ratio and lllarket capitalization are COlllput.ed using
voting shares data (1 $ = 1200 Lit.).
VARIAB. MEAN MEDIAN ST.DEV. MIN. MAX.
Voting Premium 82.50 74.4 64.88 -44.36 435.01
Differential div. 1.06 0.93 0.97 0.06 6.31
Perc. voting shares (7r) 75.38 79.59 12.9; 50 100
Size biggest shareholder 52.16 51.20 12.97 5.20 92.00
Size second biggest shareholder 5.91 0.00 7.72 0.00 33.40
RSO (!-) 0.23 0.00 0.41 0.00 3.57
E-P ratio 6.0 4.9 .5.2 0.0 47.6
Market Cap. (In million US$) 1052 342.5 1966.6 15.6 17732
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Table 2.3:
Determinants of the Voting Prelllium
V Pit == a + f3( R;O )it +, Privilegeit + Eit
V Pit is the percentage premiuln of voting over nonvoting shares for COlllpany i at t.he
beginning (first five trading days) of year t. RSOit is tIle relative Shapley value of
the ocean composed by small shareholders (those who own less t.han 5% of t.he vot.es).
Votes ownership is computed at the beginning of each year, using data update(l t.ill
the end of the previous year. 1T" is the percentage of voting sllares in tIle CalJital
structure of company i at the beginning of each year. TIle privilege is the percent.age
size of the additional dividend yield of the nonvoting shares at the beginning of each
year. All estimates are obtained Jy OLS. Heteroskedasticity rolJust standard errors
are reported in brackets. For the pooled regression the sf.andard errors are rolJust
both to heteroskedasticity and to serial correlation between observatiollS of the sanle
companies.
1987 1988 1989 1990 Poole{l
Constant 60.0 90.0 102.8 80.7 84.4
(6.3) (16.6) (12.0) (12.0) (8.2)
RSO 17.9 14.6 38.9 41.7 29.4
11" (6.9) (12.9) (15.6) (14.7) (9.3)
Privilege -5.0 -12.8 -11.9 -20.1 -10.1
(2.8) (6.5) (5.9) (7.3) (3.8)
R**2 (%) 10.0 4.9 10.0 14.9 7.5
Observations 57 75 78 77 287
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Figure 2-2:
Plotting of the Pooled OLS Regression
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Table 2.4:
Alternative Specifications: Whole Sample
RSOit is the relative Shapley value of the ocean composed by 5IIIall sllareholders (t.hose who
own less than 5%). Votes ownership is computed at the beginning of eacll year, using dat.a
updated till the end of the previous year. 1r is the percentage of voting shares in the capit.al
structure of conlpany i at the beginning of each year. The nonillajority-owned dUlllllly takes
vallIe 1 when a company does not have any shareholder owning 50% or Inore of the votes,
and 0 otherwise. The size of the largest shareholders is the fraction of votes held by the
largest shareholder in a company. SinLilarly for the SiZE of the second largest shareholder r
The product of the first two shareholders is the product of the two variables just lllellt.ioned.
The ocean votes variable is the fraction of votes held by small shareholders. Th.e privilege is
the percentage size of the additional dividend yield of the nonvoting shares at the beginning
of each year. All estimates are obtained by OL8 and have 287 observations. The standard
errors (reported in brackets) are robust both to heteroskedasticity and to serial correlation
among observations of the same companies.
I II III IV V
Constant 84.4 83.9 132.0 81.8 97.0 83.4
(8.2) (8.5) (15.2) (15.7) (20.6) (i.B)
RSO 29.4
1f'
(9.3)
Nonmajority-owned dummy 28.6
(10.9)
Size Largest Shareholder -75.8
(28.8)
Size Second Larg. Shareholder 191.2
(60.2)
Ocean votes - 8.6
(41.8 )
Product First Two Shareholders 425.4
(144.3 )
Privilege -10.1 -10.8 -10.3 -10.8 -11.3 -~, 1.7
(3.8) (3.8) (3.8) (4.0) (4.0) (4.1 )
R**2 (%) 7.5 7.0 6.4 7.8 2.8 7.7
111
Table 2.5:
Alternative Specifications:
N onmajority-owned Companies
RSOit is the relative Shapley value of the ocean cOlnposed by sIllall sharellol(lers (those \vho
own less than 5%). Votes ownership is computed at the beginning of eacll year, using data
updated till the elld of the previous year. it" is the percentage of vot.ing shares in t.he capit.al
structure of company i at the beginning of each year. The size of the largest shareholders
is the fraction of votes held by the largest sharehol(ler in a COIllpany. SiIllilarly fOT the size
of the second largest sharellolder. The product of the first t"NO shareholders is tIle produ(~t
of the two variables just mentioned. The ocean votes variable is tIle fractioll of votes held
by small shareholders. The privilege is the percentage size of the additional dividend yield
of the nonvoting shares at the beginning of each year. All estilllates are oht.ained by OLS
and havE 92 observations. The standard errors are robust both to heterosk~dasticityand
to serial correlation among observations of the saIlle CGmpal1ies.
I II III IV V VI
Constant 96.7 113.9 120.8 117.3 159.6 125.6
(20.1 ) (15.7) (16.9) (19.1 ) (49.5 ) (3i.2)
RSO 20.9
1['
(13.3)
1 71.6
1r
(257.9)
Size Largest Shareholder -14.5
(57.8)
Size Second Larg. Shareholder -7.4
(9.0)
Ocean votes -8.9
(8.8)
Prodttct First Two Shareholders .. 14.9
(48.0)
Privilege -13.7 -14.8 -14.2 -14.7 -15.4 -14.5
(10.0) (10.3) (11.1) (10.3) (10.3) (10.:1 )
R**2 (%) 4.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 6.6 3.1
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Table 2.6:
Effect of State Ownership on the Voting
Premium
V Pit = a +{3( R;O)it + ,Privilegeit + 6DSTATE it + fit
V Pit is the percentage premiUlll of voting over nonvoting shares for COlllpany i at the
beginning (first five trading days) of year t. RSOit is the relative Sllapley value of the
ocean cOlnposed by small shareholders (those who own less thatl 5% of the votes). Votes
ownership is computed at the beginning of each year, using data updated till the end of the
previous year. The privilege is the percentage size of the additiollal dividend yield of t.he
nonvoting shares at the beginning of each year. 7r is the percentage of voting shares in the
capital structure of company i at the begi1ming of each year. DSTATE is a dUlllllly variable
that takes -value 1 when a company is controlled by the Italian Government, and 0 otherwise.
The standard errors are robust both to heteroskedasticity an<l to serial correlatioll between
observations of the same companies.
Constant 91.4
(8.3)
RSO 23.1
11" (9.2)
I Privilege -10.8(3.7)
State ownersllip dUlllll1y -57.2
(8.8)
R**2 (%) 13.4
Observations 287
Average Voting Premium in State-Owned
Companies
Mean
St.dev.
MiniIIlUm.
Maximulll
1987 1988 1989 1990
10.4 5.8 29.7 33.7
10.2 16.2 19.7 17.8
0.5 -8.9 6.3 15.1
20.9 30.9 60.8 59.1
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Figure 2-3:
I Prices of Mondadori's voting rights before the
control contest
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RTI = Right to vote in the elect.ion of t.he llOaf(l of direct.ors.
RT2 = Right to vote for modifications of the Art.icles of Incorporations.
Prices are measured in Italian Lira.
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Figure 2-4:
Prices of Mondadori's voting rights during the
control contest
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RTI = Right to vote in t.he elect.ion of t.lle boar(l of direct.ors.
RT2 = Right t.o vote for modificat.ions of t.he Articles of Incorporat.ions.
Prices measured in Italian Lira.
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II Chapter 3
The Value of the Voting Right in
the U.S.
The 1980s can legitimately he considered the decade of corporate control. Fri~ndly
and hostile acquisitions have reshaped corporate America. Tender offers for publicly
traded companies increased from 58 in 1975 to 217 in 1988. The total nUlllber of
acquisitions of publicly traded cOlnpanies went {roin 130 in 1975 to 462 in 1988.
Takeover speculation was considered a fundamental propellant of the bull lllarket of
the 19808, and antitakeover legislation was even hlalned (Mitchell and Netter 1989)
for the 1987 crash. The collapse of the junk hond market and gtate antitakeover
legislations seem to have ended this period. In 1990 acquisitions of publicly traded
companies dropped to 185 and tender offers to 56, respectively 60% and 74% less
than just two years earlier.
These events makes the last decade a very interesting period to st.udy the value
of corporate control and its changes through time. However, there is one difficulty:
the value of corporate control is not directly observable. It is not generally possible
to distinguish between the value of a vote and the value of the underlying investlnent
interest, bundled together in a common share. Disentangling these two components,
though, is possible whenever there are multiple classes of common stock traded, hav-
ing differential voting rights. Companies with dual class stock llave been studied for
the 19708 by Lease, McConnel and Mikkelson (1983 and 1984). They found that su..
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perior voting shares traded at a 5% average premium above the inferior voting shares
of the same company. However, they could not account for the cross sectiollal Rn(l
th.e time series variability of this prenliuln. Furthernlore, they were unable t.o direc.t.ly
relate the voting premium with the control value.
The purpose of this paper is to explain the llloveinents in t.he prelniulll at.t.ril)ut.ed
to superior voting shares during the 19805, by directly relating this vot.ing preJlliuJll
to the control value. By following this approach I will be alJle to estilllate t.he value
of control and to investigate its sources. First, I will arglle that. the vot.ing prellliulll,
suitably defined, is equal to the expected differential paylnent in c.ase of a takeover.
The size of this payment is related to the private benefits that a controlling sllarehol(ler
can extract from a company. The likelihood of a differential payillent is deterillined by
the ownership structure and by the competition in the lllarket for corporat.e control.
I will then test these propositions by using a new data set of dtlal class COlll!lanies
having both classes traded on the same stock exchange. During t.he 19805 dual class
companies have become increasingly widespread in the U.8 .. Therefore, I was able to
assemble a pan~l data consisting of 97 companies.
A study of acquisitions among these companies shows that superior voting shares
receive a differential payment whenever the acquisition is not frien(lly initia.ted a.nd
there is more than one bidder for the company. A direct investigatioll of the l)ehavior
of the superior voting shares' premium, at the time a company undergoes lllajor
changes in the ownership structure, uncovers a clear relationship between tile size of
the voting premium and the probability of a takeover. These two facts support t.he
claim that the voting premium reflects the expected differential payment in case of a.
takeover.
A panel data analysis investigates the relationship between the value of control,
the ownership structure, the likelihood of a takeover and the voting prellliull1. A
simple regression of the voting premium on the voting power of outside shareholders
and on the likelihood of a takeover can explain 11% of the variability of the voting
premium. This regression pro'llides also an estinlate of the relative size of private
benefits of control: about 2% of the value of the discounted future cash flow. In
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addition, controlling for the company size, tile voting prellliulll is posit.ively correlat.ed
to the level of executive salaries.
There is no evidence that the price difference between the two classes is affected
by a "noise trader risk" it la De Long et ale (1990). According to their t.heory, assets
mainly traded by individual investors should sell at a discount with respect to their
fundamental value. A large concentration of not-fully-rational individual investors
creates an additional resale price risk, which is reflected in a lower price of the asset..
This theory would ilUply a positive relationship between the size of tIle prellliulll
and the presence of institutional investors, who reduce the discount produced }lY
noise traders. On the contrary, the voting prelniulll is negatively correlated with t.Ile
fraction of superior voting shares held by institutions. A possible eXI>lallation for
this finding is that institutions prefer to own st.ocks in ,vhich control vallie is Sillall.
This preference can explain the institutional investors' leaning toward inferior voting
shares and the larger presence of institutions in superior voting stock of cOlllpanies
with a smaller voting premium.
The paper starts presenting the sampling criteria and the tnain features of t.he
dual class companies in the sample. The study includes all conlpanies having tY/O
classes of differential voting common stock contemporaneously traded on tIle saille
U.S. stock exchange (NYSE, AMEX or OTe) bet.ween 1979 and 1990. Rougllly half
of the sample is made of dual class stocks with identical dividend rigllts. In tile
remaining half of the sample the inferior voting stock is entitled to receive a larger
dividend. However, the size of the additional dividend is sluall and its occurrence
uncertain, therefore the market value of this additional right is fairly slnall. This fact
justifies pooling the two subsamples. However, I also present the results obt.ained
restricting the sample to dual class stocks with identical dividend rights, wllenever
there is any doubt that the results may depend on the difference in the divj(lend
rights.
Section 2 tests whether the voting right has a positive value. In 69% of tIle
company-years superior voting shares are stati.stically more valuable than inferior
voting shares. Vice versa, in 18% of the cases superior voting shares are statist.ically
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less valuable than inferior voting shares. This puzzle is not just an effect of differ-
fences in dividend rights. Restricting the attention to dual class stock witll identical
dividend rights, 71 % shows a positive value of the voting right, while 24% shows a
negative value of the voting right. Lease, Me,Connel and Mikkelson find tllat only
the companies with a voting preferred stock outst.an(ling have a negative value of t.he
voting right. Their finding is not confirnled in this saillple.
Section 3 presents the reasons why a voting right filay be valuable. The st.udy
focuses on nlarket price of voting rights, excluding any type of block trading. Mar-
ket trading takes place among outside shareholders, not directly involved in control.
Therefore, tlleir valuation of votes depends on the expected differential pa.ylllellt at-
tributed to superior voting shares in case of a takeover. This idea contrasts wit.h
the fact that only rarely superior voting shares receive a larger prelniunl in case of a
takeover. In only 2 out of 12 changes in control that took place during the salllple
period, superior voting shares received a differential prelnium. The section cont.ains
an explanation of this apparent anomaly, using a Inodel of takeover bid along t.he lille
of Grossmall and Hart (1988). According to this Inodel a different.ial paYlllent should
be expected only when the acquisition is not friendly initiatecl, and t.here is Inore t.llan
one party interested in control. A study of the events surrounding the acquisit.ions
confirm the prediction of the model. Furthermore, the average voting prelllill1n in the
year before the acquisition indicates that the market anticipates when a differentia.l
payment is more likely.
The rest of the paper uses different approaches to test the relationship between
the voting premium and its possible determinants. Section 4 contains six case studies
of the effect on the voting premium of a drastic change in the ownership struct.ure.
Five cases in'volve, or are related to, the death of the largest sharellolder. 'fIle last.
one involves the voluntary quitting of the largest shareholder. In all tIle cases t.lle
voting premium changes dramatically around these events. For the cOlllpanies with
a larger news coverage it is possible to uncover the exact titlle of certain events. In
those cases the voting premium reacts instantaneously to any news that increases the
probability of a control contest.
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Section 5 conducts a panel data analysis on the deterillinants of the votillg pre-
mium. The annual average of the voting preinitlill for each c.Olllpany is relat.ed t.o t.Ile
likelihood of a control contest and to the probability lllarket votes are IJivotal wIlen
the control contest takes placell For each year the likelihoocl of a control cont.est. is
proxied by the number of takeovers taking place in the same industry. The prolJabil-
ity that market votes are pivotal is cOlnputed froin the existing ownership st.rtlc.ture
by using an extension of the Shapley value concept. A lllodel along these lines can
explain 11% of the time series and cross sectional variability. The relative liquidity of
the two stocks, measured as the ratio of the daily average volunle in the two classes,
fails to show any significant impact on the voting premi1.1111. The section tries also
to identify possible differen~es in the relative value of control across c.olllpanies an(l
through time. As proxies of differeilces in control value I consider the salary l>aid t.o
corporate executives and the takeover premium observed in the same industry. Only
the first proxy helps explaining the variability in the vOtil1g prelniuln.
Section 6 studies the effects of institutional ownership on the pricing of tile t.wo
classes. Institutions hold, on average, a larger fraction of inferior voting sllare, and
this bias has increased between 1984 and 1990. In ~ontrast to the noise trader 1110del of
De Long et al. (1990), there is no evidence that the presence of individual investors
in the su.perior voting stock induces a discount with respect to the inferior voting
stock. By contrast, the results suggest the possibility tha.t institutiollS choose to own
a smaller proportion of superior voting stock when the value of control is la.rger.
Section 7 concludes the paper suggesting directions for fllture researc.h.
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Sample Procedure
If a company has more than one class of differential voting COffilnon stock traded,
then it is possible to estimate the market price of voting rights. This can be easily
derived from the price differential between the two classes. The best estilnate of tIle
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vote value can be obtained when the two classes differ only in tlleir voting rigllts.
For this reason, Lease et ale (1983) linlit their att.ention to suc.h group of cOIllpanies.
However, in many cases the two classes differ also for a snlall additional dividend
that the inferior voting stock is entitled to receive.1 The payillent of the additional
dividend is conditioned upon the distribution of a cash dividend to all sllarellolders.
However, many of these companies do not distribute any cash dividend, nlaking tIle
additional dividend right worthless. By controlling for the difference in dividen(l
rights, it is possible to pool the two types of companies, lllore than doubling the
sample size.2
Despite the possible preferential dividend inferior-voting COllllllon stocks are sulJ-
stantially different from preferred stocks. Preferred stocks proillise a fixed (lividenu
and a fixed sum in case of liquidation, and therefore are substantially less risky than
common stock. Therefore, it is impossible to COlnpare thelll with CO111111on stoc.k in
order to infer the value of a voting right. For this reason preferred stocks are excluded
from the sampl~.
In the U.8. there are more than 300 public companIes that ha.ve two or lliore
classes of common stock with differential voting power. However, only a subsall1ple of
them have at least two classes traded at the same time. To identify all tIle ~olnpanies
having multiple classes of common stock contemporaneously traded 011 the sallIe stock
exchange I used the CRSP daily data files, including companies listed on NYSE , t.he
AMEX and the NASDAQ.3 In these files the last two digits of the (1usip nUllll}er
lThe AMEX policy has encouraged listed companies to attribute a dividend preference to the
inferior voting class. As 8 result, more than 50% of the dual class cOlnpanies with both classes
traded attribute some additional dividend to the inferior voting class.
2Lease et ale main objective is to prove the existence of a positive value of the voting right. In
that context it makes perfect sense to exclude any confounding element. By contrast, nIY objective
is to explain the time series and cross sectional varia.tion of the voting premiuDl. The presence of
8 dividend preference, constant through time, is not a. ma.jor problem. On the contrary, doubling
the sample size is a great benefit. Therefore, I will use the whole sample of companies ha.ving
different classes of common ~tock, with identical, or similar, dividend rights, but different voting
rights. Whenever there is any doubt that 8 result may depend upon the differential dividend, I will
redo the analysis restricting the sample to dual class cODlpanies having equal dividend rights.
8This criterion excludes companies h&ving different classes traded on different stock excha.nges.
I am aware of just one such a company: the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae).
Stock exchanges differ in their trading mechanisms and so in their trading costs. These differences
may create an additional wedge between the prices of t·he two stocks. In addition Sallie Mae voting
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identify a single issue, ,vhile the previous six digits identify the iSS1.1er. Therefore, I
searched for companies with more than one class of COIDlnon stock by sorting all the
issu.es having the first 6 digits equal. I got 399 issues. By taking out the All1ericlls
Trusts (80 issues) and the stock that have been delisted and re-enlisted, I olJtained
275 issues, corresponding to 137 conlpanies. These were cOlupanies that had two
classes of common stock traded at the same time in the saIlle lllarket. Lease et ale
(1983) collected a sample until 1978. For this reason I started lIlY salllple in 1979. The
sample ends at the end of 1990. By eliminating the issues that were not trade(l after
the beginning of 1979, I remained with 117 cOlllpanies. Other six cOlllpanies were
dropped because they were traded for less tllan six 1110nths.4 For all t.lle reillailling
companies I searched the characteristics of the issues in the llfoody 's Ma1~ua.ls an(l in
the Standard & Poor Stock Records. The companies are included in the final salllple
if they met the following requirement:
1. Th.e companies are incorporated in the U.S. or in Canada (3 cOlllpanies dropped).
2. The different issues of each company differ in their voting power (7 cOlllpanies
dropped).
3. Despite additional dividend rights, the different issues have a clailll on t.he sallIe
cash flow. For example, this criterion excludes those issues that. have a dividend
linked to the performance of a subsidiary (like (jeneral Motors class E and II
stock). (2 companies dropped).
4. The issues are common stock and not certificate of voting trusts (2 conlpanies
dropped).
This leaves 97 companies that have two classes of conlffion st.ock traded at. t.he
same time for more than six months between 1979 and 1990.
stock ownership is restricted to banking and educational institutions (see Chevalier 1991). 'fhese
differences suggested to exclude this company from the sample.
4Five companies issued the second class after June 1990, the sixth conlpanies (First Boston Inc.)
had the second class traded for less than six month before deciding to convert it.
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3.1.2 Voting Characteristics
Table 3.1 shows the main characteristics of this sanlple. The cOlnpanies are eqlla.lly
divided between the American St.ock Exchange and the NASDAQ quotation systelll:
46 companies are traded on the AMEX, 47 on the NASDAQ. Only 4 conlpaIlies are
traded on the NYSE. The small number of companies froln the NYSE cannot be at-
tributed only to historical factors. 5 At the beginning of 1991 I could identify 88 NYSE
companies with dual class arrangements (versus 128 on AMEX and 117 on NASDAQ).
Therefore, the number of dual class cOlnpanies that chose to list bot.h classes of stock
is substantially different across exchanges. The difference is attributable to t.he dif-
ferent listing requirements of the three stock exchanges. The superior voting class is
generally held by a limited number of people and the volulne of trading is not very
high. Given the stricter listing requirements of the NYSE, a conlpany listed on t.he
Big Board finds harder to meet the listing requirements in both stocks.
The voting power of the two classes differs across companies. Only 21 cOlllpanies
have a nonvoting common stock. In 57 companies the superior voting stock lIas ten
time the voting power of the inferior voting stock. This clusterillg is the result of t.he
large application of the Wang formula. 6 Ho·wever, it is relnarkable that 47% of t.he
NASDAQ companies and 75% of the NYSE conlpanies adopted the saille foriliula.
In addition, 11 companies have a differential voting power that exceeds the 1:10
5 Until 1984 the NYSE forbade the listing of multiple classes of different.isl voting comlnon stock.
6In 1976, in the process of admitting Wang laboratories to listing, the AMEX elaborated it,s
policy toward differential voting shares, that became known as "Wang fOllllula". According to this
rule the listing of differential voting stock was accepted, provided that it met the following criteria:
1. The limited voting class of the common must have the ability - voting as a class - to elect
not less than 25 percent of the board of directors.
2. There may not be a voting ratio greater than 10 to 1 in favor of the "super" voting claGs in
all matters other than the election of directors.
3. No additional stock (whether designed as common or preferred) may be created which can in
any way diminish voting power granted to the holders of the limited voting class.
4. The Exchange will generally require that the "super" class lose certain of its attributes should
the number of such shares fall below a certain percentage of the total ca.pitalization.
5. While not specifically required, it is strongly recommended that a dividend preference be
established for the limited voting issue.
123
ratio. The maximum inequality among differential voting stock is reaclled by Resort
International with a 1:100 ratio. In 5 companies both classes have the saIne voting
power in all matters except the election of directors. In the election of <lirectors t.he
inferior voting class elects only a minority of directors (frolll 14% to 33%) and the
superior voting class elects the remaining ones.
The Wang formula reql1ired also that, independently of the voting ratio, the infe-
rior voting class could elect 25% of the Directors. This is the case in all t.lle AMEX
companies with a 1 to 10 voting ratio. This is also the case in 50% of the NASDAQ
companies that adopted the 1 to 10 voting ratio. This fact suggests that Inany NAS-
DAQ companies arranged their voting structure not to prevent a possible listing 01\
AMEX.
The dividend rights of the two classes differ across companies too. Overa.ll, 40
companies state clearly that the two classes are equal in all respect.s except the voting
power. In 21 companies the Article of Incorporation allows t.he board of directors
to pay a larger dividend to inferior votiIlg stock, while it prohibits any differential
payment in favor of the the superior voting class. The remaining 36 cOlllpanies clearly
state that inferior voting shares have right to an additional dividend whenever a cash
dividend is distributed. In one third of the cases this additional dividend is a fraction
of'the dividend distributed to all shareholders (e.g. the inferior voting class receives
1.15 times the dividend paid to the superior voti~g class). In the reiliaining t.wo thirds
the inferior voting class is expected to receive a fixe(l sum per share in addition to
the common cash dividend, every quarter (or year) in which a cash dividend is paid.
For example Wang class B should receive 2.5 cents a share Inore than class (~ in eac.ll
quarter in which a cash dividend is paid. This additional dividend right is generally
modified according to stock splits.
In 41% of the companies the superior voting shares can be converted into the
inferior voting shares at the holder's will, while no conversion in the opposite direction
is allowed.
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3.1.3 Salllple Deacription
Table 3.2 reports the COlllplete list of the 97 cOlupanies in the saluple. For each COlll-
pany the table describes the voting characteristics of the two classes, their different.ial
dividend right and the presence of a conversion right. Overall, 17 cOlnpanies ha(l a
dual class structure before 1979. Between 1979 and 1983, 29 conlpanies introduced
and listed a second class. In the following five years tIle number of COIIIIJanies tllat
introduced and listed a second class was 45. The increase in the ntlillber of new cilla.l
class companies after 1984 cannot be at.tributed only to the revision of the NYSE pol-
icy. Just three NYSE com~~nies joined the group during this period. Taking thelll
out, the number for the later period remains substantially larger. In 1989, a.fter t.lle
creation of Rule 19c-4,7 the number of new entrants fell to just 2, versus an average of
9 companies per year in the previous period. However, in 1990 the nunlber IJOllnc.ed
back to 8.
At the end of 1990, 69 of these companies have both classes still traded, 4 of tIlelll
have only one class traded and 24 of them have been delisted. Table 3.3 presents the
name of the companies delisted and the cause of delisting, when this is known. There
is not any particular trend in the sample. It is interesting to notice that, desl>ite
the fact dual class arrangements favor ownership concentration, there have been 12
acquisitions. However, 10 out of 12 are friendly acquisitions. The remaining two were
not friendly initiated, hut eventually received the approval of the target '8 IJoard. In
addition there has been 3 MBOs and 1 going private t.ransaction..
Table 3.4 presents some sunlmary statistics. Dual class cOlllpanies are g~nero.lly
small companies. Considering their 1990 volulne of sales they rank between 7 and
5584 million dollars. The average value of sales is $570 millions, but the tnedian
is significantly lower ($200 millions). The percentage of equity represellted by the
superior voting shares varies between a mere 3% to 80%, with an average of 38%.
7SEC Rule 19c-4, introduced in June 1988, was a.imed at preventing the use of dual class recapi..
talization to reduce the voting power of existing shareholders. Rule 19c-4 did not prevent cOlllpanies
from issuing limited voting or nonvoting shares, provided that the voting pOYler of existing sbare-
holders was not reduced in anyway. In June 1990 the rule was struck down by a sentence of the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit.
125
The SUpel'lOr voting class represents on average 87% of all the ,Toting power~ It,
is important to keep in mind that this is a selected sanlple of dual class c.olnpanies,
because it includes only companies with both classes traded. It is likely that a sllperior
voting class, representing a very sinall fraction ~f tIle capital, will llardly IJe traded.
In fact, De Angelo and De Angelo (1985), studying all dual class cOIllpallies in 1980
find that the average equity stake represented by the super~,)r voting class is 23%
for the whole sample, but 36% fer the sltbsample in which both classes are publicly
traded.
The ownership of directors and officers is 011 average 53% of the sllperior voting
class aild 27% of t.he inferior voting class. Quite relnarl\:ably these perccllt.a.ges are
almost icentical to the ones found by De Angelo and De Angelo in their satnple:
55% in the superior votiIlg class and 21% in the inferior one. As a consequence t.he
directors and officers control on average 49% of the voting power. Roughly half of
the companies in the sample are nlajority controlled by insiders (median 49~8). In no
company the 1nsiders control less than 10% of the voting power.
3.2 Does the vote have a positive value?
Lease, McConnel and Mikkelson (1983) find that superior voting stoc.k cOffilnands
a statistically significant premium over inferior voting stock in those cases in wllich
the company does not have outstandillg a class of voting preferred .. Otherwise t.lle
premium is significantly negative.
I redo a similar test during my sample period (1979-1990) by using daily dat.a.
The null hypothesis is that the prices of the two classes of stock are equal except.
for a recording error, due to the fact that closing prices can lJe regist.ered at sligh t.ly
different points in time. Therefore, under the null the price of a VOt.illg st.ock (P~) is
equal to the price of a nonvoting stock (P~v), plus an observational error (€t), that. I
assume independeiltly and identically distributed:
(3.1)
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IThe alternative hypothesis is that superior voting share prices are on average larger
than the prices of the corresponding inferior voting shares, tile average difference (R1' )
being tile value of the superior voting power:
(3.2)
A simple t-test on the price difference between the daily prices of the two stocks
can determine whether the superior voting power does ha~Je SOIne value. Tallie 3.5
reports the results of a similar test. In 88% of the cOlnpany-years the hypot.hesis of
equal prices is rejected at a 99% level. In 69% of the COlllpa.lly-years t.lle sUJ>erior
voting shares carry a statistically significant prellliulll, ill 18.6% t.lle difference is
significantly negative.
The sign of the price difference is quite persistent inside each COlnpany. On aver-
age 84% of the tests of each company give the same result (i.e., if the test for one year
suggests a positi,'e value, the test for the other years will do the saIne). Only 7% of
the tests show a significant ch.ange in the sign of the price of voting rights, while tIle
remaining 9% change from being significantly different from zero to being insignifi-
cantly different from zero. These results suggest t.hat there are sOlne charact.eristics
that make tIle vote valuable in certain companies and valueless in others. rfo identify
those characteristics is the objective of section 3.5.
These results confirm Lease et al. finding that superior voting shares are generally
worth more than inferior (or nonvoting) shares. The average value of tllis prellliull1
is 10.5% (median 3.0%), even larger than the 5% found by Lease et al. However, in
almost 20% of the cases the superior voting shares sell at a statistically significant
discount. For certain stocks this discount can be easily explained by the larger div-
idend paid by the inferior voting stock. However, by restricting the sample to dual
class stocks with identical dividend rights I still obtain 22% of the COlnpany..years
with a negative premium. Lease et a1. find that a negative premiunl is present only
in companies that have olltstanding a voting preferred stock. This is not true in this
sample. There is not statistical relationship between the existence of a class of votillg
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Ipreferred outstanding and the negativity of the price difference. Therefore, the Ileg-
ative premiuDl reInains unexplained. A theoretical justification for tile discount. lllay
be found in a difference in liquidity between tIle two st.ocks. I will COllle back to t.his
argument in section 3.5.
3.3 Change in Control in Dual Class Companies
The expectation that the superior voting class is paid ...nore in the event. of a t.akeover
is the theoretical basis for the existence of a positive vote value in publicly traded
cOlnpanies. In this type of compall~es outside investors who daily trade in t.he COtll-
panies securities will never get any share of the conlpany private )Jenefits. Their
valuation of a voting right depend on the expected resale value. The resale value of
the additional voting right should be equal to the discounted value of tIle different.ial
payment received by the superior voting shares in case of a takeover. Therefore, an
analysis of the prices paid in case of acquisitions is a study on the uitilllate source
of the vote value. This section will look at some new enlpirical evi(lence on this is-
sue, and in particular will determine in what cases a differential paylnent sllould be
expected.
The existing evidence on the subject is provided by De Angelo and De Angelo
(1985). They look at acquisitions anlong all dual class conlpanies (not just cOIllpallies
with both classes traded) between 1960 and 1980. They identify 30 acquisitions: 12
paid the exact same price to both classes, 6 paid a non-cash additional cOIIlpensation
to superior voting shares, and 4 paid a cash additional premium to superior vot,ing
shares ranging from 83% to 200% of the price paid to inferior voting shares. No case
of differential payment takes place among companies with both classes trade<l. TIle
authors do not explain this observed difference in behavior.
Similarly, in the U.K. Megginson (1990) finds that 43 dual class stock COII1I>an.ies
have been acquired between 1955 and 1982. All the conlpanies in his SRll1ple have
both classes traded. In 37 of the 43 cases the superior voting shares received a higller
price. On average the price received by superior voting shares is 28% above the Ilrice
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paid for inferior voting shares. Also Megginson does not provi(le all int.erpretation for
this observed difference across cOlnpanies.
3.3.1 The Theory of OptilDal Bids in Dual Class CODlpanies
Before introducing the new UwS. evidence on the subject I briefly present a t.heoret-
ical framework that allows to predict the occurrence of a differential paylllent in a,n
acquisition. The conceptual framework is derived froD1 (~rossl11an anc) Hart (1988). I
show that a necessary condition for the existence of a differential paylllent in favor of
the superior voting shares is the existence of private benefits of control. A sufficient.
condition is the presence of competition in the lllarket for cont.rol, in a s~nse t.hat. will
be clear later.
The stylized model assumes that there are just two parties interestecl in control:
the incumbent and the rival.8 For simplicity we also aSSUlne that any bid 111llSt. involve
all the company's securities, even if different classes tnay receive different prices. In
this case the rival's bid must satisfy the following constraints:
where:
P. > a·yRI _ I
(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)
P"Pi = rival bid for the total amount of.. superior (inferior) voting sh.ares;
a,,8i = fraction of equity represented by the superior (inferior) voting class;
yl', yR = security value of the iricumbent (rival). This is the inCOlne produced by the COllll>any
under the incumbent (rival) management and distributed between the two classes
8It is not necessary that one of the two parties is the incumbent management. These nantcs are
just given for simplicity.
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according to the fraction of equity they represent (8. or Si);
BI,BR = incumbent's (rival's) private benefits of control.
The first inequality says that the riva!'s hi'''} for the superior vot.ing shares shoul<l
be at least equal to the maxilDum price the incul11bent is prepared t.o pay for those
shares. The incumbent reservation price is given by the fraction of inCOllle he obt.ains
when he runs the company (s.yI) plus his private benefits of control (BI). Here it is
assumed that the 8upericr voting class controls nlore than 50% of t,he vot.ing power.
This is indeed the case in all but one the conlpanies in IllJT S'tlIlplp.9
The second inequality represents the incentive constraint for the outside share-
holders. If they hold on to their shares they will receive their fraction (s6) of the
income produced by the rival (yR). This is the result of their ability to free.. ride
on the increase in the income produced by a change of control (Grossman an<l Hart.
1980). For this reason they will never tender below this price.
A similar constraint applies to inferior voting shares - equation (3.5). One lI1igllt.
ask tIle question why the bidder should bid at all for these shares. The bidder is
actually indifferent between bidding and not bidding. If he bids he will pay thell1
siyR, exactly how much they are worth to him. The requirenlent that. he bids also
for those shares is meant to capture the legal COllstraints that are illlposed to the
winner by the existence of an inferior class publicly traded. For example any nlerger
that alter in any way the right of inferior voting shares requires a separate vote by
class. Therefore, ceteris paribus the bidder prefers to buyout also the inferior voting
class. Furthermore, if he does not buy those shares he will end up paying tllem 8iyR
anyway, because of free riding.
If there is not any other potential bidder interested in the COlllpany, then the rival
has only to overcome the free rider problem. In this case his bid will be:
Rp, = S.Y and RPi = 8iY • (3.6)
9Also in this company, Wang Lab., the superior voting class is able to elect the ma.jority (75%)
of directors aud has veto power in case of mergers.
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This implies that the takeover price per share will be equal across classes:
P, Pi R
-=-=y.
S, Si
(3.7)
On the contrary, whenever there is another potential bid<ier wit.h a reservation
value higher than the rival's security benefit (yR), the binding constraint in t.he l>id
for the superior voting class is given by inequality (3.3). Therefore, the bid will 'je a.t
the following prices:
I B1p, = s.y + and RPi = 8iY • (3.8)
This implies that the per share price of the superior votillg share would be larger:
P. _ s.yI +BI ~ yR = Pi.
8. s, Si
(3.9)
The condition s,yl + BI > 8.yR corresponds to the idea that the bidder fa.ces
competition from other parties interested in control. In fact, if this condition is
violated the opponent is less of a threat than an outside shareholder. In this case the
rival is substantially unchallenged in his bid for the COlupany. Therefore, tender offer
prices of the two classes will diverge only when a bidder faces real competition.
3.3.2 The Empirical Evidence
In my sample of dual class companies, with both classes publicly traded between 1979
and 1990, I identified 12 acquisitions. In addition, there are 3 nlanageluent. buyout.s
and 1 company going private. All these transactions are described in In.ore details in
an Appendix available upon request.
The three MBOs and the going private transaction certainly follow under the
no competition case. In all the four cases the incumbent management was alr~~rly
owning more than 50% of the votes. Therefore, the binding constraint are only (3.4)
and (3.5). It comes as no Sltrprise that the price paid is the same for both classes in
all four cases.
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The remaining 12 cases involve a change in the ruling Illanageillent. In 10 out of
12 cases the prices paid are the same. Only' in two cases they differ. One case is t.lle
battle for control of Resorts International and the second is the takeover of Dickenson
Mines by Goldcorp Investment. In these two cases establishing the actual prelllitltll
is far from trivial. Control of Resorts International cllanged hands twice. TIle first,
time from the heir of W. Crosby to D. Trunlp. Trulllp offered $135 a share, ouly for
superior voting shares. At the beginning no offer was Illade for inferior voting sllares.
The implicit premium, computed as the difference between t.he superior share lli(1
price and the inferior share market price at the beginning of the bid, itJ about 306%.
The second control change was a negotiated transaction between Trulllp a.nd Merv
Griffin. Griffin paid $135 a share for all the superior voting shares held by 'rrUl11p
(more than 97%), and $36 for all the others. In addition, he agreed t.o sell tIle Taj
Mahal Casino to Trump. Without including the net value of the Taj Mahal sale, the
premium received by Trump is 275%.
In the Goldcorp's acquisition of Dickenson Mines the winning bid was at 0$9.0
for 100% of superior voting shares and 0$8.5 for 50% of the inferior voting class. Tll6:
difference in the bid prices is just 6%, however it should be taken into ac.count the factI
that one class is bought out completely, while the other not. The Illarket. asseSSlllent
of the premium, at the time the hid was made, was a 26% plemiuDl.
Summarizing in 10 out of 12 cases there is not a differential paylnent, in tile
other two the differential payment is respectively 306% and 26%. According to the
theory the possibility that a competitor enters the bidding should deterlnine the
takeover price characteristics. In. the absence of infornlational aSYlnlnetries one slloulcl
never expect more than one bid. In fact, the optimal bid is always a preemptive
one. However, in real world situations the best proxy for the existence of potential
competitors is the realization of alternative bids. In this respect the two groups differ
remarkably. In the group with no price differential there is only one COlllpany in
which an alternative bidder appear3. In all the other cases tllere is no record of an
alternative bid. The only exception is Mobile COllllnunications in whicll, after tile
initial bid by BellSouth, a mysterious second bidder, whose term were undisclosed,
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appeared. As a consequence BellSouth withdrew it.s bid and CatIle back ollly after
other potential bidders have disappeared. Therefore, it was not. really a COtltest.ed
acquisition. By contrast, in tIle two cases where a differential paYIIlent took place,
there is always at least another bidder involved.
Another pro~y for the possibility of competition is the agreeJnent with the in-
cumbent management. A pre-existing allreelnent with t.he incuIllbent lllRllageluent.
takes out a very strong competitor and gives to the bidder a la,rge illforlnational
advantage. tO In this case the criterion divides exactly the two groups. The first. ten
acquisitions happen with the consent of the incunlbent board. In the other two cases
the board initially rejects the offer of an alternative bidder, and only afterwar(ls joins
the winning bidder.
A different (but not alternative) interpretat.ion is that. differential paylllent are
more likely in companies where private benefits are larger. In fact., ill tile presenc.e of
larger private benefits constraint (3.3) is more likely to be binding. This interpretat.ioIl
is not testable directly. However, it suggests an interestillg indirect t.est. If t.lle
probability of a differential payment is lin"ked to the firm specific characteristics, then
the market should have anticipated this with a larger voting premium. For tllis reason,
I compute the average voting premium in the year before the first announcement of a
tender offer for all the companies involved in a control change. Table 3.6 presents the
results. The mean voting premiunl a.cross the first group of cOlnpanies is 3.28%. By
contrast, the mean of the two companies that experienced a differential payIllent. is
more than ten times as large (38.25%). Even if it is difficult to talk about statistical
significance with such a small number, a test of the equality of the two Jneans can be
rejected at the 99% level.
In sum, the empirical evidence supports the prediction of the Inodel. A different.ial
payment may be expected when more than one party is interested in control and
private benefits of control are large. In the U.8. a differential payment between the two
classes is a relatively unlikely event. However, the market seems to correctly forecast
when a differential payment is more likely. The expected value of the differential
lOOn this issue see Novaes (1991).
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payment is the potential source of the cross-sectional differences and of tile changes
through time of the voting premium. Section 3.5 will forntalize t.his int.uit.ion.
3.4 Case Studies on the Effects of Ownership on
the Vote Value
The premium of the superior voting share over an inferior vot.ing share represent.s an
estimate of the market value of the superior voting power of one class wit.h resIlect.
to the other. This premium is subject to dail)" fluctuations. Lease et ale (1984) find
that the voting premium rises after the news of an acquisition. On the contrary, they
could not find any relationship between the voting prelniuln and other corporate news
(dividend or earnings announcement).
One of the purposes of this paper is to understand what deternlines the fluc.tu-
ations in the value of the voting premi·.lm. Since Lease et ale study, many other
papers have looked at the voting premium in others countries.!! All of thelll find
a relationship betweerl ownership structure and vote value. If a cert.ain Iluillber of
players compete for the right to Inanage corporate resources, then the lllarket value
of votes depends on the power that the votes traded on the market have in allocating
control. In Section 3.5 I will formalize this relationship. However, beforehand, I want
to test whether there is any direct evidence that a change in the ownership structure
or in the balance of power inside a corporation changes the market price of votes. In
each company the ownership structure is fairly complex, and there are a lot of special
voting arrangements. Therefore, it is useful to perform SOlne case studies of nlajor
events, that substantially modified the ownership structure of a company.
The events, I am interested in, are any identifiable news that the ownership struc-
ture has changed, or, alternatively, that an existing voting agreelnent has broken
down. One example of this type of news is the death of a large shareholder. TIle
death of a large shareholder may alter the existing ownership structure, but it, does
l1Rydqvist (1987) studies the Swedish market; Megginson (1990) the British one; Robinson and
White (1990) the Cana.dian market; and Zingales (1991) the Italian one.
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not need to. A complex system of voting trusts lllay keep the defunct '5 voting block
together. For this reason, each case study should include an analysis of the effect.s
of the death of the large shareholder on the existing ownership structure. Another
possible important news is the revelation of contrasts inside the cont.rolling fRlllily or
inside the controlling management team.
By a joint examination of the Wall Street Journal Indez and the proxy statelIlent-.s
between 1979 and 1990 for the 97 companies in the sample, I could identify six event.s
that produced the disappearance of a large shareholder, and, thus, a Inajor change
in the ownership structure. Four of these C8fies are represented by the death of the
largest shareholder in the company. Another one is the joint event of the illness of
the main shareholder and the news of conflicts inside his family. The last case is tIle
decision of the largest sharehol~er of a company to swap his holdings for SOlne real
asset of the company, because of contrasts with the exist.ing nlanagelnent..
Even if five out of six cases involve the death of a large shareholder, this study
will have a very different perspective from Johnson et ale (198~5) study on the stock
price reaction to the sudden death of an executive. Johnson et al. analyze the
effects on corporate performance of the unexpected termination of an executive labor
contract. Their interest is in the size of the possible rent extracted by executives.
By contrast, I focus on the effects on the voting premium of the terluinat.ion of a
particular voting arrangement. The ownership stake, rather then the Illanagerial
position, is the screening criterion. By using the voting prelnium, any cllallge in
expected performance is fully discounted by the changes of the inferior voting shares.
Thanks to the dual class structure I can isolate the changes of the vote COlllponeIlt at
the time of the event. Finally, a big component of the news are the changes following
the large shareholder's death, e.g. the public announcement of the will. Therefore,
in my case the fact the death is unexpected is not so crucial.
The limited number of cases available and the peculiarities of each one of thelll
make a case by case stltdy more appropriate than a statistical analysis based on six
observations. Therefore, in the following I will briefly review the events and the
reaction of the voting premium in each of the six events.
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3.4.1 Resorts International
The clearest case is represented by the sudden death of W. Crosby, chairll1RIl al1d
larg~8t shareholder of Resorts International. Resorts Int~. is a big ganlbling concertl,
now controlled by Merv Griffin. At the time of his death Crosby cont.rolled direct.ly
48% of the votes. With his brotllers and sisters' holdings his control exceeded 60%
\;f the voting power. Therefore, until his death, a takeo,~er was illlpossil)le.
Figure 3-1 reports the behavior of the voting prelniuln around April 10, 1986,
date of Crosby's death. Before his death, given the impossibility of a t.akeover, the
voting premium is close to zero. At the time the death is announced (04/14/1986)
the voting premium rises sharply: +39%. This increase is significant.ly different, froll1
zero at the 99% level. Crosby did not llave children and the Wall Street Jottrrtal
reported that there were rumors that a big part of Crosby's estate was reserved for
his companion, outside the group of family menlbers. This possibility, then realized, of
a fragmentation of the controlling block increased tIle likelihood of a control contest.
It is interesting to note that both classes rose sharply. The reason of the rise in
the inferior voting stock (with just 1/100 ~lote per share) lllay be attributed to tIle
burden imposed on the company by Crosby. He was involved in ill-fated speculation
in the commodity futures market. Therefore, his death produced an increase ill the
expected corporate performance. However, far bigger was the increase in the vote
value. The dramatic increase in the voting preilliulil can be jllstified ex-post by t.he
differential premium paid to superior voting shares in a subsequent control contest
(see section 3).
3.4.2 Wang Laboratories
A complete different story is represented by the illness and eventual death of All
Wang, founder and largest shareholder of Wang Laboratories. Through his large
holdings in the superior voting class Wang owned directly 14% of tIle voting power.
By including the family holdings he controlled 38% of the voting power. Furthermore,
An Wang himself was considered the main asset of the company. His patents and
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ideas created and raised Wang Lab.. Therefore, a change in control was very tllllikely.
Given the presence of a 1.25 additional dividend for the inferior voting class, the
voting premiuln has been traditionally around zero.12
Figure 3-2 shows the behavior of the voting preilliulll during Wang's illness. On
June 26, 1989 An Wang undergoes surgery for a lllalignallt tUlllor. In tllis case
the voting premium does not show any significant. change. Wang's son was already
chairman of the company, and Wang's wife was among the directors. The in\rolvel11ent
of the family and the importance of the "Wang asset." can easily justify the behavior
of the voting premiunl. During that period, the perforillance of the COlllpany was
deteriorating. On August the 9th An Wang, recovered {orIn the surgery, olJliges the
son to step down as president, and announces the intention to searell for an outside
manager. On that day the voting premium jUlllPS froIII 5% to 62%, an increase
significantly different from zero at the 99% level. The Inonolithic Wang (.ont.rol over
the company is broken, and the D18.rket immediately reflects that.
When An WaIlg re-enters the hospital (03/09/90) the voting prellliunl increases
of another 20 percentage points. This increase is also significantly different frolll zero
at a 99% level. By contrast, the 7% increase at the news of his death (3/25/90) is
not significantly different from zero.
The conclusion from these two case studies is that the voting premiulll reacts very
sharply to an increase in the probability of a control contest. The death or probable
death of a large shareholder is not a sufficient reason to change the expectations of
a control contest. The market seems to discOl.lnt many other factors as well. What
really changes the voting premium is the news that a voting arrangelllent, which used
to rule the company, is terminated.
The previous two events took places in large and fa·.nlous cOlnpanies, witll a very
large news coverage. The next four cases are less clear-cllt. One possible reason is
the difficulty in recovery ~ the necessr"ry information.
12The additional dividend right of the inferior voting share was initia.lly 2.5 cents per share. In
1983, after a stock split, it became 1.25 cents per share.
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3.4.3 Petroleum Helicopter
Petroleum Helicopter is the world's largest chopper operator. Robert Suggs, founder
and chairman, owned 52% of the voting stock of the company. He died in Novelllber
1989.13 In his will he divided his holding among his wife and his six children. However,
he left all the voting power to his young wife, who decided to rule the COlllpany l)y
herself.
Figure 3-3 presents the behavior of the voting premiunl around the tillle of the
death. There is some evidence of a rise of the voting premium. Ilowever, this rise is
temporary. It should be so, given that the control block is Inerely transferred frolll
one hand to another.
3.4.4 United Foods
Similar to the previous story is United Foods. J.O. Tankersley, chairman and owner
of 17% of the superior voting class, dies on the 26 of April 1986. The only news of
his death I could find was on the New York Times of May 28, 1986. The art.ic.le also
reports that J .1. Tankersley, president of the company, is elected chairman, succeeding
J.o. Tankersley.
Figure 3-4 shows the behavior of the voting prellliuIll. There is not any relevant.
change around the time of the death. The big rise in the voting prellliulll takes place
between Friday May, the 30th , and the Monday, June the 2nd (+15%) and the day
after (+15%). Both these increases are different form zero at a 97.5% level. Ilowever,
I could not find any public news about the company in those two days.
One year later the voting premium suddenly returns to the previous level around
zero. I could not find any news that explained this drop. The proxy statements show
that holdings and control pass smoothly to James I. Tankersley.
181 have not been able to recover the ,,"{8Ct date of death yet.
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3.4.5 PlylDouth Rubber
Another intriguing case is represented by Ply'mouth Rubber. The Massachusett.s
rubber company is controlled by a trust of the Halllilburg family. In 1987 the presi(lent.
of the company and head of the trust, which controlled 52% of the voting stock, was
D. Hamilburg. He retired from his presidential office at tIle end of April 1987, and
eventually died in June 1989.
Figure 3-5 SllOWS the voting premium during all this period. There is no eviclence
of any increase in the voting premium at the tinle of Daniel Hamilhurg's deat.h.
By contrast, there is a period in which the voting prelnium is significantly different
from zero in late 1987 beginning of 1988, between the retirelnent and the <Ieath of
D. Hamilburg. Also in this case there are no available nevIs that can justify this
increase. An educated guess is that during that period the fanlily was bargaining on
a new votin.g agreement. In fact., an amended voting trust agreelllent was deposit.ed
at the time of the new lO-K report (November 1988). The positive voting prelniulll
in the preceding months may reflect tIle probability that the voting t.rust would break
down.
3.4.6 Moog Inc.
The last case does not involve a death but a voluntary quitting. In FebrualJ 1988
William C. Moog, founder, chairman and president of Moog Inc, a maker of aircraft
equipment, decided to swap his holdings for certain assets. The stated reason is "dif-
ference of opinion with the board" (NYT 03/02/1988). Before this decision W.O.
Moog owned about 30% of the superior voting stock and was part of a voting agree-
ment inside the Moog family. After his departure the compa,ny remained without any
large shareholder. The largest shareholder became the Moog Inc. Retireillent Trust
Plan, which owned 13% of the superior voting stock.
Figure 3-6 shows the behavior of the voting premium at the tillle of the departure
and in the year aftero In the two days around the announcelnent. (02/02/88) tlle
voting premium jumps from 5% to 22%, an increase significantly different frolll zero
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a.t a 99% level. After ihe event the voting preInium remains significantly higher. Tile
swap puts the company in play and the voting prcmiulll reflects tllat.
in summary, these six mini case studies show that the voting prellliulll reacts in
a predictable way to an increase in the probability of a control COlltest.
3.5 The Determinants of the Voting Premium
This section contains an analysis of the determinants of the differences in vot.ing
premia across companies and through tinle. The section starts with a lllore !lrecise
definition of voting premium, that takes into account the cross sectional differences
in the relative voting power of the two classes. The section continues reporting SOille
summary statistics of the data used in the regression analysis. After\vards, tile section
presents a panel data analysis of the determinants of the voting prel11ium. The annllal
average of the voting premium for each company is related to the likelihood of a control
contest and to the probability market votes are pivotal when the control cont.est takes
place. For each year the likelihood of a control contest is proxied by t.he nUlllber of
takeovers taking place in the same industry. The probability that· marl{et vot.es are
pivotal is computed from the existing ownership structure by using an extension of
the Shapley value concept. Differences in liquidity, proxied by the ratio of the daily
average volume in the two classes of stocks, do not have any ilnpact on the voting
premium.
The section also looks at possible differences in the relative value of control across
companies and through time. As proxy of differences in control value I cOllsider
the salary paid to corporate executives and the takeover premium observed in the
sa.me industry: Controlling for size, the level of the top executive salary is positively
correlated with the voting premium. On the contrary, the level of takeover prellliulll
is not significantly correlated with the voting premium.
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I
3.5.1 Definition of the Voting PremiulD
Up to now I have been deliberately vague in the definition of the voting prellliuIU. I
have been using as voting premium the premium cOffilnanded by a superior voting
share over the corresponding inferior voting share, but this is not a very sensilJle
measure when the two classes differ in their relative voting rights across cOlllpanies.
Therefore, for the purpose of a cross-sectional cOll1parison I will give the following
definition:
Definition: The voting premium is the ratio between the value of one vot.ing
right and the value of one nonvoting security:
(3.10)
where
RT = value of one voting right;
Pnv = price of a nonvoting share.
This definition is not operational yet. In fact, only if one class of shares is vot.ing
and the other not, then I can compute the vallIe of one voting right (RT) as t.he
difference between the price of the two types of shares. In this case the voting preilliulll
is given by
VP = Pu - Pnu •
Pnv
(3.11 )
I
If dual class companies differ in the voting power attributed to the two classes,
then equation (3.11) should be modified. Consider the general case in whicll each
class A share has a votes and each class B share has b votes, then
V
PA = aRT +-N
VPs = bRT+-N
(3.12)
(3.13)
where ~ is the dividend value of a, security, i.e., the value of a fictitious nonvoting
141
share.
Assume without loss of generality' that a > b, then define r == ~, i.e., the relative
number of votes attributed to the inferior voting class when the nunlber of votes
attributed to the superior voting class is normalized to one. The purpose of tllis
normalization is to make different voting arrangements comparable. For example,
many companies attribute ten votes each to the superior voting shares and one votle
each to the inferior voting shares. Other companies prefer to attribute just one vote
to the superior voting shares and one tenth of a vote to the inferior voting shares.
This difference is clearly only a nominal differerice. So I norlnalize all the vot.es so
that the superior voting class has one votes per share and the inferior voting class lIas
r vote per share (with r < 1). After this norlnalizatioll equation (3.12) an(l eqtlation
(3.13) become
and
V
PB =rRT+ N'
Then the price of one voting right is simply
RT = Po - Pb ,
l-r
and the price of a fictitious nonvoting share is
p. _ V _ rPb - Po
nv - N - 1 - r ·
Therefore, the voting premium as defined in equation (3.10) is given by
(3.14)
(3.15)
(3.16)
(3.17)
(3.18)VP = PA - PB ,
PB -rPA
Equation (3.18) coincides with equation (3.11) when r = 0, i.e., class B is nonvoting.
This definition of voting pre;mium makes premia cOlnparable across cOlllpanies with
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different voting arrangements.
3.5.2 SUInlDary Statistics
Table 3.7 presents summary statistics on the whole sall1ple. Th,e whole SRlllple is
composed of tIle 94 companies listed in Table 3.2 between 1984 and 1990.14 Tile
sample period starts in 1984 for two reasons. First of all, 1984 is the first. year for wllich
I could get ownership data fronl Spectrum 5. Spectrttm 5 is a montilly publicatioIl
that collects all the 13-G filings and 13-D filings of all t.he ptlblic c.onlpanies. The
second reason is that, as I have already said in Section 1, nlost of the con11>anies
introduced their second class after 1984.
The grand median of the annual average of the daily voting premia is equal to 3%.
This sample excludes two outliers (918% and -9424%) corresponding to the last days
of trading of the superior voting class during the takeover of Resorts Internatiollal in
1988, and to the last days of trading of Merchants Capital Corp in 1990. The grand
mean (10.5%) is about 2 times the average level found by Lease et ale (5.4%). In
part the difference can be explained by the different definition of voting preIlliul1115
However, it should be noticed that Lease et ale lilnited tlleir attention to dual classes
with identical dividend rights. One should expect that companies with a diiTerellt.ial
dividend in favor of the inferior voting shares have a smaller voting prellliuln. This
is actually true. Table 3.8a presents the annual average of the voting prell1iulll for
all the companies, and Table 3.8b just for the companies with equal dividend rights.
The two series do not look very different. The mean on the whole S&111ple is slightly
smaller than the mean on the subsample, as expected. However, this relationship is
not always verified if one looks at the medians. For example, in tIle last two years
the median in the 8ubsample is smaller than the median over the whole salnpleft
The level of the voting premium in the U.8. is comparable with the level found in
Sweden (6.5%), and U.K. (13.3%). However, it is below the value found in C1anada.
14Three companies (Investor Diversified, Home Oil and Nielsen) were acquired before 1984, there..
fore they do not appear in this sample.
l&Lease et al. define as voting premium P.,:a, where PA is the price of the superior voting shares
and Ps the price of the inferior voting shares.
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(23.3%) and Sw~tzerland (about 27%), and it is well below what found in Israel
(45.5%) and Italy (81%).16 The reasons of these sharp differences across count.ries
remain an interesting and unexplored topic.
By looking both at the means and at the medians of the voting preilliulli tllrough
time, there seem to be a trough around the mid 1980s, with t,vo peaks aroul1d 1982
and 1987-1988, corresponding to two stock rnarket minima. The negative relationship
between voting premia and market performance is another unexplored topic tilat is
left for future research.
Another important datum is the volume of daily trading. I conlputed the average
daily volume for both classes in each year. Then I defined the relative Volul11e as
the ratio between the average trading volume in the superior voting class, divi(led by
the average trading volume in the inferior voting class.17 CRSP dat.a on VOIUJlleS are
available since 1982 for companies enlisted in the NASDAQ systeIn, bllt. only sincf.'
1986 for AMEX and NYSE companies. Table 3.8a reports for each year the cross-
sectional summary statistics of the relative volumes. On average, the Volullle ill t,he
superior stock is 44% of that ill the inferior stock, but the median is only 0.2 alld
there are huge cross sectional differences. By looking at the medians ttlere seelllS to
be an increase in the relative volume of trade in the superior voting stock »etween
1986 and 1988. Those years are also characterized by a larger voting prellliuln.
The vote-to-share ratio represents the total number of norlnalized votes divided
by the number of outstanding shares. The average voting structure has Inore than
twice as many shares as votes.
The next two variables in Table 3.7 are ownership variables. The size of the largest
shareholder is simply the percentage of votes controlled by the biggest. shareholder
in a company. The average size of the largest I shareholder is 32.3%)' roughly twice
the average size of the laJ:gest shareholder reported by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) for
l6The data come from the following works: Levy (1982) for Israel, Rydqvist (1987) for Sweden,
Horner (1988) for Switzerland, Megginson (1990) for England, Robinson and White (1990) for
Canada and Zingales (1991) for Italy.
17This average is obviously different from the average of the daily relative trading volumes. This
definition was chosen because the trading volume may be equal to zero in certain datc" lllaking the
ratio Dot defined.
144
large US corporations. The comparison is not fair because t.heir salnple includes only
Fortune 500 companies. However, I am not aware of any study on the ownershil>
structure of smaller corporations. The voting power controlled by the largest five
shareholders is on average 47.2%, versus the 28c8% reported by Shleifer and Vishny
(1986). It is worth noticing that, despite the different size of the largest shareholder,
the total ,roting power controlled by the additional fOUf largest shareholders is roughly
the same in the two samples (14.4% in this sample, 17.3% in Shleifer and Vishlly 58.111-
pIe)e Therefore~ the dual class arrangements help the largest shareholder in illc,reasing
its voting control, but do not modify the average stake of the ot.ller large shareholders.
This result is in sharp contrast with the Italian data on stoc.k ownersllip in (lual class
companies reported by Zingales (1991). In Italy the largest shareholder controls on
average 52.2% of the voting power, but the five largest shareholders control 81% of
the voting power. Therefore, the four additional large shareholders own on average
28.8% of the votes, roughly twice as many as in the u.s .. Tllis difference reveals a
different structure of the market for corporate control in the two countries: a pulJlic
market for control in the U.S. and an oligopolistic nlarket for cont.rol in It.aly, where
the same few family groups are present in II10St of the publicly traded cOlllpanies.
The probability market votes are pivotal is a llleasure of ownership concentrat.ion
based upon the theory of oceanic games of Milnor and Shapley (1961), which I will
explain in more detail in the next section.
3.5.3 Determinants of the Voting Premium
In Section 3 I showed that in a contested acquisition superior voting shares received a
larger I .·emium. Therefore, the voting premium should reflect the expected value of
this differential payment. This section investigates whether there is a.ny evidenc.e of
such relationship by using a panel data of the voting prelIlilllll. Besides the relative
characteristics of each issue, the explanatory variables of the voting prellliulll will lle
a measure of the distribution of ownership and a proxy variable for the proba.bility of
a change in control.
Let's consider that a company produces an amount B of private benefits. If tllese
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benefits were distributed pro rata to each voting sha,reholder in proportion of t.he
votes held, then the value of one voting right RT would be
BRT=-,Nv
(3.19)
where Nv is the number of votes outstanding. However, private benefits of control are
not distributed pro rata (otherwise they would not differ in any way frolu ordillary
cash-flow), btlt they are appropriated by the shareholder or group of sllareholders
holding a majority of votes. Therefore, an outside shareholder, who does not. llRve
the financial resources for taking over a company, values the voting right according
to their expected resale value in case of a control contest. In particular his votes
will be very valuable if they are able to decide the allocation of control between
two (or more) alternative management teams, i.e. they are pivotal. In this Silllple
framework it is assumed that if outside shareholders are pivotal, then the cOlllpetit.ion
among contenders will oblige the bidders to payout all their private benefits to buy
the pivotal votes floating on the market. Let's call a the fraction of votes held by
outside shareholders. Then in a control contest each vote will receive BN • For a givena "
ownership structure it is possible to compute the probability that each vote held by
outside shareholders is pivotal (let's call this c)). Then the value of a voting right.
traded on the market is equal to the probability the vote is pivotal tilDe the prellliuIll
it will receive, i.e.,
B
RT=t)-N·
a v
(3.20)
With a finite llumhers of players the probability that a block of votes held by
individual i is pivotal is given by -the Shapley value of that block of votes ill a silnple
majority games,18 i.e.,
18In a majority game an individual (a coalition) wins when reaches the majority of votes. The
game is simple when the winning individual (coalition) gets the whole value of the galne (norlnalized
to 1) Bnd the everybody else gets nothing.
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s!(n-s-l)!~i = L I '
· · t I 12,.t pttlO a
(3.21 )
where 8 is the number of players in a coalition, n the total number of players and
the summation is taken with respect to all of the feasible coalitions such t.hat the
coalition with 8 players is a losing one (i.e., holds less than 50% of the votes) and the
coalition with s members plus player i is a winning one.
In public corporations besides a snlall nunlber of large shareholders there is a
large number of small outside shareholders. Milnor and Shapley (1961) S\lggest. to
approximate the small outside shareholders with a continuum of infinitesiIllal share-
holders. By doing this approximation it is possible to COlupute the proba.bilit.y ~ that
outside shareholders' votes are pivotal, given the distribution of ownership of large
shareholders.19
The value B of private benefits is not directly observable. To obtain an elnpirical
specification I assume that private benefits of control are a constant fraction of the
cash-flow value of a company, indicated by V: 20
B = f3 V.
This implies that
f)
RT = 7\T f3 V.
(lJYv
Dividing the value of a voting right by the price of a nonvoting share I obtain
(3.22)
(3.23)
RT (3.24 )
19The first application of the theory of oceanic ga.mes of Milnor and Shapley to price differenf,ial
voting shares is due to Rydqvist's (1987) study of the Swedish market. Others examples are Robinson
and White (1990) for the Canadian market and Zingales (1991) for the Italian market.
20Another way of putting it is that I estimate the average relative size of private benefits. However,
this interpretation requires that the idiosyncratic cOlnponent in the relative size of private benefits is
uncorrelated with my right hand side variables. In other words, I assume that Bj = ({3+Uj) Vj, where
u is an independently distributed random variable with mean zero. This interpretation requires that
E[u'~]=o.
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where 1[' = !ft is the ratio between number of votes and number of shares. The left
hand side of equation (3.24) is exactly the voting prelniulll as defined in. equation
(3.18). Therefore, in the absence of any· difference in dividends the voting preilliulll
(VP) is equal to
f)
VP == f3-.
Ct1r
(3.25)
Equation (3.25) is the fundamental equation relating ownership structure and vot-
ing premium. In order to test this relationship I should also include some institutional
differences between the two classes of stocks. To control for differences in dividends
paid to the two classes I construct a dummy variable DIV, equal to one for those
company-years in which inferior voting shares received a larger dividend. In additioll
I should take into account that certain companies allow superior voting shares to be
converted into inferior voting shares. This conversion right is potentially vall1able, in
particular whert the inferior voting shares pay an additional dividend. The variable
CONY is a dummy variable that takes value 1 in every COlllpany-year in which tile
superior voting share is convertible into an inferior voting share at the holder's will,
and 0 other\vise. Therefore, I obtain the following empirical specification:
(3.26)
" "' .
. j
j'
According to the model sketched above"l I expect the intercept. /30 to be zero. In
fact, if the model is correctly specified, then it should account for all the differences
between the two classes, so the remaining premium should be zero. The coefficient
{31 has been defined as the proportion of the value of private benefits over t.he cash-
flow value of the company, therefore it is expected to be positive. The coefficient (32
represents the average premium in case the inferior stock pays a differential paylnent,
and should be negative. The coefficient {33 represents the value of the conversion
right, and is expected to be positive.
21A more detailed description off'. model along these lines is contained in Zingales (1991).
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3.5.4 Regression Results
I estilnate equatiol1 (3.26) by OLS. The standard errors are corrected to take into
account heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the errors across the observations
of the same company in differerlt years.22 Table 3.9 (column I) presents the results.
All the coefficients have the expecied sign, and all but f33 are statistically different
from zero at a 95% level. The estimated relative size of the private benefit of cOlltrol
is 1.9%. This is not very different from the premiuln found in block trading IJy
Barclay and Holderness (1989) (4% of the total value of equity). It is also Silllilar t.o
what Rydqvist finds applying a similar model to Swedish differential voting shares
(between 3% and 8%). On the contrary, it is substantially below tIle relative size
of private benefits of control found by Zingales (1991) applying the saille 1110del t.o
Italian dual class companies (30%).23 The estimated value of the r~dditional dividend
(8.1%) is quite plausible, and so is the value of the conversion right. (3.9%). The only
!
disturbing figures are the explanatory power of tIle regressiOlt (just 5%) and the level
of the intercept (7.2%, significantly different from zero).
Equation (3.26) does not take into account possible differences in the probalJilit,y
that a control contest will take place. As a proxy for this variable I eillploy t.he
annual number of takeovers in the industry. The industry classification is taken frOll1
Mergerstat Review. The review provides the SIC codes that define each of its 50
industry groups. Therefore, I could determine the Mergerstat Revietl' industry for t.lle
companies in my sample by using the SIC codes reported by CRSP.24 Every year t.lle
variable NTAKE for company i is equal to the number of takeovers in the industry
to which company i belongs to, as reported by Mergerstat Review.26 Therefore,
specification (3.26) becomes
22These standard errors corresponds to GMM standard errors, WI ~ele the underlying serial corre-
lation is assumed to be of order N, where N is the number of companies.
281 suspect that this difference in the relative size of private benefits of control is due to the
difference in the legal protec.tion provided to minority shareholders in different countries. This
difference may explain the international diversity in the size of the voting prelnium.
241 could not matehjust one company: Chambers Development, SIC code 9511. This is the reason
why in passing from regression (3.26) to regression (3.27) I lose three observations.
2&As aD alternative proxy I tried for 1990 the predicated probability of a takeover according to
Palepu (1986) estimates, but it has not explanatory power.
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Table 3.9 (column II) reports the results of the OLS estilnates of equation (3.27).
The proxy has a positive coefficient significantly different from zero at a 95% level.
The size of the coefficient is hard to interpret, but it corre'lponds to a 0.6% larger
premium for every additional takeover in the same industry. The explanatory power
of the regression rises to 11%, and the intercept is not significantly different from
zero. The other coefficients remain substantially unchanged.
Another possible reason why there is a price difference between the two classes of
stock is a different liquidity. As I have already shown, the superior voting shares are
generally less traded than the inferior voting one. This may produce larger trading
costs that should be reflected into lower prices of the superior voting shares. I defille
the relative volume (VOL) as the average daily volume in the superior voting shares
divided by the average trading volume in the illferior voting shares. By inserting t.he
relative volume VOL into regression (3.27) I obtain
t
- Po + f31 (-)it + f32 PREFit + f33 CONVit +
Q1r
+ {34 NTAKEit + f35 VOL it + fit·
(3.28)
The relative volume should have a positive impact on the voting premium. Ta-
ble 3.9 (column III) reports the results of regression (3.28). The coefficient f35 is indeed
positive but it is not statistically different from zero. The econolnic significance of
this coefficient is rather small too. If the superior voting shares, instead of Ilaving a
trading volume equal to that of the inferior voting shares, have just 50% of it, then
the voting premium drops by 0.3 percentage points. As expected the intercept is
not statistically different £rOIn zero. The coefficients of all the other variables have
the expected sign, and they are significantly different from zero at. a 95% level. In
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addition, {32 and f33 are not statistically different {roln one another in absolut.e sign.
Therefore, ceteris paribus companies that pay an additional dividend to inferior vot.-
ing shares have no smaller voting premia, if they allow the superior voting sllares to
be converted into inferior shares. This result ilnplies that outside shareholders con-
vert their superior voting shares into inferior voting shares up to the point the value
of the voting right is equal to the value of the additional dividend. The R-squared of
the regression is equal to 12.8%.
Summarizing, I showed that the voting premium can be, at least partially, ex-
plained by the ownership structure (as represented by the prolJability lllarket votes
are pivotal) and by the probability of a takeover. The additional (lividend paid t.o
. inferior voting shares and the conversion right of superior voting shares affect. ill a
consistent way the price difference between the two classes. Their COlllbined effect
is not statistically different from zero. The results do not support the exist.ence of a
liquidity premium of the more traded class with respect to the otller one.
3.5.5 Sources of Private Benefits
The specification (3.27) assumes that private benefits of control are a constant pro-
portion of the value of the discounted future cash flow of a company. By using this
assumption it was possible to estimate that the relative size of these private bene-
fits was about 2% of the verifiable value of the company. However, tllis regression
does not tell us anything about where these benefits come {roln. In addition, the
assumption of proportionali~y prevents us from identifying the companies that have
the highest benefits of control. This subsection explores the possibility of increasing
the explanatory power of the basic regression by introducing some proxies for possible
differences in private benefits of control.
The most natural source of private benefits of control is the extra salary tllat a
controlling shareholder can attribute to himself. The ability to extract nloney frOlll
the company in this way is limited by the threat of a shareholder suite for waste of
corporate resources. However, the board has a fairly large discretion in deciding the
salary. Therefore, a huge salary can be a non trivial component of the private benefits
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of control.
The determination of the actual compensation of an executive is a COlllplex lllat-
ter. A compensation package generally includes a cash salary, various types of fringe
benefits and stock options. In this context I will limit my attention just t.o the casll
salary for two reasons. First of all, the cash salary is the easiest nUlnber to olJtain
and to compare across companies aIld years. Furtherlnore, the interest here is 011
the amount of cash that a controlling shareholder is able to legally extract frolIl a
company. In a closely controlled comp~ny, like most of these are, it is very llard to
distinguish between managerial fringe benefits and other company expenses directed
to the sole benefit of the controlling shareholder. For this reason the cash. conlpen-
sation is the cleanest measure of the amount of cash extracted from the COlllpany.
In addition, the amount of stock options is fairly limited. The higher executives are
generally large shareholders of the company, and they do not need furtller incentive
schemes.
The summary statisticfi of the top executive salary, in thousands of dollars, are
also contained in Table 3.7. The sources are the proxy statelnents of each companJT.
Every year I picked the largest cash salary paid to an executive. This nleasure excludes
deferred compensation accrued in previous years. In most, but not all the cases, 't.he
largest salary is paid to the CEO. However, in some cases the controlling shareholder
covers different positions (like cllairman of the company). For this reason I consi(ler
that the highest executive salary is a better proxy of the private benefits of control
rather than the CEO salary.
The average top executive salary is about $390,000 (median $331,000), with a
very wide range: from $70,000 to $1,560,000. Part of the cross sectional difference
is certainly attributable to different company sizes. I certainly do not want to use
as a proxy of private benefits the raw measure of the salary, but only tIle part of
variation in salaries that is not explained by the different sizes of the companies. For
this reason I will insert as a control variable in the regression the logarithlll of the Ilet
annual sales. A simple regression of the top executive salary on the logaritilln of net
annual sales is able to explain 27% of the variation in salaries. Therefore, I will use
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the unexplained component in the top executive salary as a proxy of private benefits
of control and I will test whether this proxy is able to help explaining the variation
in the voting premium.
The first three columns of Table 3.10 report tIle estimates obtained by using t.his
proxy in different specifications. Column I reports the results of a sinlple regression of
the voting premium on the top executive salary and the logarithtn of net annl.tal sales.
The top executive salary is positively correlated with the size of the voting preillilllll,
but the coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. ColuIllns II and III insert
the salary proxy into equations (3.26) and (3.27). The t.op executive salary vh.rialJle
has a positive coefficient, which is statistically significant in both specifications (at a.
90% level in the first case and at a 95% in the second). These result.s suggest. t.hat.
the proxy is performing its job of capturing those cOlnpanies wllere private }Jenefits
of control are larger than the average. The coefficient indicates that, for a given
company's size, the voting premium raises of two percentage points every $100,000
in extra salary paid to the highest paid executive. A back of the envelope calculation
suggests that this is a reasonable estimate. As a first approxilllation, tile value of
a company is roughly equal to the level of its sales. Therefore, the average value
of a company in the sample is $400 millions. The value of an additional $100,000
in salary, capitalized at a 5%, is equal to $2 millions, 1.e., 0.5% of the vallie of the
average company. If the value of managerial rents is fully reflected in the Illarket.
value of voting rights, then every $100,000 in extra salary should inc.rease tIle voting
premitlm by 0.5%, not far from the 2% obtained in the regression. 26 The larger than
expected impact of extra salary can be explained with the fact that the top executive
salary is just a proxy for other forms of privileges connected to cOlltrol It is reasonalJle
to imagine that executives who extract higher salaries are Inore likely t.o enjoy also
larger amount of other perquisites.
The second proxy for differences in the level of private benefits is the average size
of the premium observed in takeovers of companies in the same industry. As for the
26These computations assume an all equity firm. If I take into account the a.verage debt to asset
ratio at book value, the expected impact will rise to 0.8%.
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number of takeovers I use the 50 industry classification of Mergerstat Revieto. As I
showed in section ~ only the additional takeover prenliunl paid to sup~rior voting stock
can he interpreted as a proxy of private benefits of control. However, the takeover
premia recorded by Mergerstat Review refer to cOlnpanies witl1 just one class of stock.
In general, a bidder may end up paying a premium over the lllarket price even if
there are no private benefits of control. In fact, dispersed shareholders foresee the
improvement a winning bidder will implement in the COlnpany, and wal1t to free ride
on these improvements. As a consequence, this proxy is expecte<l to IJe a very noisy
measure of the differences in the level of private benefits in different indust.ries in
different years.
The last three columns of Table 3.10 report the contribution of the takeover pre-
mium proxy in explaining the variations in the voting prelniunl. Column I regresses
the voting premiuln just on the takeover premium. Columns II and III insert tile
takeover premium proxy into equations (3.26) and (3.27). In all three cases the proxy
has a positive coefficient, as expected, but it is 110t statistically different fr01I1 zero at
conventional levels.
These results suggest that there are still SOlIle differences in private benefits un-
accounted for in the basic model. One proxy for these differences is th.e level of ext.ra.
salary paid to controlling executives. On the contrary, the average level of takeover
premium in the industry contains too much noise and fails t.o help explaining t.he
voting premium.
3.6 Impact of Institutional Ownership
In the previous sections I implicitly assumed that the Inarket price of each class
correctly reflected the fundamental value of that class. An alternative approacll is to
attribute tIle price difference at some form of Inispricing. In particlilar, following De
Long et al. (1990), the price difference can be attributed to "noise trader sentililent".
De Long et ale present a model in whicli the presence of not-fully-rational investors
creates an additional resale price risk in' the a.ssets they tra(le. As a consequence
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assets traded mainly by individual investors should sell at a discount with respect.
to otherwise identical assets, that are mainly owned by institutional in,,-estors (nl0re
likely to be fully rational). Lee, Shleifer and Thaler (1991) find support for this
hypothesis in the closed-end fund discount. Closed-end funds - tIle arguluent. goes
- sell at a discount with respect to their net asset valu~ because they are lllaillly
held by individuals. The larger presence of individual investors in the closed-end CUtl(t
shares creates an additional resale price risk, that is reflected in lower prices.
This section explores the noise-trader sentiment explanation in the COlltext of
differential voting shares. The noise-trader sentiment can create a difference in t.he
prices of two classes of common stock of the sanle conlpany only if the two cla.sses have
a differential clientele. Lee, Shleifer and Thaler identify the percentage of sllares held
by institutions versus that held by individuals as the relevant distinction. Therefore,
this section is dedicated to the study of the effects of the inst.itutional ownersilip of
the two classes on the size of the voting premiuln.
The relative importance of institutional ownership in the t,vo classes of st.ock is
relevant by itself. The noise-trader approach takes illstitutional ownersllip as exoge-
nous. However, institutions may choose their relative holdings according t.o sOlne
unobservable characteristics of the stock. This may produce a different relationship
between institutional ownership and voting prelnium. This section will illvestigate
the theoretical and empirical relationships bet,veen institutional ownership and voting
premIum.
3.6.1 Possible Relationships bet\Veen Institutional O'WD.er-
ship and Voting PremiulD
According to the noise-trader approach ownership by individual investors increases the
riskiness of an asset. Therefore, assets mainly owned by individual invest.ors should
sell at a discount with respect to their fundamental value. This discount should
grow proportionately to the presence of individual investors Rtnong the owners of tile
asset. Assets not held by individuals are held by institutions. Therefore, tile larger
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the presence of institutional investors is, the smaller the discount should be. As a
first approximation, the price of a class of stock can be related to the institutional
ownership according to the following relationship:
(3.29)
where Va is the fundamental valuation, 6 is the discount corresponding to a COlllpany
100% owned by individual investors, and I a is the percentage of class a stock held
by institutions. According to this line of thought , should be positive. A siillilar
relationship holds for the class b stock. As a result the voting prelniulll should be
equal to
(3.30)
I
where f3 X are the other determinants of the voting premium, as expressed in equation
(3.27), I want to control for. 27
The alternative view is not necessarily that 1'1 and 1'2 are equal to zero. Although
in efficient markets institutional ownership should not have any effect on tIle relative
·valuation of the two stocks, in equilibrium we may observe sOlne correlation between
the two. In fact, a possible alternative is that clientele are not exogenous: institutions
choose their relative holdings according to some unobservable characteristics of the
stock. Specification (3.27) was obtained assuming that private benefits are a constant.
proportion of the value of the discounted future cash flow of a company. This simpli-
fying assumption is not particularly appealing. It is very likely that tIle proportion of .
private benefits differs across companies and through time. If this is the case, tilen,
ceteris paribus, institutional investors are less likely to hold superior voting shares ill
companies where private benefits of control are larger. In fact, institutional investors
are ~elativelydisadvantaged players in the corporate controllnarket. They cannot en-
ter in a coalition that controls a company and enjoys the private benefits. Therefore,
individuals, who are relatively advantaged in the market for corporate control, sholtld
27Equation (3.30) represents a linearization of the aetual relationship.
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be more present in the superior voting stock of conlpany wit.h larger control value. As
a result, in equilibrium the percentage of superior voting shares held by institut.ions
should be negatively correlated with the unobservable differences in cont.rol vallie,
and thus, negatively correlated with the voting prellliulll.
By contrast, the size of private benefits does not necessarily affect the aillount. of
wealth each institution wants to invest in a certain COlllpany for portfolio considera-
tions. For a given investment target, a smaller investment in superior voting shares
implies a larger investment in inferior voting shares. As a result institutions sllould
hold more inferior voting stock in companies with larger private benefits. Therefore,
in equilibrium the percentage of inferior voting shares held by inst.itutions 8}10\1](1
be positively correlated with the voting premium. Therefore, according to the en-
dogenouJ selection hypothesis the coefficient 11 in regression (3.30) is expecte(l t.o be
negative, and the coefficient 12 positive.
3.6.2 Empirical Results
Table 3.11 reports the institutional ownership of dual class cOlnpanies as reported IJy
the S&P Security's Owner Stock Guidet The Guide does not always report the dat.a
for both classes of each stock. For this reason Table 3.11 reports in separate rows
the statistics of the percentage held by institutions in each class and the statistics
of the difference between the percentage held in the t,vo classes. Tllis difference is
computed only with respect to those companies that have data for both classes. The
coverage of the Guide with respect to dual class stocks has increased throl1gh tilIle.
In 1984 only 47% of the companies had institutional ownership data for both classes.
In 1990 tllis number was 66%.
The Guide reports the number of shares held by institutions each lllonth. For
each year I collected the December datum, which is reported in the January edit.ion
of the Guide of the subsequent year. To obtain the percentage ownership I dividec}
the number of shares owned by institutions by the total nunlber of outstanding shares
of the same class at the end of that year, as reported by CRSP.
Table 3.11 clearly shows that in~titutionshold relatively Inore inferior voting stock.
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In 1984 on average institutions controlled 5.8 percentage points Inore of the inferior
voting stock rather than of the superior voting stock .. In 1990 this difference was 14.8
percentage points. This increase is caused by a differential speed in the growth of
the importance of institutions. In the six year period the percentage held in superior
voting stock increased only by 4 percent.age points, while the percentage held in
inferior voting stock increased by 14 points. As a cOlllparison the lloldings of equit.ies
by institutions in the U.S. increased from 35% in 1984 to 44% in 1989.28 Tllerefore,
during the sample period institutions increased their presence in inferior voting st.ock
more than in other stocks and increased their presence in superior voting stock less
than in other stocks. The results was a lunch stronger leaning of institutional iIlvestors
toward inferior voting stock.
Table 31112 shows the results obtained by estimating regression (3.30) by OLS.29
The sample size is roughly 60% of what it was in Table 3.9, because, as I lllentiolled, in
many cases the data of institutional ownership in at least one class of stock are lliiss-
ing. Column I employs equation (3 ..30) without any controlling variables .. COIUIIID II
and column III correspond to two slightly different specifications for tIle cont.rolling
variables X, respectively equations (3.26) and (3.27). The estinlates of the coeffi-
cients of the controlling variables are substantially the same as the original estilllat.es,
obtained without inserting the institutional ownership variables (Table 3.9). The first.
two rows report the coefficients of the percentages of institllt.ional ownership in t.he
two classes. The percentage held by institutions in the superior voting stock lIas a
positive effect on the voting premium. This effect is statistically significant at t.he
99% level. By contrast, the percentage of inferior voting stock held by institutions
have a negative effect, which is borderline significant at the 90% level.
These results reject the hypothesis that noise-trader sentilnent affects the relative
valuation of the dual class stock. On the contrary, the results are consistent with
the hypotheses that institutions buy relatively fewer voting stock in those cOlllpanies
where the value of control is unusllally high. In this context it is not possible to
28These last data are reported in The Security I"du3try in the Eight;e~. ,~IA }lact Book.
29As in the previous cases the standard errors are corrected to take into account of heteroskedas-
ticity and of serial correlation among the observations of the saine cOlnpany ill different years.
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attribute any casual interpretations to the coefficients. However, it is ililportant to
notice that their size is economically relevant. An increase of one percentage point
in institutional oWIlership in the superior voting class is associated witll a llalf-point
smaller voting premium. By contrast a one percentage Inore of inferior voting shares
held by institutional investors is associated with one fifth of a point larger vot.ing
premIum.
In sum, institutional ownership of dual class COlllpanies present SOllIe interest-
ing characteristics. Institutions prefer to invest in inferior voting stock, and this
preference has increased during the sample period considered. On average a larger
institutional ownership in superior voting stock is associated with a slllaller vot.ing
premium. These findings reject the hypothesis that the price differential is caused IJy
some form of noise-trader mispricing. By contrast, the results suggest tile possil)ilit.y
that institutions are relatively disadvantaged players in t.he corporate cont.rollllarket.,
and therefore hold a smaller proportion of assets with a larger control value.
3.7 Conclusions
Private benefits of control are a powerful working tool in most of the theoretical
literature in corporate finance. However, very few is kno,vn about their actual size
and the real sources of these benefits. This paper is able to estinlate the relative
size of the private benefits and to identify one important source of these benefits,
by studying the value of voting rights in publicly traded companies with different.ial
voting stock.
The paper proves in a defi.nitive way the positive value of the voting right. The
source of this value comes from the expectation of a differential paylllent when there
is a control contest, with the size of the differential payment being related to t.he size
of private benefits of control.
A study of dual class company acquisitions confirms this view. A differential
payment takes place whenever the company attracts Illultiple bidders. The clifferent
size of the voting premia in the year preceding an acquisition suggests that the Dlarket
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correctly anticipates the probability of a differential paYlllent.
The paper tries also to identify the determinants of the value of the votillg right.s.
The case studies presented show that the premium of superior voting shares reacts
in a predictable way to changes in the ownership structure. A panel data analysis
shows that the ownership struct.ure and the likelihood of a takeover ca.n explain 12%
of the variability of the voting premiulll'. This analysis provides also an estiID.at.e of
the relative size of private benefits of control with respect to the company cash-flow
value of about 1.9%. In addition, controlling for the size of the COlnpan)r, a larger
salary paid to top executives is associated ,vith a larger voting prelniul11, suggest.ing
that extra salaries can be a relevant source of private benefits of control.
The institutional ownership of superior voting shares is inversely related to the size
of the voting premium. This finding rejects the hypothesis that individual investors'
sentiment affects the voting premium. On the contrary, this result. supports the view
that institutions prefer to invest in stock with low control value.
Although this study advances our understanding of the relative valuation of differ-
ential voting classes, it still leaves some questions unanswered, that will be addresse<l
in future works. For example, 24% of the cOlnpanies show a negative vot.ing prellliulll
even when the two classes have identical dividend rights (see, for exalnple, Plyillouth
Rubber in Figure 3-5). Differences in liquidity may only be a partial answer. A Silll-
ilar explanation begs the question of why two stocks that differ only for their voting
rights should have different trading costs. One possible explanation is tllat tile lllarket
of superior voting shares is more populated by insiders, who have access to privilege<l
information. As a result the adverse selection component of t!!.e bid-ask spread of
superior voting shares is much larger than that of inferior voting shares. The 11igller
cost of transacting is then reflected in a lower price of the superior voting shares.
Another unanswered question is the positive voting premiuln observed in compa-
niea that require an equal payment of the two stocks in case of a take<)ver. This is the
case of Pittway (35% premium in 1990) and, Playboy Enterprises (12% prellliulll in
1990). This phenomenon is also observed by Robinson and White (1990) for certa.in
Canadian companies. This fact seems to suggest, contrary to what assumed ill tllis
160
paper, that outside shareholders can get some benefits out of their voting right even
outside of control contests. Further analysis is required to determine this illlportant
issue.
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Table 3.1:
Sample Characteristics
The voting ratio is the number of votes per share of the inferior voting class divided by
the number of votes per share of the superior voting tlass. When the two classes differ
only with respect to the number of directors, then the COIllpany is reported under the last
column. By contrast, if the two classes differ for both the number of directors they elect and
their voting power, then the company is reported under the column of the correspoIldillg
voting power ratio. In Table 3.1b no difference in divi<J.ends illlplies tllat the two class are
constrained to pay the very same dividend. When the Article of Incorporation allows the
possibility of a larger payment to the inferior voting class, but it does not require it, then
the company is reported under column 2. When the inferior voting class pays a lliultiple
of the dividend paid to the superior voting, tilen the company is re!>orted under COltl111D 3.
The last column reports the companies that esiablish the dollar alliount of the quarterly
(annual) differential dividend.
a: Voting AIIangelllellts
Stock One class Voting ratio Voting ratio 'Toting ratio Difference only Total
Exchange no~voting 1:10 > 1:10 < 1:10 numb. directors s8tnllie
AMEX 5 32 3 3 3 46
NASDAQ 15 22 8 2 47
NYSE 1 3 4
Total 21 57 11 3 5 97
b: Dividend Characteristics of tIle Two Classes
Stock No difference Inf. class Additional dive Additional Total
Exchange in dividends dividend proportionately dividend s31nple
may be larger larger in fixed BUIn
AMEX 16 11 5 14 46
NASDA.Q 23 10 6 8 47
NYSE 1 1 1 1 4
Total 40· 22 12 23 97
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Table 3.2:
Characteristics of Dual Class COlllpanies in the SaDlple
Additional dividend is the dividend preference of the inferior voting class. Possible indicates
that the board may, but is not oblige to, pay an additional dividend to the inferior class.
When the dividend of the inferior voting class is proportionately larger, then the relationsllip
is expressed with an equp,tion, where da (db) is the dividend of class A (B). If the additional
dividend is a fixed sum, then it is expressed in cents per year, UIuess a Q indicates that
it is cents per quarter. The right to convert is the right to exchange one superior voting
share for one inferior voting share, at the holder's will. The percentage of directors elected
by the inferior voting class is expressed only when the inferior voting stock is allowed to
vote separately as a class on this issue. Otherwise inferior voting shares vote witli superior
voting shares, with the same voting ratio as previously indicated.
Stock Company Name Vote Vote Additional . Right Percentage (Iir.
Exchange class class dividend to elected inferior
A B convert voting class
NASDAQ Acmat Corp 0.1 1
NYSE Alberto-Culver 0.1 1 possible y
ASE American Fructose 1 10 25%
ASE American Maize 0 1 30%
NASDAQ ,,\ssociated Conim. I 0.04
NASDAQ Autodynamics 0.1 1 possible y 25%
NASDAQ B Ii A Group 1 10 da==1.15db y
NASDAQ Baldwin & Lyons 1 0
NASDAQ Base Ten 8ys. 0.1 1 possible y 25%
ASE Beneficial Standard 1 1 1/3
NASDAQ Benihana National 0.1 1 possible y 25%
ASE Bio-Rad Lab. 0.1 1 possible y 25%
ASE Blount Inc. 0.1 1 1.25c Q y 25%
ASE Brown-Forman Corp. I 0
NASDAQ U :rec Corp 1 15 da =1.05db y
ASE Canandaigua Wine 0.1 1 da==l.ldb y 25%
ASE Care Corporation 0.1 1 2.5c Q y 25%
ASE Care Enterp. 0.1 1 2.5c Q y 25%
NASDAQ Cerbco 0.1 1 possible y 2.5%
ASE Chambres Develop. 1 10 5c y 25%
ASE Charter Med Corp. 0.1 1 25e Q y 25%
NASDAQ Chesapeake Life I 1 0
NASDAQ Colonial Bancgroup 0.05 1 40c y 25%
ASE Concord Fab. 1 10 da =1.15db y 2.5%
ASE Crown Central Petr. 1 0.1 18%
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TABLE 3.2 cont.
Stock Company Narne Vote Vote Additional Right Percenta.ge dirt
Exchange class class dividend to elected inferior
A B convert voting class
NASDAQ Dairy Mart 0.1 1 possible 25%
ASE Diagnostic/Retriev. 1 0.1 possible y 25%
ASE Dickenson Mines 1 10 y 25%
NASDAQ Enchanted Village 0 1
NASDAQ Equitable Iowa 1 0
ASE Everest & Jennings 0.1 1 2.5c Q y 25%
NASDAQ Figgie International 0.05 1 Be until 1988
NASDAQ Financial Benefit 1 1 y 1/3
NASDAQ First Arner Bk & Tr. 0 1
NASDAQ First Am.Financial 1 0.1
NASDAQ First Citiziens Banc. I 16
NASDAQ Food Lion 0 1 possible
ASE Forest City Ent. 1 10 6c till 88 y 25%
NASDAQ Haverty Furniture 10 1 da==1.05db y 25%
NASDAQ Hechinger Co. 1 10 Ie Q y
ASE Home Oil Ltd 0 1 25e
NYSE Homestead Financial 0.1 1 da== 1.1db y 25%
ASE Hubbell Inc. 20 1 y
NASDAQ Int. Bank Washington 1 10 25c
NASDAQ Int. Dairy Queen 0 1 da==1.1dh y 25%
ASE Investors Diversified 1 1 da = 4db
NASD.AQ Jones Intercable 0.1 1 5c Q 25%
NASDAQ Kelly Services 0 1 possible y
ASE Key Corp. 0.1 1 possible 25%
NASDAQ Liberty Homes 0 1 da==1.2db y
NASDAQ Malrite Comm 1 10
ASE McRae Industries 0.1 1 possible y 1/3
NASDAQ Merchants Cap. Corp. 0.1 1 10e Q y
NASDAQ Method Electrs 0.1 1 possible y 25%
ASE Metro Mobile 1 0 y
NASDAQ Mobile Communications 0.1 1 O.5c Q 25%
ASE Moog Inc. 0.1 1 possible y 25%
NASDAQ Multnomah 0 1
NASDAQ Nielsen 0 1
ASE Noreen En. 1 5 y
ASE Odetics Inc. 0.1 1 y after 1985 25%
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TABLE 3.2 cont.
Stock Company Name Vote Vot.e Additional R.ight Perc,eIlf.age (lir.
Excha,nge class class dividend to elected jnferior
A B convert voting class
ASE Oriole Homes 1 0.1 2.5c Q y 25%
NASD4~Q Oshkosh B Gosh 0 1 da=1.15db 25%
NASD.t\Q Pasquale Food Inc. 0.05 1 possible y 25%
NASDJ\.Q Petroleum Helicopt. 0 1
ASE Pittway 0.1 1 2.5c Q 25%
NYSE Playboy 1 0
ASE Plymouth Rubber 1 0
ASE Presidential Realty 1 1 1/3
ASE Presidio Oil 0.05 1 da==1.1db
NASDAQ Provident Life & Ac. 0.05 1
NASDAQ Republic Pictures 1 10
ASE Resort Int. 0.01 1 y
ASE Restaurant Ass 0.1 1 possible y 25%
NASDAQ Roses Stores 1 0
ASE Saunders System 0.1 1 possible y 25%
NASDAQ Schwartz Brothers 0 1 100e 20%
NYSE Sequa Corp. I 10 IOc till 1992 y
.4SE Smith (A.O.) 1 0.1 possible 2.5%
ASE Stevens Graphics 0.1 1 y 25%
NASDAQ Tele Communications 1 10 y after 1986
NASDAQ Thomas Nelson Inc. 1 10 ~T
NASDAQ Thonlston Mills 0 1
ASE Three D Departments 0.1 1 possible y 25%
ASE Transcisco Ind. 1 10 possible y 25%
ASE Tranzonic cos. I 0.1 3c Q y 25%
ASE Turner Broadcasting 1 0.2 dA=0.9B
NASDAQ United Artist 1 10 y
ASE United Foods 0.1 1 2.5c Q y 25%
NASDAQ Universal Tel Inc. 1 1 14%
ASE VGC Corp. 1 10 da=1.1db y 25%
ASE Viacom 0 1
ASE Wang Laboratories 0.1 1 1.25c Q y after 1982 25%
ASE Watsco Inc. 0.1 1 possible y 25%
NASDAQ Westmark Comm. 1 10 y
NASDAQ Wiley John & Sons 0.1 1 possible y 30%
ASE Winn Enterp. 0.1 1 y 25%
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,Table 3.3:
List of COlllpanies Delisted
Name Class Delisted Year Cause
AUTODYNAMICS INC b 1984 reclassified Rnd acquired
BENEFICIAL STANDARD CORP b 1985 liquidation
CARE CORP h 1986 acquisit.ion
CARE ENTERPRISES b 1988 (~hapter 11
CERBCO INC s 1985 lack. of trading
CHARTER MEDICAL CORP b 1988 MBO
CHESAPEAKE LIFE INS CO b 1983 lack of trading
COLONIAL BANCGROUP INC s 1986 unkllown
ENCHANTED VILLAGE INC b 1987 Ilnknown
FINANCIAL BENEFIT GROUP INC s 1989 llnkllown
FIRST AMERICAN BK &; TR PALM BEACH h 1989 lJankruptcy
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES INC s 1990 l.lnknown
HOME OIL LTD b 1979 acquisi tiOll
INTERNATIONAL BANK WASHI~GTON h 1986 acquisition
INVESTORS DIVERSIFIED SVCS\INC b 1979 acquisition
KEY COMPANY ~ b 1989 (~hapter 11
MALRITE COMMUNICATIONS GaOUp b 1989 MHO
MERCHANTS CAPITAL CORP i b 1990 unkllown;
MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS " b 1988 acquisition
MULTNOMAH KENNEL CLUB s 1987 unknown
NIELSEN A C CO \ b 1984 acquisitioIl
PASQUALE FOOD INC b 1987 acquisit.ion
RESORTS INTERNATIONAL INC h 1988 acquisition
RESTAURANT ASSOCIATES INDS INC b 1987 MBO
SAUNDERS SYSTEM INC b 1986 acquisition
UNIVERSAL TELEPHONE INC b 1985 acqu.isition
V G C CORP b 1989 acqllisition
WESTMARC COMMUNICATIONS INC b 1990 went private
WINN ENTERPRISES b 1986 Chapter 11
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Table 3.4:
Summary Statistics
If a company still has two classes traded in 1990, the data refer to 1990. Otherwise tile data
refer to the last year of presence of a company in the s8Inp!\,;. The net sal~s data COllIes frolll
Lotus Onesource. The data on the number of shares are end of the year data from (~RSP.
The data on the voting power comes from different Moody's Manuals and are reported in
Table 3.2. The data on insiders' ownership conles frolll the most recent proxy statelnent
available.
SERIES MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV. MIN. MAX. ODS.
Net Sales million US$ 480 182 734 2.8 4717 88
Percentage equity sup. class 38.1 37.9 17.1 3.4 80 97
Percentage of votes sup. class 86.7 89.9 13.0 26.2 100 97
Insider ownership superior class 53.9 53.0 19.3 10.3 92.7 97
Insider ownership inferior class 27.3 19.3 20.7 0.0 85.0 9.5
Voting power controlled by insiders 48.9 49.6 17.4 10.3 88.4 96
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Table 3.5:
Tests on the positive value of the voting right
The direct t-test tests whether the difference between the price of the superior voting stock and
the price of the inferior voting stock is equal to zero. Positive (negative) indicates that the pric.e
attributed to the superior voting power (difference between the price of a superior voting share and
the price of an inferior voting share) is significantly larger (sDlaller) than zero at a 99% level (two-tail
test).
Direct t .. test
Conlpany Name Positive Negative Observations
Acmat Co~ 4 0 4
Alberto-C ver 5 0 5
American Fructose 0 7 7
American Maize-Products 0 10 12
Associated Communication 8 0 8
Autodynamics 4 0 4
.B H A Group 0 3 3
Baldwin & Lyons 5 0 5
Bl\Se Ten Sys. 10 0 11
Beneficial Standard Corp 2 1 7
Benihana National 4 0 4
Bio-Rad Laboratories 3 2 11
Blount Inc. 3 4 8
Brown-Forman Corp. 0 11 12
C Tec Corp 4 1 5
Canandaigua Wine 5 0 5
Care Corporation 4 0 4
Care Enterp. 4 0 4
Cerbco 1 1 4
Chambres Development 5 0 5
Charter Med Corp. 2 3 8
Chesapeake Life I 5 0 5
Colonial Bancgroup 3 1 4
Concord Fab. 1 2 3
Crown Central Petroleum 11 0 11
Dairy Mart Convenience 3 0 6
Diagnostic/Retrieval Sys 8 0 8
Dickenson Mines 4 0 5
Enchanted Village 2 0 2
Equitable Iowa 11 0 11
Everest & Jennings 6 1 11
Figgie International 5 0 5
Financial Benefit Gou~ I 4 0 4
First Amer Bk & TR alm 10 0 10
First American Financial 2 0 2
First Citiziens Bancshar 5 0 5
Food Lion 8 0 8
Forest City Enterprises 4 0 8
Haverty Furniture Co 5 0 5
Hechin~er Co. 6 0 8
Home il Ltd 0 1 1
Homestead Financial 1 3 4
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Direct t-test
I Hubbell Inc. 3 6 12Int. Bank Washington DC 7 0 8
Int. Dairy Qeen inc. 4 0 5
Investors Diversified 0 1 1
Jones Intclb 8 1 10
Kelly Services 5 1 7
Key Corp. 3 0 4
Lib~rty Homes 4 1 6
Malrite Comm g. 4 0 5
McRae Industries 3 5 8
Merchants Capit. Corp. 4 0 5
Method Electrs 7 .0 9
Metro Mobile 2 0 2
Mobile Communications Co 6 1 7
Moog Inc. 10 0 11
Multnomah 7 0 7
Nielsen 0 6 6
Noreen En. 2 0 2
Odetics Inc. 7 0 7
Oriole Homes 5 1 8
Oshkosh B Gosh 0 6 6
Pasquale Food Inc. 4 0 4
PetroleUln Helicopters In 10 0 10
Pittway 1 0 1
Playboy 1 0 1
Plymouth Rubber 8 1 12
Presidential Realty 11 0 12
Presidio Oil 0 3 4
Provident Life and Ace 3 0 3
Republic Pictures 4 1 6
Resort Int. 10 0 10
Restaurant Ass 3 0 3
Roses Stores 7 4 12
Saunders System 2 3 5
Schwartz Brothers Inc. 0 2 3
Sequa Corp. 4 0 4
Smith (A.O.) 8 0 8
Stevens Graphics 1 .1 3
Tele ConlDlunications Inc. 5 () 12
Thomas Nelson Inc. 5 0 5
Thomston Mills 3 0 3
Three D Departments 7 0 8
Transcisco industries 1 1 5
Tranzonic cos. 3 0 3
Turner Broadcasting 4 0 4
United Artist Entertainm 2 0 2
United Foods 5 1 8
Universal Tel Inc. 6 1 7
','GC Corp. 3 0 3
Viacom 0 1 1
Wang Laboratories 3 4 12
Watsco Inc. 7 0 7
Westmark Communications 3 2 6
Wiley John & Sons 8 0 9
Winn Enterp. 2 0 2
Total 412 111 596
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Table 3.6:
Comparison bet'Ween Market Expectations and Realized
PreDlia
The average voting premium in the year before the tender offer is the average percentage
premium of the superior voting shares over the inferior voting ones, computed in the 250
trading days before the tender ofter is announced. The differential paylnent at the titlle of
the tender offer is the differential tender offer premium, if a tender offer is nlade for both
classes with similar terms. Otherwise, it is the prellllulll of the tender offer price of tIle
superior voting shares over the trading price of the inferior voting sllares the first day of
the tender offer.
Company
Care Corp.
Home Oil
Int. Bank of Washington
Invest. Diversified
Mobile Comma
Nielsen
Pasquale Foods
Saunders
Universal Telephone
V.G.C.
Average
St. Dev.
Dickenson Mines
Resorts International
Average
St. Dev.
Average voting premium
in the year before the
tender offe~
1.4
..5.2
15.6
0.9
..0.2
0.5
7.4
3.4
4.3
4.7
3.28
5.22
34.3
42.2
38.25
3.95
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Differential payillent.
at the titIle of tIle
tender offer
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
26.0
306.0
166.0
100
o
112
eo
,.
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Table 3.7:
SUDllIlary Statistics
SERIES MEAN MEDIAN STD. DEV. MIN. MAX. OBS.
Voting Premium 10.47 3.02 23.70 -18.94 221.83 396
Relative Volume 0.44 0.18 0.69 0.00 4.98 348
Fraction of Votes Held 0.55 0.51 0.22 0.03 1 396
by Small Shareholders
Vote-Share Ratio 0.43 0.44 0.17 0.08 0.88 396
Siz~ Biggest Shareholder 32.33 28.38 19.74 0.77 85.85 396
Probability Market Votes 0.41 0.41 0.31 0 1 396
are Pivotal
Number of Takeovers 9.10 6 9.61 0.00 53 3~3
in the Same Industry
Average Premium in 38.47 35.9 18.45 5.6 183.3 375
Takeovers same Industry
Difference in Dividends 0.38 0 0.49 0.00 1 396
Conversion Right 0.61 1 0.49 0 1 396
Top Executive Salary 386.3 331.3 2:l9.6 70 1559 396
Logarithm Net Sales 12.8 12.13 1~66 1.95 15.53 354
('000)
Perc. Superior Shares 16.13 12.08 14.27 0.1 68.92 237
Held by Institutions
Perc. Inferior Shares 28.12 24.55 20.15 0.04 101.8 237
Held by Institutions
Given a class A of shares with a votes and a class B of shares with b votes, let r = ~,
then the voting premium is defined as
vp= PA -PB
PB - rPA
The Voting Premium variable is defined as the annual average of voting prenliuln as defined
above. Relative Volume is the ratio between the annual average number of superior voting
shares traded every day divided by the annual average number of inferior voting shares
traded. All the data come from CRSP. Volume data are available since 1982 for NASDAQ
companies, and since 1986 for AMEX and NYSE companies. The probability Inarkets vote
are pivotal is equal to the Shapley value of the market votes in a SilIlple Inajority gaille.
The fraction of votes held by small sllareholders is the voting power held by shareholders
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with less than 5% of votes. The Vote-Share Ratio is the ratio between the total nornlalized
number of votes (obtained by attributing Dne vote to each sllperior voting share and r of a
vote to each inferior voting shares) and the total nUlllber of outstanding shares. 'l'lle Size
of the Biggest Shareholder is the percentage of votes controlled by the largest shareholder.
All the ownership data comes from Spectrum 5. The number of takeovers in the iIldustry is
the annual number of takeovers taking place in the industry to whicll a COlllpany belongs
to. The average premium is the premium observed in those takeovers. The nUlllh~rs and
the industry classification is from Mergerstat Rel1iew. Difference in dividends is a dUllltlly
variable taking value 1 for every company-year in which the inferior voting sllares paid a
larger dividend than the superior voting shares. Conversion Right is a dlllllIllY variahle
taking value 1 for every company-year in which the superior voting shares were convertihle
into inferior voting shares at the holder's will. The executive salary is the cash salary of the
highest paid executive in each company-year as reported by the proxy state111ents. TIle data
for net sales are obtained from Lotus Onesource. The nUlllber of shares held by institutions
at the end of each year are obtained from the Se4P Security's OUJner titock Gu.ide and are
divided by the number of outstanding shares of that class at the end of each year as reI)Orted
by CRSP.
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Table 3.8:
a: Annual Sumlllary Statistics on the Whole SaRlple
Cross sectional average by year of the Voting Premium and the Relative Volulne as defitled
in Table 3.7. Volume data are available since 1982 for NASDAQ cOlllpanies, and since 1986
for AMEX and NYSE companies.
SERIES MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM OBS.
Voting Premium 1979 11.81 4.05 20.43 -4.02 59.47 15
Voting Premium 1980 7.03 3.27 10.71 -4.89 32.46 22
'Voting Premium. 1981 12.79 6.75 19.11 -9.35 71.48 26
Voting Premium 1982 22.30 2.93 75.18 -10.08 409.93 30
Voting Premium 1983 9.05 3.04 24.43 -4.2 154.21 45
Voting Premium 1984 8.28 2.28 21.12 -5.67 137.09 49
Voting Premium 1985 3.72 1.90 8.75 -7.59 36.26 56
Voting Premium 1986 7.59 1.70 14.90 -10.22 75.50 67
Voting Premium 1987 11.52 3.82 29.45 -10.34 221.83 69
Voting Premium 1988 14.28 3.43 29.33 -10.4 180.16 72
Voting Premium 1989 12.85 2.85 31.43 -16.21 188.41 73
Voting Premium 1990 10.96 3.31 19.08 -18.94 81.97 70
Relative Volume 1984 0.56 0.16 1.15 0.020 4.98 22
Relative Volume 1985 0.65 0.15 1.40 0.010 5.38 26
Relative Volume 1986 0.66 0.30 1.82 0.003 14.85 68
Relative Volume 1987 0.50 0.25 0.63 0.001 3.20 69
Relative Volume 1988 0.48 0.21 0.74 0.001 4.20 72
Relative Volume 1989 0.44 0.15 0.79 0.003 5.07 73
Relative Volwne 1990 0.45 0.17 0.81 0.002 5.61 71
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b: Annual SUlDrnary Statistics on the Subsarnple "With
Equal Dividend Rights
Cross sectional average by year of the Voting Prenlium, as defined in Table 3.7, for those
companies that have two classes of common stock that differ only in their voting rights.
SERIES MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV. MINIMlJM MAXIMUM OBS.
Voting Premium 1979 14.18 2.96 22.29 -4.02 59.47 12
Voting Premium 1980 7.03 4.99 10.32 -4.89 32.46 16
Voting Premium 1981 16.62 8.72 22.14 -1.64 71.48 17
Voting Prenlium 1982 35.89 4.34 98.47 -4.34 409.93 17
Voting Premium 1983 15.63 3.42 37.55 -4.2 154.21 18
Voting PremiUln 1984 13.71 2.02 31.93 -5.67 137.09 20
Voting Premium 19R5 4.63 0.55 12.58 -7.59 36.26 22
Voting Premium 1986 12.59 3.21 21.49 -10.22 75.5 26
Voting Premium 1987 21.60 10.74 45.53 -10.34 221.83 26
Voting Premium 1988 15.81 6.16 23.69 -10.04 81.10 26
Voting Premium 1989 15.50 2.44 31.64 -12.19 119.83 30
Voting Premium 1990 10.80 2.87 17.83 -8.62 80.26 29
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Table 3.9:
OLS Estimates of the DeterDlinants of the Voting PreIniUlll
~
/30 + /31 (-)it + /32 PREFit + (33 CONVit +
01r
+ f34 NTAKEit + f35 VOLit + fit·
(3.32)
The Voting Premium variable is defined as the annual average of the voting prelIlium as
defined in equation (3.31). The Voting Power is equal to ~, and is a measure of the voting
power of votes traded on the Inarket. 9 is the probability market votes are pivotal, a is the
fraction of votes held by outside shareholders, and the vote share ratio (1r) is tIle nUlltl)er
of votes divided by the number of shares. Dividend Preference is a dUllllny eqllal to Olle
for all those company-years in which the inferior voting stock received a larger dividelld
than the superior voting stock. Number of Takeovers is the nUlllber of takeovers ill the
industry group to which a company belongs to. The data and the definition of industry
derives from Mergerstat Review. The conversion right is a dUIDlny variable equal to one for
all those company-years in which the superior voting stock is convertil>le into the inferior
voting one and zero otherwise. Relative Volume is the ratio between the annual average
number of superior voting shares traded every day divided by the annual average nUlllber
of inferior voting shares traded every day. The standard errors, reported in brackets, ar~
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation alnong observations of the sanle COlllpallY
in different years.
DepeI}.dent Variable:
Voting Premium I II III
Intercept 7.19 2.86 0.76
(3.11) (3.40) (2.92)
Voting Po'wer 1.91 1.32 1.45
(0.74) (0.52) (0.57)
Difference in Dividends -8.06 -11.41 -11.54
(3.71) (3.42) (3.87)
Conversion Right 3.89 5.66 7.84 ,
(4.00) (3.89) (3.82) \
Nurnber of Takeovers 0.64 0.69 ~\
(0.27) (0.28) ~~.
Relative Volume 0.59 ~~
(1.82) ,\,
\
~
R-squared (%) 4.8 11.0 12.8 \
Observations 396 393 345 t\
1
t
r
~
I
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Table 3.10:
Possible Sources of Private Benefits
The executive salary is the cash salary of the highest paid executive in each company-year as
reported by the proxy statements. The data for net sales are obtained fronl Lotus Onesource.
The Takeover Premium is the average premium observed in takeovers ill the sallIe industry
in the same year. The nwnbers and the industry classificatioll is frolll Mergerstat Review.
The Voting power is equal to o.~1f' and is a llleasure of the voting power of votes traded on
the market. 9 is the probability market votes are pivotal, a is the fraction of votes held
by outside shareholders, and the vote share ratio (1r) is the nunlber of votes divided by the
number of shares. For all the other variables see Table 3.9. The estinlates are obtained by
OL8. TIle standard errors, reported in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation among observations of the same COlnpany in different years.
Dependet Variable: Executive Salary Takeover Prellliulll
Voting Premium I II III I II III
Intercept 49.45 46.70 44.09 8_18 3.56 -0.47
(26.8) (28.28) (23.02) (1.85) (2.74) (2.86)
Executive Salary 0.017 0.021 0.026
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Logarithm Net Sales -3.85 -4.10 -4.52
(2.48) (2.67) (2.28)
Premium in Takeover in the 0.05 0.07 0.05
Same Industry (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Voting Power 2.03 2.01 2.00 1.39
(0.77) (0.74) (0.76) (0.52)
Difference in DivideIlds ..9.22 -14.06 -8.43 -11.55
(4.22) (4.45) (3.91) (3.57)
Conversion Right 5.69 7.68 5.17 6.71
(4.73) (4.21 ) (4.01) (3.75)
Number of Takeovers 0.77 0.67
(0.31) (0.27)
R-squared (%) 6.0 11.9 20~0 0.2 5.6 12.6
Observations 357 324 322 428 375 375
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Table 3.11:
Institutional OW"nership
Percentage of each class held by institutions at the end of each year are ol>tained frOlll
the S&P SecuritY'8 Owner Stock Guide. The Guide does not. report the data of bot.h classes
for all the companies. Therefore, the difference can be computed only for a suhset of
companies.
SERIES MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV. MINIMUM MAXIMUM 08S.
Superior Class 1984 14.14 10.69 14.26 0.33 68.92 33
Inferior Class 1984 19.11 17.84 17.72 0.91 73.90 33
Difference -5.77 -2.42 11.57 -36.93 14.01 23
Superior Class 1985 15.66 9.76 15.98 0.17 64.27 38
Inferior Class 1985 22.51 17.84 18.38 0.91 73.90 48
Difference -7.34 -4.29 13.71 -32.08 16.86 28
Superior Class 1986 18.96 15.30 14.65 0.85 67.94 44
Inferior Class 1986 25.71 22.92 18.38 0.83 72.74 .5 Ii
Difference -6.61 -4.65 15.30 -43.98 25.15 32
Superior Class 1987 19.20 13.42 17.85 0.5'7 76.01 51
Inferior Class 1987 28.26 22.68 20.67 0.62 70.65 1)7
Difference -11.50 -7.63 19.71 -59.82 32.90 39
Superior Class 1988 20.50 15.51 18.02 0.10 71.06 50
Inferior Class 1988 31.88 28.91 20.45 0.62 70.65 F)7
Difference -13.63 -11.34 14.68 -45.25 9.77 43
Superior Class 1989 18.46 15.84 15.66 O~06 74.10 49
Inferior ClasB 1989 32.88 30.01 22.10 0.06 101.81 60
Difference -14.17 -9.70 16.92 -57.39 9.66 45
Superior Class 1990 17.15 12.57 15.23 0.10 63.21 50
Inferior Class 1990 33.38 29.62 21.84 0.73 7~5.67 60
Difference -14.75 -10.02 17.42 -59.58 7.38 46
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Table 3.12:
Effects of Institutional O\Vnership
The number of shares held by institutions at the end of each year are obtained frolll the
S&P Security's Owner Stock Guide and are divided by tIle nUlnber of outstanding shares of
the same class at the end of that year, 8S reported by CRSP. The Voting power is equal t.o
:1'( and is a measure of the voting power of votes traded on the lnarket. ~ is the proballility
market votes are pivotal, 0: is the fraction of votes held by outside shareholders, and tile
vote share ratio (7r) is the number of votes divided by the nUlllber of shares. }i'or all tile other
variables see Table 3.9. The estimates are obtained by OLS. The standard errors, report.ed
in brackets, are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation alllong observations of
the same company in different years.
Dependent Variable:
Voting PrelniUln I II III
Intercept 11.28 6.54 1.45
(2.17) (3.77) (5.30)
Percentage Superior Class -0.46 -0.51 -0.51
Held by Institutions (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
Percentage Inferior Class 0.20 0.20 0.23
Held by Institutions (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Voting Power 2.43 2.40
(0.84) (0.93)
Difference ill Dividends -8.31 -13.14
(4.95) (5.05)
COl1versioll Right 7.17 8.79
(4.10) (4.51 )
Nulllber of Takeovers 0.64
(0.47)
R-squared (%) 5.5 10.8 15.5
Observations 256 237 234
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Chapter 4
Shareholder Response to Dual
Class Exchange Offers
A L.ual class exchange offer (DeEO) is an offer to all the shareholders of a corporation
to exchange shares of common stock with superior voting rights for Silllilar shares of
the same company, with inferior voting rights. Inferior voting shares are genera.lly
guaranteed a privilege, such as higher dividends, to induce exchanging. Before t.lle
SEC ban in 1988, DCEOs were becoming increasingly popular as lllethod of introduc-
tion of dual classes of common stock. Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) find that between
1984 and 1987 46% of dual class recapitalizations in the U.8. have IJeen iinplelllented
through an exchange offer.
The theoretical properties of this form of recapitalization have b~en analyzed by
Ruback (1988). Rttback argues that in a DCEO outside shareholders are likely to
face a prisoner's dilemma. The dividend privilege induces outside sharellolders to
give up their voting rights by exchanging. However, if outside shareholders were allle
to coordinate among themselves they would be better off not exchanging. In fact., l)y
exchanging outside shareholders will leave the majority of. votes to insiders and lose
the premium of a potential takeover. However, while in Ruback's work it is clear that
shareholders may be trapped in a coercive equilibrium by a DCEO, the Slll>seClltent.
debate has taken for granted that they are always trapped. Surprisingly enough, the
question has never been addressed empirically.
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The purpose of this paper is precisely to test t.he aSStlInptions and the predict.ioI1S
of Ruback's model by using actual data of shareholders' behavior in dual class ex-
change offer. This analysis is interesting frol!1 two very different perspectives. First
of all, Ruback's model is one of the few cases in wllich the !lrerlictiollS of a gallle
theoretic model with multiple equilibria can be tested with actual, and I10t experi-
mental, data. In addition, the results are also very interesting frol11 a public policy
perspective. Ruback's work, submitted to the Security and ExchB~nge COIIIJ11ission
in the hearings on the one share-one vote issue, has been particularly influent.ial in
the decision to ban DCEOs taken by the SEC ill July 1988 (rule IHc-4). The SE(~
decided to ban DCEOs because it accepte(l the vie\\T that DCEOs are illtrinsically
coercive. However, in June 1990 the Federal Appeals Court invalidate<l t.he SE(~ ban,
on the ground that the SEC cannot invade state cOlnpetence in corporat.e governallce
nlatters. Therefore, DCEOs may return as an issue in the public policy debat.e.
The data chosen to test Ruback's model regard DCEOs in Italy. Th(~ advant.age of
the Italian institutional setting is that it excludes other confounding elell1ents present.
in the U.S .. First of all, since 1974 DCEOs have been legal in Italy, and so have beell
nonvoting shares. The same certainty of the legal environlllent cannot be clail11ed
in the U.S .. Inferior voting shares were banned from tIle NYSE until 1984. After
that date there ,vere strong regulatory pressures to ban all types of different.ial vot.ing
shares fronl all the Exchanges. The risk of a ban on differential vot.ing sllares 111aJT have
distorted the exchanging decision in the U.S., but not. in Italy. Secondly, the It.alian
law requires that both classes of stock be listed in an It~lian stock lllarket. 'l'his is not.
the case in the U.S .. Therefore, an outside shareholder in the U.S. facil1g the ,exc}lange
offer perceives the risk of being left with a delisted security. This risk increases his
incentives of choosing the saIne security that everybody else chooses. This Rc\ditional
risk may further distort the original choice of by outside shareholders ill t.Ile U.S ..
Finally, in Italy the exchange offers often last for many years, decreasiI1g tIle possilJilit.y
of uninformed decisions due to time pressure. Tllerefore, Italian DCEOs prc,viele a
nice sanlple to focus on the characteristics analyzed by Ruback's paper, keeping aside
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other confounding elements.!
The study shows that there is no evidence that the most likely equilibriuln selected
by shareholders is the coercive one. Data on shareholclers' exchange behavior and on
prices of the two cla.sses of shares after the DCEO expired show that sharellolders have
an incredible ability in coordinating on the nonc.oercive equililJriulll. The evidenc.e
suggests that DCEOs do not necessarily trap shareholders in a prisoner's (lileJll111R.
type of situation, and that insiders do not necessarily obtain cont.rol of tIle cOlnpany
cheaply.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews Ruback's arguIlleIlt and t.he
assumptions upon which it relies. The theoretical possibility of 111ulti!lle equilibria.
relies on the assunlption that, at least in some cases, superior voting shares can l)e paid
more in takt:(Jvers. Therefore, section 2 presents the U.S. and international evidenc.e
on differential takeover premia of dual class ohares. Section 3 desc.ribes t.Ile It.alian
data sample and presents empirical behavior of shareholders facing an exchange offer.
Conclusions follow.
4 .. 1 Ruback's Argument
In a DCEO shareholders are offered the opportunity to exchange shares of C,Ollllllon
stock with superior voting rights for shares with inferior vot.ing rights but lligher
dividends. Ruback (1988) considers the optilllal strategy for outside sharehol(lers. lIe
analyzes two cases. In the first one, he assumes that both classes of shares ,viII receive
the same price in case of a takeover. In this case exchanging is a dominant strat.egy
for an outside shareholder, unless he is pivotal (i.e. his decision det.erlllineR \vhet.her
the incumbent management obtains the Illajority of votes). Following t.he literat.u re,2
I will luaintain the nonpivotal assulnption. Outside sllarellolders are geIlerally Slllall
and dispersed, therefore it is very unlikely they perceive theIl1selves as pivotal. In tllis
case, if an outside shareholder exchanges, he will get the additional dividend without
lor course, such elements should be taken into account to dra\v any public policy conclusion.
2 An ex~eptiQn j$ Holmst~i)m !!nd Nalebuf! l1988).
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losing the premium in case of a takeover. By contrast, if he does not excllange he will
give up the dividend privilege in exchange for the superior voting power. Ilowever,
Ruback argues that the superior voting power is vailleless. Eit.her insiders ol)t.fl.in
a majority of votes after the DCEO and the superior voting power is of no use for
the outside shareholder, or the insiders do not get the majority and the out.side
shareholder may hope in a takeover premium. However, by aSSUlllption both classes
will receive the same price in case of a takeover, therefore the superior voting power
has no value. Therefore, the additional dividend is lost without any cOlllpensation.
This makes excha.. 1ging a strictly dominant strategy.
If takeover premia are allowed to differ across different classes of sllares, t.hen
exchanging is not a dominant strategy any more. As Ruback correctly point.s out" in
this case there is another equilibrium in which outside shareholders are not. llurt. hut.
benefit froln a DeEO. Ruback is aware of this possibility, but. he considers it "less
likely to occur in practice" (p. 168). The reasoning is tile following: IJy exchanging,
an outside shareholder gets the adclitional dividend but loses the potential (lifferent.ial
premium in case of a takeover. His optilnal strategy will depend on his expectation
of other outside shareholders' behavior.3 If he expects that tIle nUIIlher of Qutsi<le
shareholders who exchange is large enough to give the lllajority to the inculllbents,
tlleIl his best response is to exchange. This produces the coercive equilibriulll, in
which outside shareholders are coerced to exchange by the fear of losing the <livi(lencl
privilege. However, if he does not expect that enougll sllarellolders will excllallge,
then he will exchange only if the value of the additional dividend is bigger than
the expected takeover extra premium of superior voting shares. In tllis f.ase out.side
shareholders are not trapped, but they are free t.o choose. In the goo(l eqllilibriulll not.
all outside shareholders exchange. Given that outside shareholders llave an ident.ical
payoff function, this can be an equilibrium only if either nobody wants t.o exchange
or everybody is indifferent between. exchanging and not exchanging (i.e. the two
strategies produce the same payoff). This itnplies that the value of the st11>erlor
voting power should be greater than or equal to the vallie of the dividend privilege.
aIn all thc~ discussion it is assumed that insiders will never exchange their sha.res.
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From the point of view of outside shareholders, this equilibrium is Pareto superior
not only to the coercive equilibrium, but also to the pre-DCEO situation. In fact,
insiders are not entrenched, but they end up paying a larger dividends to the out.side
shareholders who have chosen the inferior voting sliares.
rfhere are two aspects of Ruback's work that should be test.e(l. 'l'he first. one is
whether dual class stocks will ever receive two different prices in Cft-se of a t.akeover.
If I can elnpirically reject that, then the coercive equilibriulll is unique, and tllere is
no scope for further testing. However, if differential paYlllellts in case of t.akeovers a.re
possible, then I can test empirically which equilibriulll is selected alid wllet.her t.he
equilibriuln conditions asserted by Ruback are satisfied.
4.2 Empirical Evidence on Differential Takeover
Premia
This section seeks to establish whether there is any evidence suggesting tllat <lif-
ferential voting shares are sometimes paid a different price ill case of an acquisitioll. If
this possibility is rejected, then the emergence of the coercive equilibriunl ill D(~EOs
W0111d follow on an "a priori" ground, and no further testing would be required.
If a law or a specific corporate by-law ilnposes an equal treatIllent of botll st.ocks
in case of an acquisition, this is certainly th.e case. However, this is not t.he usual ca.se
in the U.S., so one should look at the empirical evidence on this issue.4
Ruback himself looks at the evidence on tlLis issue, by nlent.ioning the reSl11ts
of De Angelo and De Angelo's (1985) paper. De Angelo and De Angelo analyze
acquisitions of companies with dual class stock between 1960 and 1980. In 20 Ollt
of 30 cases analyzed the price paid is equal for both classes. In 6 ot.her cases sonle
shareholders receive additional noncash. compensation (option to blly a division of the
4Note that here I bias my reasoning in favor of the coercive outcolne, by Inaintn.ining the as-
sumption that a voting right is valueless if the takeover prenliunl for the two classes is required t.o
be the saIne. On the contrary, in a study on the value of votes in Canada., Robinson and Whit,e
(1990) find that superior voting shares trade at a premium over inferior voting shares, even in those
companies with a by-law that requires equal price in case of a takeover. The size of thi5' pretnitlln
varies between 2% and 16% in different years.
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company, etc.). In the remaining 4 cases the prellliulll paid for the superior voting
shares varies between 83% and 200% above the price of t.he inferior votillg shares.
However, the authors find no case of differential payillent aillong COlllpa.nies wit.h
both classes publicly traded. Therefore, according to De Allgelo aIld De Allgelo's
evidence it seems that outside shareholders should never expect to receive a la,rger
payment for their s11perior voting stock.
However, this conclusioIl is reversed if you look at a broader set of evidence. In t.he
U.K. Megginson (1990) finds that 43 dual class stock cOInpanies have been acquired
be~ween 1955 and 1982. In 37 of the 43 cases the superior voting shares received 3,
higher price. On average the price received by superior voting sllares is 28% a.bove
the price paid for inferior voting shares. Rydqvist (1987) present.s t.he case of four
control contests in Sweden. The premia for superior voting shares vary lJet.ween 2.5%
and 190%. Similarly, Zingales (1992a) reports the events of a control COllt.est ill It.a.ly,
where differential voting stocks were paid two very different prices.
Evidence in this direction is not linlited to foreign countries. Despite the sIllall
number of dual class companies with both classes publicly traded in the U.8., t.here
have been recently two cases of acquisitions paying a larger price to the superior
voting shares. In these two cases (Dickenson Mines and Resort International) the
additional premium offered to superior voting shares is equal to 26% and 306%. It.
is worth mentioning that the initial offer of Donald Trulnp for Resort International
was at a 800% premium, $13.5 per share for the superior voting sllares versus $15 per
share for the inferior voting shares. It was only after many shareholders suits and
the intervention of another bidder (Merv Griffin) that tile differential prellliulll was
sensibly reduced.6 Therefore, even if a differential takeover prenliulll is not, always
present, it cannot be ruled out ex-ante.
This conclusion is also supported by the international evidence on the price dif-
ferential between shares that differ only in their voting rights. All the studies find
that superior voting shares are traded at a premium.6 These findings imply that tile
51f you Vl8nt to know more on this issue see Zingales (1992b).
8Levy (1982) studies the Israeli Dlsrket; Lease, McConnel a.nd Mikkelson (1983 ~nd 1984) and
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marginal investor, most likely an outside rather than an inside shareholder, values
the superior voting rights. Outside investors do not obtain any private benefits frolll
superior voting rights, therefore they should expect to be paid a larger price for t.lleir
superior voting right in case of a takeover.
4.3 Empirical Evidence on Conversions
In Italy DCEOs are legal and they have been quite frequent in recent years. Aft.er a.
brief description of the Italian financial market and of the saillple 1.1sed, I will present.
the results of the shareholders' response to DCEOs.
4.3.1 The Italian Salllple
In Italy, besides common shares (called ordinary), there exist nonvoting shares, called
savings shares. Nonvoting shares are guaranteed some privileges: the right to a
minimum dividend of about 6% of the par value whenever earnings are posit.ive, and
the right to excess dividends above those distributed to ordinary shareholders, of
between 2% and 20% of the par value, if cash dividends are distributed. 7
Since the par value is generally well below the Inarket price, these privileges are
much smaller in terms of Inarket prices. Table 4.1 presents the size of the Ilrivileges
of nonvoting shares for each company in the salnple, as a percentage of the average
monthly price of the nonvoting shares in the year before the exchange offer eXl)ired.
On average, the nonvoting shares have the right to a nlinitnUlll dividend equal 2.3%
and the right to an additional dividend equal to 1% of the market price. These
privileges are very sinlilar to those granted to inferior voting shares in tile U.S ..8
Despite the size of the privileges is quite limited, their amount is far froIl1 trivial. A
nonvoting shareholders would receive, on average, 36% more cash dividen{ls than a
voting shareholder.
Zingales (1992b) the u.s. nlsrketj Rydqvist (1987) the Swedishj Megginson (1990) the Brit,ish;
Robinson and Wbite (1990) the Canadian; and Zingales (1992a) the Italian luarket.
7To learn more on tbe characteristics of these securities and of the Italian 1l1srket in general you
C81l see Zingales (19928).
8See Zingales (1992b).
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My analysis considers all the transactions concluded between January 1985 and
July 1990 involving an exchange offer or a right to convert. one-t.o-one nonvot.ing and
voting shares. The sample consists of 12 conlpanies that issued nonvot.ing shares
convertible into voting ones at certain prespecified dates; 1 COlllpany t.hat. allowed
nonvoting shareholders to convert their shares into voting ones, and 3 cOlllpallies t.hat
offered to voting shareholders the possibility of converting their shares iIlt.O Ilonvoting
shares by a certain date.9
Only the last three cases are identical to the situation discussed by Ruback. Tile
remaining 13 cases are different from the classical DeEO discussed by Ruback in two
respects. First, in all but one the right to exchange shares was granted at t.he til11e t.Ile
security was issued, and not later on. Second, the exchange offer is frolll nOllvoting to
voting, and not vice versa. However, I will argue in tile following that none of t.llese
two differences can affect the results.
First of all, the decision of issuing nonvoting shares convert.ible illt.o voting shares
is already sunk at the time of the exchange decision. Tile price of sec.urities will reflec.t.
the expectation of the outcome of the exchange offer, but so will the pric.e of vot.ing
shares after the annOtlnCement of a classical DeED. One could argue tllat at t.lle t.itlle
of the issue of the convertible nonvoting shares insiders could have bought enougll of
them to guarantee them majority even in case of Inassive exchanging. However, t.he
same type of argument could apply to the traditional DCEOs. F1.1rthernlore, if t.his
argument were true, it would have biased the result in favor of tIle coercive equilil>riulll
(if insiders retain majority no matter what, then an Olltside shareholder is bett.er off
with a non7oting share, which pays him an additional dividend). 'I'herefore, tile final
trade-off between vote and dividend privilege is not affecte(l in anyway bJT tile Ilast
history.
The second point is a little bit more subtle: excharlge offers to nonvot.ing share-
91 exclude from my sample the few cases in whi~h there was also a. nonconvertible nonvoting
type of share, at the time the right to exchange the convertible nonvoting shares expired. The pre-
existence of nonvoting shiires modifies the terros of the problem. The results would be unchanged
including those cases, because all shareholders preferred to canvert their savings shares into ordinary
ones.
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holders are exactly the mirror ilnage of traditional DCEOs, and the fUIldall1entai
problem faced by outside shareholders is unchanged. Figure 4-1 SUIIIIllarizes the cor-
respondences between the two types of exchange offers.
Traditional DCEO Mirror Illlage DCEO
Initial security Voting
Security obtained Nonvoting
by exchanging
Payoff from exchanging -Vote + Privilege
Effect of excllange on ID.crease control
insiders' voting power
Nonvoting
Vot.ing
Vote - Privilege
Decrease (1o,atrol
Figure 4-1: Traditional vs. Mirror lInage DCEOs
In traditional DOEOs the starting point is a voting share. By exc.llanging it for
a nonvoting share an outside shareholder will gain the dividend privilege, but will
lose the value of the voting right. In addition, the exchanging decision will affect t.lle
insiders' voting power (any exchange will increase insiders' voting power). Vice versa
in the mirror image DCEOs an outside shareholder will gain tile dividend privilege
and lose the voting right by not exchanging. Similarly, by not exchanging }le will
increase (or fail to decrease) the insiders' voting power. It is clear that a lllirror
image DCEO is equal to a traditional DCEO in which tile choice to keep the original
security is called "exchanging" and the choice of converting the non voting share int.o
the voting share is called "not exchanging". Therefore, by looking at the class of st.ock
eventually chosen, and not at the action, the two types of DCEO can be sUllllnarize(1
fnto one. In this context choosin~ the voting share is equivalent to "exchanging",
and choosing the nonvoting share is equivalent to "not exchanging". R,ulJack's Ino<lel
applies to this extended framework as well. One possible concern, in testing R,ul)ack's
predictions with experiments that are framed differently, is t.he possibility of a stat.us
quo bias. This bias will increase the shareholders preference for nonvoting shares. As
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I will show later this possibility is clearly reject.ed by t.he data.
After this relabeling the only difference between these two types of DCEOs con-
cerns the interpretation of the initial insiders' holdings. In a traditional D(~EO out.si(le
shareholders' choices determine whether insiders will obtain lllajority cont.rol. By con-
trast, in a mirror iInage DCEO outside shareholders' clloices will deterllline whet.her
insiders will lose absolute control. The Italian DeEOs would be the perfect lllirror
image of traditional DCEOs only if the insiders' oVlnership is above 50% before the
DeED, and it may go below 50% as a result of a Inassive excllange of voting shares.
This is indeed the case in my sanlple. Table 4.1 reports also the size of the largest.
shareholder before the DeED in each cOlupany.10 The average stake aillong COlllPa.-
nies that underwent the mirror iInage DtJEO is 55%. An average stake slight.ly above
50% corresponds to a stake slightly below 50% in traditional DeEOs. In Part.cll '8
(1987) sample the average insiders' ownership of all t.he COlllllanies t.llat. int.ro(luced
dual class stocks in the U.8. is 48.6%. The same average, for cOlllpanies that did t.hat
through an exchange offer, is 42.7%. Therefore, Italian DC1EOs are the IJerfect Illirror
image of the typical U.8. DeED studied by Ruback. Furt.herlllore, in all lJut. one case
the conversion of all nonvoting shares into voting would leave the largest sllarellolder
without a majority control.11
By contrast the three traditional DeEDs taking place in Italy· show a lligller level
of insiders' ownership (67%). The fact that in these three cases insiders alrea(ly
owned the majority of stock before the DeEO should bias tIle result in favor of the
coercive equilibrium. If the value of the voting power beCOllles zero wIlen the insiders
own more than 50%, then exchanging the voting right for the dividend pri''',rilege is a
dominant strategy for outside shareholders.
lOIn Italy it makes more sense to measure the insiders' ownership in ternlS of the ownership of
the largest shareholder. This is generally a family group that controls the Board of Direct,ors and
appoints the head of the family to the position of CEO. The Italian corporate sector is characterized
by a very concentrated ownership structure. Even among listed corporations, the average nUluber
of votes held by the largest shareholder is above 60%.
I1This result can be derived from the last column of Table 4.1 and the first coltllnn of 'fable 4.2,
under the assumption that the largest shareholder does not own any convertible nonvQting share
and does not buy additional voting shares. Nonvoting shares are issued to the bearer, therefore it
is impossible to know \vho owns them.
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4.3.2 Results
The prediction of Ruback's coercive equilibriuln is that all outside sharellolders will
prefer nonvoting shares because of the privileges. Therefore, whenever a DCEO offers
the chance of exchanging nonvoting shares for voting ones, outside shareholders slloul(l
not want to do 50. Table 4.2 presents evidence on the actual Italian experience. Part A
containR the conversion of nonvoting shares into voting. In the coercive equilibriulll
ever:y-one chooses the nonvoting because of the privilege. Therefore, the expected
result is that nobody converts, i.e. the third Coluilln of 'I'able 4.2.A should have only
zeros. But the data show that only 2 out of 13 cases are close to that situat.ion. One
of tllese two companies (Sip) is majority-owned by the Italian C4overnlllent. III tllis
case it is reasonable to assume that shareholders would not. value the voting rigllt
very much. By contrast, in 10 of the remaining 11 cases more that 90% of nonvot.ing
shareholders exchanged their shares, in the eleventh 80% did so.
In the three cases of classic DCEOs, the evidence is less clear-cut. The law re-
quires that the number of nonvotiIlg shares not exceed the nUluber of COIIIIIIOll sllares.
Therefore, the percentage conversion should always be less than or equal to 50%. Fur-
thermore, in the Alleanza case, the right to exchange was lilnited to 30% of t.he sha.res.
Therefore, if the coercive equilibrium is selected the last colulnn of t.able 2.B should
be equal to 50% in the first and last row, and 30% in the 111iddle one. In the AI-
leanza case, just 17% of the common shares was converted (and nlore than Ilalf 9£
that was converted by insiders). Italcable, another COlllpany controlled by tIle Italiall
Government, shows a higher pe.!centage of conversions (24%), but still short of tIle
50% threshold. In the last case (Boero Bartolomeo) the number of conversions was
insignificant (O.35~~). Therefore, in at least 16 out of 18 cases the results reject the
implications of the coercive equilibriuln.
A possible objection might focus on the limited size of the additional divi(lelld
right offered to shareholders in my sample (about 1% of the market price, but on
average 36% more than the dividend received by voting shares). A higher privilege
may have induced shareholders to convert. This is the exact point: sharello1ders
are not coerced into tendering their votes at any positive price, but tlley require an
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"appropriate" conlpensatioll.
So far the e,,~idence on tIle percentage of sharehol(lers choosing voting over non-
voting securjty suggests that outside sharehol(lers are 110t generally trapIJed in t.he
coercive equilibrium. Howe'ver, it is pOC5sible to actllally test. whether it is t.he at,her
equilibrium that is generally selected. A test on t.he returns of the t.wo exchanging
strategies will achieve this goal. Ruback's ~ood equilibriuIll does not. restrict. t.he rel-
ative percentage of voting versus nOllvoting shares, IJut, it does est.al)lish a t.est.able
restriction on the behavior of the prices of the two sllares after tIle excllange ofrer
expires. If only a fraction of outside shareholdera exchange, then the eXllect.ed prices
of tl1e two stocks should be equal. This nlakes outside shareholders indifferent. be-
tween exchanging or not.12 To treat in a unified framework t.he t.wo cases (classica.l
DCEO and mirror image DCEO) I will define the strategies referring to the securit.y
eventually chosen, independent of the starting point. The pre(lict.ion of t.he coerc.ive
equilibrium is that the choice of the nonvoting shares shoul(l pro(luce a. larger ret.urn.
In fact, if an outside shareholder chooses a voting share, wllile nlOSt. of the ot.hers
choose the nonvoting one, he will have neither a (lividend privilege nor a pot.ent.ial
takeover premium. On the contrary, in a good equilibriull1 eit.ller only a fraction
of outside shareholders choose the nonvoting share, becatlSe t.hey are indifferellt, be-
tween the two strategies (i.e. they yield equal expected retarns), or nobody cllooses
the nonvoting share, because choosing the voting one gives a higher expect.ed ret.ltrn.
Therefore, in a good equilibriuln the expected difference IJetween tIle ret.ufll of choos-
ing a voting share and that of choosing a nonvoting share should be nonnegative.
Table 4.3 presents the returns of the two strategies for the 14 out of 16 cases in
which it was possible to conlpute t.heln.13 ASsull1ing norlnality of tIle difference in
the return and independence across cOlllpanies, it is easy t.o t.est. t.he hypothesis of
a coercive equilibrium (,t < 0) versus the alternative of a good one (It ~ 0). Tile
average difference of returns is 2.74%, with a standard deviation of 5.61. A test of
12In order to make data comparable across companies I compute the returns to the two possible
strategies: exchanging and not exchanging.
laThe two cases excluded are Alleanza (the nonvoting share was listed only several months later)
and Boero Bartolomeo ( the nonvoting share is not yet listed).
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size 0.90 rejects the null hypothesis.!4
An additional argument in favor of this equilibriuln is that it does not adlllit an
arbitrage opportunity. In fact, in the coercive equilibriulll share1101ders lose l)ecallse
they fail to recognize the impact of their choice on the probability of a takeover. An
arbitrageur can bu.y all outside shareholders' shares and internalize this effect.. After
the conversion he can immediately resell the shares at a prellliul11, bec.ause tllen the
share price vlill incorporate the takeover premiul11. However, lJeCallSe tllis arlJit.rage
is not risk free, it does not completely rule out the coerc.ive eqllililJriul11.
4.4 Conclusions
Ruback's theoretical work (1988) points to two possible equilibria. ill DOBOs: one
coercive and one not. He conjectures that the coercive one is Inost likely to occur,
but leaves open the question of ,vhich equilibriuln is realized in prfr.ctice. {Ising data
on DeEDs in Italy, this paper suggests that outside shareholders are 110t tra!>pe(l
in a coercive equilibrium, but rather that they require substantial cOlllpensation for
giving up their votes. Both the conversion percentage and the ex-post beha.vior of
prices suggest that the noncoercive equilibriulll is tIle 1110st likely to occur.
The ability of dispersed shareholders to coordinat.e on t.lle superior e(luilibriulll
raises the question of how this actually happens. Do shareholders play different
strategies with their shares (e.g. each one exchanges just 20% of his holdings) or does
each shareholder play the same strategy with all of his shares, randolnly pic.killg llis
own strategy? This is a potentially fruitful area for future research. Unfortunatel}' it
requires data on individual behavior, not easily available.
The other question that this paper raises is what induces corporate insiflers to use
the exchange offer mechanism. If outside shareholders are not trapped in a coercive
equilibrium, then insiders do not buy control cheaply. A noncoercive tlleory of DCEOs
14It is worth mentioning that the averuge premium of the voting shares over the nonvot.ing shares
in the month aft'er the conversion right expired was just 3%. not significantly different froln zero.
This is in sharp contrast with the 80% average prelnium across the whole population of Italian dual
class stock companies (Zingales 1992a). This fact supports the conclusion that shareholders choose
between the two types of stocks so to equalize the expected prices.
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requires a consistent explanation of why DCEOs are used. This is a topic tllat sllould
be addressed in a future work.
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Table 4.1:
Preferences of Nonvoting Shares and Stock O-wnership in
Italy: 1985-1990.
The minimum dividend yield is computed as a percentage of the average Illonthly price
of the non voting share in the year before the right to covert expired. For Alleanza and
Baero, where the non voting shares were not listed, the price of the corresponding voting
share is used. The dividend yield in excess is the additional dividend gtlranteed only to
nonvoting shareholders as a percentage of the average Inonthly price of t.he non voting
share in the year before the right to covert expired. The dividend yield of the voting shares
over the dividend yield of the nonvoting shares is just the ratio between the dividend yield
of the two stocks computed for the year before the conversion is considered. If voting shares
did not pay dividend that year, the nearest dividend paid is considered. The percentage
stake of the largest shareholder is computed as the percentage ownership of voting shares
before the exchange offer. Ownership data are obtained from "11 1'accuil10 dell'AzioIlista"
of the corresponding year. Ownership before conversion is the one reported in tile January
edition just before the conversion right started.
---.
Minimum Dividend Div. yield vot. Percentage stake
Company dividend yield over div. yield largest sllarehold.
name yield in excess non voting before D(~EO
Italcable 0.88 0.35 1.13 60.i
Sip 4.14 1.66 1.26 63.4
Premuda 5.83 2.33 1.74 51.9
Standa 0.52 0.21 1.08 69.4
Rejna 1.74 0.58 1.57 67.0
III 2.85 1.71 1.59 89.3
Necchi 2.38 1.19 1.18 52.0
Cantoni 1.90 0.76 1.28 21.1
Safilo 0.97 0.58 1.16 72.2
Selm 3.60 1.44 1.25 63.6
Gemina 1.42 0.57 1.23 34.0
Jolly Hotel 1.16 1.16 1.47 60.0
Saipem 1.78 1.07 1.65 51.0
Burgo 2.90 0.72 1.22 19.3
Alleanz8 0.22 0.22 1.25 64.6
Boero Bart. 4.01 1.60 1.67 76.6
Average 2.27 1.01 1.36 57.3
St. Dev. 1.48 0.59 0.21 18.4
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Table 4.2:
Conversion Patterns
The percentage of non voting shares before the beginning (after the end) of the COI1-
version period is taken from Ii Taccuino dell 'Azionista. of tIle corresponding year. C~OhlJl111
3 cannot be obtained from ColUlnn 1 and 2 because in tnany cases new offerings during
the conversion period have altered. the proportion of voting and non voting shares in the
conlpany. Companies are listed according to the date of e,xpiration of the conversion rigllt.
starting from June 1985 to July 1990.
A: Nonvoting Shares Convertible into Conunon
Percentage Percentage Percent.age
non-voting shares non-voting shares non-voting shares
Company name before cony. started after cony. finished converted
SIP 47.71 37.67 1.31
PREMUDA 33.33 33.24 0.30
STANDA 50.00 3.47 93.0i
REJNA 50.00 0.70 98.60
III 49.78 2.02 93.29
NECCHI 38.50 1.44 79.40
CANTONI 33.33 2.60 92.17
SAFILO 11.71 0.85 92.71
SELM 23.69 5.56 93.91
GEMINA 26.02 0.64 96.53
JOLLY HOTEL 48.37 0.23 99.53
SAIPEM 22.22 0.60 96.40
BURGO 37.59 0.65 96.01
Mean 36.33 6.90 79.48
St.Dev. 12.17 12.29 33.87
B: Common Shares Convertible into NOllvoting
ITALCABLE 16.67 36.36 23.64
ALLEANZA 0.00 16.67 16.67
BOERO BARTOLOMEO 0.00 0.35 0.35
Mean 5.56 17.79
,
1.3.55
St.Dev. 7.86 14.73 9.76
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Table 4.3:
Returns to Choosing a VlJtiklg
Versus a Nonvoting Share
at the Ti.me of the Last Conversion
In the first case the voting shareholders could convert their shares into non-voting shares,
in the renlaining 12 cases non-voting shareholders could convert their shares into voting
shares. In order to make them homogeneous the two strategies considered are expressed as
a function of the type of share chosen and not of the decision of excllanging. Two cOlllpanies
are missing, because non-voting shares started to be listed severallll0nths later (Alleanza)
or they have never been listed (Baero Bartolomeo). The percentage returns COlllputed using
the average price of the chosen type of share in the Illonth after tIle conversioIl right expired,
divided by the price of the share with the conversion right at the beginning of the last lllonth
of conversion. Companies are listed according to the date of expiration of the conversiOIl
right starting from June 1985 to July 1990.
Company name Choice voting Choice Nonvoting Difference
Italcable 12.54 24.11 .. 11.57
Sip -0.79 -1.13 0.34
Premuda4 3.56 -0.80 4.36
Standa 3.61 -0.26 3.87
Rejna 2.16 1.70 0.46
III -10.74 -13.82 3.08
Necchi -9.34 -10.54 1.20
Cantoni -6.40 -10.04 3.64
Safilo 4.63 -4.65 9.27
Sehn 30.97 19.29 11.68
Gemina 10.71 7.97 2.74
Jolly 1.12 -2.64 3.76
Saipem 18.40 8.79 9.62
Burgo -32.31 -28.20 -4.11
Mean 2.01 -0.73 2.74
St. dey. 14.28 12.87 5.61
T. stat. 1.69
a In the case of Prem.uda (listed on ,~ lninor stock exchange) the return is COJllputed
using an average of the monthly prices of the first quarter after the conversion Rlld of the
six month before.
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